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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on how information asymmetry
affects agents’ behavior across different environments. The first essay characterizes
the optimal contract when a firm can employ two incentive schemes, promotion and
pay for performance, simultaneously (Chapter 2). In the second essay, I study how
information asymmetry can lead a firm to choose a less profitable short-term over
a more profitable long-term project (Chapter 3). The other essay analyzes a career
choice problem when agents have private information about their ability (Chapter
4).
Chapter 2 presents the effect of information asymmetry on executive pay structure
to examine the cause of the rise in CEO compensation and wage inequality between
CEO and other executives. To analyze the effect of the interaction of two incentive
schemes, promotion and pay for performance, on CEO compensation and within-
firm wage inequality, I embed a pay for performance framework into a tournament
structure. The model shows that when CEO and managers contribute to a firm’s
output independently, it is optimal for the firm to provide the CEO a compensation
far beyond her reservation value in order to provide promotion incentives for man-
agers. However, I find that the promotion incentive motive can disappear if there is
interdependency between the CEO’s and managers’ outputs. In this case, the main
purpose of a high CEO compensation is to induce the CEO to exert effort. The
tension between incentives for CEO and managers makes it difficult to interpret the
meaning of within-firm wage gap. As a possible solution, this paper suggests the
use of CEO’s base salary to identify which incentive factor is driving the pay gap.
In Chapter 3, I study the optimal contract problem when a firm faces a long-term
project. I consider a long-term project as one that requires an indefinite amount
of time to complete its objective. I assume that the long-term project generates
profits once it is accomplished. Using a continuous-time moral hazard model, I
characterize the incentive compatibility condition in a relatively general contract-
ing space. Moreover, I find a unique optimal contract under a restricted contracting
space which consists of the two components: the termination level and the com-
pletion payment. The firm might invest in a short-term project: one that generates
an instantaneous profit to the firm without any effect on the future, as analyzed
by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Comparison of optimal contracts for long and
short-term projects provides an interesting insight to managerial short-termism: the
vfirm, not the agent, could prefer a short-term project to a long-term project if there
is a moral hazard problem.
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of asymmetry information on one’s career choice. I
examine how people choose their career when they do not know ability of the rest
of the applicant pool. The goal is to understand labor supply in the markets where
ability is widely distributed. In particular, I consider a situation where there are two
exclusive labor markets and the upper and lower bounds of one market’s payoffs are
both higher than those of the other market. Under the market setting, agents decide
which market to participate in. I find that the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of this problem is unique. In the equilibrium, agents are divided into two groups
according to their ability. Members of the high ability group use a pure strategy and
only apply to the more desirable market. Members of the low ability group apply
to both markets with positive probability.
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on how information asymmetry
affects agents’ behavior across different environments. Asymmetric information is
an important source of friction in many markets and it can also lead a firm to raise
its executive compensation and engage in short-termism. The first essay character-
izes the optimal contract when a firm can employ two incentive schemes, promotion
and pay for performance, simultaneously (Chapter 2). This analysis helps us un-
derstand which incentive schemes contributed to the rise in CEO compensation. In
the second essay, I study how information asymmetry can lead a firm to choose a
less profitable short-term over a more profitable long-term project (Chapter 3). The
other essay analyzes a career choice problem when agents have private informa-
tion about their ability (Chapter 4). This information asymmetry yields a tension
between pursuing a more desirable career and the probability of employment since
agents cannot identify her or his ranking which determines their career path.
Chapter 2 presents the effect of information asymmetry on executive pay structure
to examine the cause of the rise in CEO compensation and wage inequality between
CEO and other executives. To analyze the effect of the interaction of two incentive
schemes, promotion and pay for performance, on CEO compensation and within-
firm wage inequality, I embed a pay for performance framework into a tournament
structure. The model shows that when CEO and managers contribute to a firm’s
output independently, it is optimal for the firm to provide the CEO a compensation
far beyond her reservation value if there are many managers who compete for the
CEO position. In particular, promotion incentives for managers generate the high
CEO pay and the wage gap between CEO and managers. However, I find that the
promotion incentive motive can disappear if there is interdependency between the
CEO’s and managers’ outputs. In this case, the main purpose of a high CEO com-
pensation is to induce the CEO to exert effort, not to provide promotion incentives
for managers. The tension between incentives for CEO and managers makes it dif-
ficult to interpret the meaning of within-firm wage gap. As a possible solution, this
paper suggests the use of CEO’s base salary to identify which incentive factor is
driving the pay gap.
2In Chapter 3, I study the optimal contract problem when a firm faces a long-term
project. In many cases, a firm cannot pursue several projects simultaneously be-
cause of limited resources. Particularly, the firm might need to choose between
long and short-term projects. I consider a short-term project as one that generates
an instantaneous profit to the firm without any effect on the future, as analyzed by
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). The firm can also invest in a long-term project: one
that requires an indefinite amount of time to complete its objective. I assume that
the long-term project generates profits once it is accomplished. Using a continuous-
time moral hazard model, I characterize the incentive compatibility condition in a
relatively general contracting space. Moreover, I find a unique optimal contract
under a restricted contracting space which consists of the two components, the ter-
mination level and the completion payment. Comparison of optimal contracts for
long and short-term projects provides an interesting insight to managerial short-
termism: the firm, not the agent, could prefer a short-term project to a long-term
project if there is a moral hazard problem.
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of asymmetry information on one’s career choice. I
examine how people choose their career when they do not know ability of the rest
of the applicant pool. The goal is to understand labor supply in the markets where
ability is widely distributed. Specifically, I consider a situation where there are
two exclusive labor markets with different payoff distributions, but people share
common preferences over possible career paths. More precisely, the upper and
lower bounds of one labor market’s payoffs are both higher than those of the other
market. Under the market setting, agents decide which market to participate in.
The presence of private information produces a tension between the probability of
being employed and the expected payoff. I find that the symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this problem is unique. In the equilibrium, agents are divided into
two groups according to their ability. Members of the high ability group use a pure
strategy and only apply to the more desirable market. Members of the low ability
group apply to both markets with positive probability.
3C h a p t e r 2
HIGH CEO COMPENSATION: INCENTIVES FOR CEO OR
MANAGERS?
2.1 Introduction
The provision of incentives has been considered as an important factor that con-
tributed the rise in executive compensation since 1970s. In particular, researchers
have focused on two incentive schemes: promotion and pay for performance.1
However, each incentive scheme has a drawback in explaining the trend in execu-
tive compensation. First, pay for performance schemes have been criticized because
theoretical analysis predicts a reduction in base salary with the rise in incentive pay,
which contradicts the empirical evidence. On the other hand, promotion incentives
do not capture the weak correlation between executive compensation and firm size.
This paper studies whether a hybrid incentive scheme that includes both pay for
performance and promotion can account for these empirical findings.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on executive compensation based
on a principal-agent framework. The moral hazard literature attributes high CEO
compensation to the need to provide incentives. There are two incentive schemes
relevant to this problem. The first incentive scheme is pay for performance as stud-
ied by Grossman and Hart (1983) and Mirrlees (1999). These works suggest that
firms need to provide high compensation to a CEO in order to make him/her exert
more effort. The second incentive scheme is internal promotion associated with a
rank-order tournament model proposed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). They argue
that firms set up internal labor markets and promote workers who do well. In this
setting, high wages at the top of the firms can make lower level employees work
harder to increase their promotion probability. Following the analysis of Lazear
and Rosen (1981), the CEO may well have a wage that is much higher than his
or her contribution to the firm because it acts as the prize for lower level managers.
The main difference between these two incentive schemes is that the former is based
on absolute performance while the latter depends on relative performance. In this
paper, I analyze how the two incentive schemes interact within a firm to understand
1For example, Bognanno (2001) shows that CEO compensation increases with the number of
competitors for the position. Also, Frydman and Jenter (2010) illustrate that the increase in incentive
pay such as option compensation significantly contribute to the rise in CEO compensation.
4when a firm might want to combine the two in a hybrid incentive scheme: a contract
based on both absolute and relative performance.
To study how the hybrid incentive scheme works, it is important to understand
which incentive scheme is relevant to each agent in a firm. In terms of incentives,
the pay for performance scheme works for both the CEO and other top executives
(from now on, I call these executives “managers") in the same way. However, the
promotion based incentive scheme only matters for managers who have a possi-
bility of being promoted. On the other hand, with respect to compensation level,
promotion incentives affect two types of agents, CEO and managers, in opposite
ways. When other conditions are fixed, raising promotion incentives increases CEO
compensation, but decreases managers’ compensation. The pay for performance
scheme yields a higher compensation to both agents if a firm wants them to exert a
higher effort. Given that raising promotion incentives impacts managers and CEOs
in different directions, it is natural to ask how the two types of incentive payments
constitute the executives’ total compensation.
In order to answer this question, I consider a model with a hierarchical structure
in which an infinitely lived risk-neutral firm hires N + 1 agents (one CEO and N
managers) in each period. For tractability, I assume that the firm offers a contract
based on agents’ positions. That is, there are only two types of contracts which do
not depend on time: one for CEO and one for managers.2 Each agent conducts
her/his own tasks and produces an outcome that depends on her/his effort level.3 In
the benchmark model, I assume that each task affects the firm’s profit independently.
That is, there is no complementarity between agents. All outcomes are observable
and contractible. This structure closely follows Grossman and Hart (1983). In
addition, I introduce a tournament structure to add promotion based incentives. If
there are qualified managers for the CEO position according to a promotion rule,
the firm fills the position by internal promotion when the previous CEO leaves.
The most important contribution of this paper is that I analyze how the two incen-
tive schemes interact in a dynamic environment similar to Rogerson (1985a). In
particular, the reward for promotion is not an immediate monetary remuneration,
but a position that can provide high compensation in the future. Under this distinc-
tive structure, the analysis of the model shows that firms can rationally employ the
2This is a stronger assumption than the commitment assumption in Lazear and Rosen (1981)
However, this makes the firm’s problem simple when I consider a complex situation in Section 2.7
3Throughout the rest of this paper, I use she as a personal pronoun for a CEO and he for a
manager.
5two incentive schemes simultaneously. Therefore, it is important to understand the
interaction between the two incentive tools within a firm as well as the effect of
each scheme.
An extensive literature investigates the two incentive schemes separately.4 Since
the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), promotion incentives based on the
tournament theory have been extensively studied in various settings.5 Although the
tournament theory has broad applications6 , unlike athletic tournaments, it requires
caution to apply the theory to a firm’s internal organization problem. The distinc-
tion of the firm’s internal labor market is that the winner of the tournament stays
in the firm as a worker to whom the firm needs to provide incentives. Ke, Li, and
Powell (2014) and Goel and Thakor (2008) reflect this idea in their papers. How-
ever, Ke, Li, and Powell (2014) only consider a risk-neutral agent and one of two
incentive schemes, while Goel and Thakor (2008) do not explicitly analyze man-
agers’ compensation. Different from these works, I investigate the role of agents’
risk aversion and the relationship between managers’ and CEO’s compensations in
a hierarchical structure.
On the other hand, the pay for performance literature investigates how the optimal
level of incentives changes according to numerous factors affecting the contract.7
For example, Baker and Hall (2004) examine how the measure of CEO incentives
could change according to the effect of a CEO on the firm’s value, and Prendergast
(2002) studies the effect of uncertainty on incentives and shows that a positive rela-
tionship between uncertainty and incentives can arise. In this paper, I examine the
relationship between CEO incentives and the internal labor market.
A number of papers compare the two incentive schemes from a theoretical perspec-
tive. However, most papers do not consider a firm that uses both schemes together
though most of firms implement an incentive system based on both schemes in
practice. For example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Mookherjee (1984) inves-
tigate conditions under which one of the incentive schemes is optimal. That is,
these papers consider the two incentive schemes as substitutes. A notable excep-
tion is Ekinci and Waldman (2015), where they combine pay for performance and
promotion incentives. Different from my paper, Ekinci and Waldman (2015) use a
4See Prendergast (1999).
5See Lazear and Oyer (2012).
6Konrad (2009) and Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2015) review a broad literature on
contests.
7For a comprehensive review, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
6market-based tournament theory, where the reward of promotion is determined by
expected wage offers of competing firms.8 Therefore, their paper focuses on how
the market wage is determined, while I illustrate that a CEO can earn more than her
market wage because of the internal labor market.
The formal analysis yields the following results. First, the firm provides compensa-
tion beyond the CEO’s reservation value when there are enough candidates for the
promotion and if agents are risk-averse. That is, the CEO’s participation constraint
can optimally be slack to maximize the firm’s profit. I interpret the gap between
the CEO’s expected utility under the optimal contract and the CEO’s reservation
value as the promotion incentive because this utility gap, rather than the monetary
gap, is the reward from the agent’s point of view.9 The non-binding participation
constraint implies that a large wage gap between a CEO and managers could be
optimal for the firm in order to incentivize managers below the CEO even when the
firm employs an absolute performance based incentive scheme. Intuitively, when
there is a small number of managers, the profit generated by the CEO accounts for a
substantial part of the firm’s profit. Thus, the firm does not want to raise promotion
incentives beyond the CEO’s reservation value since this makes it more costly for
the firm to provide incentives to her (particularly when CEO is risk-averse). How-
ever, when the firm is large, the CEO’s contribution is marginal compared to the
profit created by managers. Thus, the firm uses its CEO position as the prize to the
winner of internal competition rather than an output producer, which leads to the
rise in CEO compensation and larger wage gap.
Second, for a fixed number of managers, analyzing the comparative statics gives
interesting results for a CEO’s utility and managers’ wages. I show that there is a
negative relationship between the promotion incentive and the CEO’s effort level.
In other words, the optimal contract provides a higher expected utility to the CEO
when the firm requires less effort from her. The contract could even offer her a
higher expected compensation. This result captures how promotion incentives in-
teract with CEO incentives. I will discuss this issue in more detail later. The other
important comparative static is the relationship between promotion incentives and
managers’ reservation value. The positive correlation between them illustrates that
the two extreme allocations between the two incentive schemes for managers can
happen. That is, the firm can only adopt the promotion incentive without pay for
8See Waldman (2013) for a survey of the literature on the two tournament theories.
9Note that the monetary gap can widen if the firm requires a higher effort from the CEO since
agents are risk-averse.
7performance scheme if managers’ reservation value is high enough. The opposite
situation (no promotion incentives) can occur when the reservation value is very
low. In particular, I expect that the former case can provide an explanation of why
performance-tied compensation is not prevalent in the workplace as illustrated in
Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009).10 Firms may optimally mute the absolute
performance channel even though they consider this incentive scheme. Namely, in-
troducing relative performance-based incentives can make managers’ compensation
less dependent (even independent) on their performance.
As an extension of the benchmark model, I analyze a situation where there is com-
plementarity between the CEO’s task and managers’ outputs. Specifically, I con-
sider the CEO’s task with a multiplication effect on the sum of other managers’
outputs. This specification is closely related to Baker and Hall (2004), where the
marginal product of the CEO’s marginal effort is increasing in the size of the firm.11
This extension indicates that the level of promotion incentive depends on the role
of a CEO. Under the multiplication specification, the promotion incentive can dis-
appear. That is, if the firm hires enough managers, the slackness of the CEO’s
individual rationality constraint can alter to the binding constraint. Because the
CEO’s marginal effort is much more valuable for the firm as the number of man-
agers increases, the firm prefers to focus on the CEO’s absolute performance based
incentive rather than the managers’ relative performance based incentive.
The extension provides a unique implication regarding CEO compensation. Al-
though the benchmark model and the extension can produce a positive link be-
tween compensation and firm size, they make a different prediction about the op-
timal compensation structure. That is, the two specifications link the rise in CEO
compensation to different channels. When the CEO’s marginal productivity is in-
dependent of firm size, compensation grows with the size of the firm because of the
raised promotion incentive. Under the alternative specification, however, the higher
compensation stems from enhanced pay for performance incentives for the CEO
because her demanded effort grows with the size. I connect this implication with a
measure of promotion incentives in section 2.10.2.
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature on the trend in executive com-
pensation. The hybrid incentive scheme model predicts that CEO compensation
remains stable and the wage gap between lower-level executives and CEO does not
10Macera (2016) provides a behavioral explanation based on loss aversion on this problem.
11They use the market value of the company or firms’ sales as the measure of the size of the firm.
8expand until the size of the firm reaches the point that it begins to raise its CEO
compensation to induce managers’ effort. The main conditions for the result are ex-
ecutives’ risk aversion and the independence of agents’ outputs. Therefore, if these
conditions are satisfied, CEO compensation has a non-monotonic relationship with
firm size measured by the number of candidates for promotion. 12 In other words,
the compensation remains at the same level although the number of competitors
increases since CEO’s participation constraint binds. However, beyond a certain
point, the firm wants to raise its CEO compensation beyond her reservation value
in order to provide incentives to its managers. Also, the wage gap widens when
the firm starts providing compensation to the CEO beyond her reservation value but
not before that point. These results suggest a possible explanation for two empir-
ical facts shown in Frydman and Jenter (2010). First, they find a non-monotonic
increase of executive pay: the rapid growth in executive pay only started in the
mid-1970s. Also, their results show that the compensation gap between CEO and
other top executives rapidly grown during the past 30 years but not before 1980. I
discuss this issue in more detail in section 2.10.1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the basic model
and the promotion rule. Before I introduce the formal model, I present a preview of
the tension between promotion incentives and pay for performance in Section 2.3.
In Section 2.4, I simplify the firm’s problem and provide the primitive trade-off of
the problem. In Section 2.5, I consider the problem without any agency problem
to illustrate the effect of information asymmetry. In Section 2.6, I discuss the main
properties of the firm’s problem demonstrating the effect of promotion on CEO’s
compensation. In Section 2.7, I introduce several dynamics into the basic model
and analyze the effect of them on CEO compensation. Section 2.8 examines how
the role of a CEO impact on promotion incentives. I compare two promotion rules
in Section 2.9 to demonstrate the benefit of external CEO recruitment. I discuss
the important implications of this paper in Section 2.10. Section 2.11 contains
concluding remarks.
2.2 The Benchmark Model
2.2.1 Firm structure and executives
I start with a simple discrete time model, where an infinitely lived risk-neutral firm
with a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) maintains its employment structure. In particular,
12For instance, Acs and Audretsch (1987) use the number of employees as a measure of firm
size.
9the profit maximizing firm employs one CEO and N managers over time. The firm
hires the managers from a labor market every period, but it can promote one of the
previous managers to be the next CEO according to a promotion rule. If there is no
manager satisfying the promotion criteria, the firm hires a CEO from an external
labor market. Throughout most of the paper, I consider the case where the CEO
leaves the firm or retires after one period, and a manager remains in the firm if
he is promoted to CEO. Otherwise, managers leave the firm after one period. I
consider a moral hazard situation where agents’ efforts (e) are not observable to the
firm and incur a cost to agents, g(·). Agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse with an
additively separable (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function U (C,e), where C
is consumption13 , in each period satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Agents’ utility function is of the form
U (C,e) = u(C) − g(e),
where u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) ≤ 0, u(·) is defined over the real interval (C,∞), and g(0) =
0, g′(·) ≥ 0, g′′(·) > 0 over e ∈ [0,1]. Also, there exists Ĉ ∈ (C,∞) such that
u(Ĉ) > 0 and limC↓C u(C) = −∞.
This assumption comes from Grossman and Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985b),
which guarantees the existence of solution and validates the first-order approach.
Additionally, I assume that agents do not discount the future, and a CEO and man-
agers have an outside option UC ≥ 0, and U M , respectively, if they do not accept the
offer from the firm. Also, in their second period, managers are assumed to obtain a
reservation utility, normalized to zero, if they leave the firm. Hence, the positivity
assumption on UC assures that promotion is beneficial for managers. Agent i does
an independent task Xi, i = 0, . . . ,N, which can end in a good or bad outcome.14
The probability of good outcome depends on the agents’ choice of effort level ei by
the function s(ei) in the following way:
Xi (e) =

Gi with probability s(e)
Bi with probability 1 − s(e)
.
13I do not consider the possibility of private saving in this paper.
14Agent 0 represents CEO.
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I assume that s(e) is a linear function of the effort level e.15 That is, s(e) satisfies
s(e) = α + βe,
where e ∈ [0,1] is the agent’s effort level. For two parameters α and β, I assume
that α ≥ 0, β > 0, and α + β ≤ 1, which guarantees that s(e) ∈ [0,1].
I assume that each manager’s task has an identical effect on the firm’s output. That
is, Gi = Gj and Bi = B j for i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N }. After observing managers’ outputs,
the firm makes the promotion decision according to the following rule:
(Promotion Rule 1) Among managers whose outcome is good (G), the firm chooses
one manager randomly for promotion. If there are no such managers, the firm hires
a CEO from an external labor market.
This promotion rule can be understood as a situation where a firm sets up a certain
requirement such that it considers managers who satisfy the requirement as candi-
dates for internal promotion. Note that this promotion rule is different from the rule
considered in Lazear and Rosen (1981), where they use the following one:16
(Promotion Rule 2) The firm promotes the best manager, whose outcome could be
good (G) or bad (B). If more than one agent makes the best outcome, the firm
chooses one of them randomly.
The difference between two promotion rules is the possibility of external hiring.
When all managers’ outcomes are bad, the firm appoints its CEO from an external
labor market under promotion rule 1 while it still uses the internal labor market
under promotion rule 2.17 I show that promotion rule 1 could be preferred by firms
to promotion rule 2 if they do not know a managers’ ability and want to promote a
more talented candidate in section 2.9.
While the CEO’s job can also have a good or bad outcome, the effect on the output
can be different from that of managers. For brevity, I denote CEO’s good and bad
outcomes by GC and BC , respectively, with manager’s outcomes denoted by GM
and BM . Also, the marginal productivity of the CEO’s effort depends on the firm’s
operational structure. As the benchmark model, I study a firm where the CEO’s
15This is not so much restrictive. With Assumption 1, this condition embraces any concave
function s(e) with s′(e) > 0.
16Strictly speaking, there is a difference. Lazear and Rosen (1981) consider a continuous out-
come space. This yields no ties with probability 1.
17As Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) show, the firm recruits its CEO from outside as well
although internal promotion is more common.
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task and managers’ jobs are independent of each other. That is, CEO and managers
are substitutable in terms of the firm’s profit. I relax this assumption later on.
2.2.2 Contracts
In order to make the problem tractable, I assume that contracts only depend on
agent’s positions regardless of time as well as internal and external hiring.
Assumption 2 The firm offers contracts based on agents’ positions.
This assumption implies that a firm offers the same contract to a future CEO as the
current one. That is, in every period, the firm offers a contract (eC ,WGC ,W
B
C ) to the
CEO choosing each component in order to maximize its profit. In the contract, eC
represents the firm’s recommended effort level while WOC is the wage if the CEO’s
output turns out to be O ∈ {G, B}. On the other hand, the firm provides a contract
(eMi,WGMi,W
B
Mi) to manager i, where the role of each component is the same as
that of the CEO contract. Note that the firm does not need to specify the prize
for the winner of promotion since Assumption 2 allows current managers to know
what they will get if promoted to CEO in the next period. This is in line with the
tournament literature in the sense that firms can commit to the prize for the winner.
For simplicity, I focus on a symmetric equilibrium in this paper. That is, the firm
requires the same effort eM from every manager. Therefore, the firm offers the same
contract (eM ,WGM ,W
B
M ) to all managers. After I solve this simple benchmark model,
I extend the model by including job security issues, complex operational structure,
and heterogeneous managers.
2.3 The Effect of Promotion Incentive on Agents’ Wages
In this section, before I move to a general problem, I study how promotion incentive
affects agents’ compensation. Since each output is binary, the two types of agents’
ex-ante utility can be described by the following two terms for each agent:
Manager

u(WGM ) + P(e−M )V when X = GM
u(W BM ) when X = BM
and,
CEO

u(WGC ) when X = GC
u(W BC ) when X = BC
,
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where P(e−M ) represents the probability that a manager is promoted to CEO when
he gets a good outcome and other managers’ effort levels are e−M . V is the CEO’s
expected utility, which the manager will get if promoted in the next period. Note
that the value of V determines the power of promotion incentive since this is the
benefit the winner of the tournament enjoys.
How does this promotion incentive affect the incentive based on absolute perfor-
mance? Note that for agents’ incentives, the difference between two utility levels is
all that matters. Hence, when the firm requires a certain effort from its executives,
the firm chooses wages fixing the value of these two gaps at some positive values:
1)
[
u(WGM ) + P(e−M )V
]
− u(W BM ) and 2) u(WGC ) − u(W BC ).
From the manager’s perspective, raising the promotion incentives makes the firm
reduce incentives based on pay for performance, that is, the gap between WGM and
W BM . This leads to a decrease in managers’ compensation. However, for the CEO
incentives, higher promotion incentives yield a bigger gap between WGC and W
B
C if
the CEO is risk-averse. This makes the compensation for the CEO rise.
Therefore, there is a tension between incentives for managers and CEO as well as
a trade-off between the two types of agents’ wages: higher promotion incentives
make it more difficult for the firm to incentivize its CEO but easier for managers.
This feature is captured by the movement of the gap between wages associated with
a good and bad outcome. It is worth mentioning that this incentive trade-off rises
because the CEO is risk-averse. If the CEO is risk-neutral, the wage gap between
WGC and W
B
C is always a constant unless the firm requires a different effort level.
Hence, adjusting promotion incentives affects two types of agents’ absolute per-
formance based incentive schemes in different ways. In the following sections, I
analyze how the firm optimally sets up the level of promotion incentives and how
this decision changes when the firm’s contracting environment alters.
2.4 Formulation of the Firm’s Problem
In this section, I explicitly state the firm’s problem and simplify it. First, I consider
the agents’ problem. The CEO’s utility maximization problem is straightforward.
For a given compensation scheme (WGC ,W
B
C ), the CEO chooses an effort level eC
maximizing her expected utility
s(eC)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))u(W BC ) − g(eC).
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The strict convexity of g(·) guarantees a unique solution to the CEO’s problem.
Notice that this problem does not depend on other agents’ effort choices.
On the other hand, the managers’ problem depends on other managers’ effort choices
e−M in the same cohort. Since I consider a symmetric equilibrium, it is enough to
focus on e−M such that e−M = (e−M ,e−M , . . . ,e−M ) ∈ [0,1]N−1. Therefore, for a
compensation scheme (WGC ,W
B
C , W
G
M ,W
B
M ), and an effort level of e−M , the man-
agers’ problem can be rewritten as
max
eM
s(eM )u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(W BM ) − g(eM ) + s(eM )P(e−M )VC ,
where
P(e−M ) =
1 − (1 − s(e−M ))N
N s(e−M )
represents the conditional probability that a manager will be promoted to the next
period’s CEO when he achieves a good outcome and other managers’ effort level
e−M is given.18 Also,
VC = s(eC)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))u(W BC ) − g(eC)
is the expected utility a manager will get if he is promoted to CEO. Recall that
managers know the contract they will get if promoted under Assumption 2.
Under the fixed employment structure, Assumption 2, and the symmetric equilib-
rium condition, the firm’s objective is to offer contracts (eC ,WGC ,W
B
C ) and (eM ,W
G
M ,
W BM ) to CEO and managers that maximize its profit under the incentive compatibil-
ity and individual rationality constraints. Mathematically, the problem is:
max
{(eC ,WGC ,WBC ),(eM ,WGM ,WBM )}
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
 s(eC)(GC −W
G
C ) + (1 − s(eC))(BC −W BC )
+ N
[
s(eM )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM −W BM )
] }
subject to
18The derivation of this equation is found in the Appendix.
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s(eC)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))u(W BC ) − g(eC) ≥ UC (IRC)
(2.1)
s(eM )u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(W BM ) − g(eM ) + s(eM )P(e−M )VC ≥ U M (IRM )
(2.2)
eC ∈ arg max
eˆ
s(eˆ)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eˆ))u(W BC ) − g(eˆ) (ICC)
(2.3)
eM ∈ arg max
eˆ
s(eˆ)u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eˆ))u(W BM ) − g(eˆ) + s(eM )P(e−M )VC (ICM ).
(2.4)
Since contracts are not time-dependent, the above problem is equivalent to solve
the following problem:
max
{(eC ,WGC ,WBC ),(eM ,WGM ,WBM )}
s(eC)(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))(BC −W BC )
+ N
[
s(eM )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM −W BM )
]
subject to the four constraints, (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4).
From now on, I call this the firm’s problem. It is worth mentioning the role of
Assumption 2 in the simplification of the firm’s problem. This allows one to focus
on a repeating part by restricting the firm to offer the same contract to the CEO. In
section 2.7, I investigate a more complex model with dynamics in a simplified form
with the same argument.
2.4.1 The basic characterization of the firm’s problem
In this section, I analyze some preliminary features of the firm’s problem before
examining its main properties.
First of all, by a similar argument with Grossman and Hart (1983), I can show that
the firm’s problem has a solution.
Lemma 1 There exists a solution to the firm’s problem.
Proof 1 All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
In order to analyze agents’ incentive compatibility constraint, I can apply the first-
order approach from Rogerson (1985b). The two first-order conditions yield the
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following results:
u(WGC ) = u(W
B
C ) +
g′(eC)
h′(eC)
, and
u(WGM ) = u(W
B
M ) +
g′(eM )
h′(eM )
− P(e−M )VC .
Since the firm can control (WGM ,W
B
M ) without affecting the CEO’s problem, the
manager’s individual rationality constraint must bind to maximize its profit. In
particular, the firm can decrease W BM such that the managers’ incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied at the given effort level eM when WGM decreases for a given
fixed value VC . This means that the firm can increase its profit if the managers’
individual rationality constraint does not bind.
Lemma 2 Managers’ individual rationality constraint binds.
However, the same logic cannot be applied to the CEO’s individual rationality con-
straint since adjusting WGC and W
B
C inevitably affects VC , which directly enters into
the managers’ problem. Reducing a CEO’s expected utility yields a higher WGM for
given eM and W BM , which could decrease the firm’s profit. This observation makes
it difficult to analyze the properties of the firm’s problem. In the next section, I
consider a modified method circumventing this obstacle.
2.4.2 CEO’s individual rationality constraint
In this section, I examine a problem where the CEO’s individual rationality con-
straint binds at a certain value in order to indirectly solve the firm’s problem. In
particular, I consider the following problem:
F (V ) ≡ max
{(eC ,WGC ,WBC ),(eM ,WGM ,WBM )}
s(eC)(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))(BC −W BC )
+ N
[
s(eM )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM −W BM )
]
subject to
16
s(eC)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))u(W BC ) − g(eC) = V (IRC)
(2.5)
s(eM )u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(W BM ) − g(eM ) + s(eM )P(e−M )V = U M (IRM )
(2.6)
eC ∈ arg max
eˆ
s(eˆ)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eˆ))u(W BC ) − g(eˆ) (ICC)
(2.7)
eM ∈ arg max
eˆ
s(eˆ)u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eˆ))u(W BM ) − g(eˆ) + s(eM )P(e−M )V (ICM )
(2.8)
forV ∈ [0,∞). The difference from the original firm’s problem is that the CEO’s in-
dividual rationality constraint binds at a positive valueV . Since both individual ra-
tionality constraints are binding now, the compensation scheme (WGC ,W
B
C ,W
G
M ,W
B
M )
can be expressed by functions of (eC ,eM ):
u(WGC ) = V + g(eC) + (1 − s(eC))
g′(eC)
h′(eC)
u(W BC ) = V + g(eC) − s(eC)
g′(eC)
h′(eC)
u(WGM ) = U M + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
h′(eM )
− P(e−M )V
u(W BM ) = U M + g(eM ) − s(eM )
g′(eM )
h′(eM )
.
These equations characterize the compensation scheme for a given effort level (eC ,eM )
and a parameterV . However, the solution to this modified problem is not necessar-
ily the same as that of the firm’s original problem. One special case when the two
problems have the same solution is V = UC and the CEO’s individual rationality
constraint binds.
In order to find the optimal compensation schemes, I exploit the modified problem.
Suppose that F (·) is a strictly quasi-concave function. Then, I can solve the original
problem indirectly using F (·). In particular, consider a maximization problem:
max
V
F (V ).
Let V∗ denotes inf {arg maxV F (V )} .19 Then, the strict quasi-concavity ensures
that the CEO’s individual rationality constraint binds and the firm’s expected profit
19From now on, I use the superscript star to denote the optimal variable.
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is equal to F (UC) if V∗ ≤ UC . On the other hand, the CEO’s individual ratio-
nality constraint does not bind and the firm’s expected profit is equal to F (V∗)
if V∗ > UC . Before analyzing this modified problem, I impose some parametric
assumptions on U M .
Assumption 3 When N = 1 and agents are risk-averse, U M is such that
V∗ = inf
{
arg max
V
F (V )
}
> 0.20
Under this assumption, I can exclude a corner solution implying that promotion
is strictly beneficial for a manager if a firm hires only one manager. Note that
the manager who is promoted to CEO enjoys the expected utility V∗ during the
second period. Hence, I can interpret this value as the promotion incentive from the
manager’s point of view.21
2.5 The Effect of Promotion Incentive on Agents’ compensation when the
Effort is Observable
Before analyzing the firm’s problem with incomplete information, I first study the
solution without any agency problem. In this section, I focus on risk-averse agents
and use Promotion rule 2 not Promotion rule 1 for simplicity.22 Then, the firm’s
modified problem is reduced to:
max
eC ,eM ,WGC ,W
B
C
,WGM ,W
B
M
s(eC)(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))(BC −W BC )
+ N (s(eM )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM −W BM ))
subject to
s(eC)u(WGC ) + (1 − s(eC))u(W BC ) − g(eC) = V (IRC)
s(eM )u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(W BM ) − g(eM ) +
1
N
V = U M (IRM ).
20Since ∂V∗∂UM > 0 and there exists U
∗
M such that F
′(V|U∗M ) |V=0 > 0, there is UM satisfying
the condition.
21More formally, the promotion incentive is max{V∗ − UC ,0} since the firm has to offer UC
in order to hire a CEO. However, I simply consider V∗ as the promotion incentive since UC is a
constant.
22There are two reasons. First of all, Promotion rule 2 simplifies the analysis if there is no
agency problem. Also, if there is no agency problem, the argument in Section 2.9 does not work
since the adverse selection issue is also related to incomplete information.
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Since there is no agency problem, incentive compatibility constraints are dropped.
Moreover, because the agents are risk-averse while the firm is risk-neutral, the two
individual rationality constraints can be rewritten as:23
u(WC) − g(eC) = V (IRC)
u(WM ) − g(eM ) + 1NV = U M (IRM ),
where the fixed payments (WC ,WM ) are paid to the CEO and managers when they
exert the required effort levels (eC ,eM ), respectively.
Therefore, for given effort levels (eC ,eM ), the optimal wage levels are determined
by
u(WC) = V + g(eC), and
u(WM ) = U M + g(eM ) −
1
N
V .
Also, the following two first order conditions characterize the optimal effort choice
levels by the firm:24
β(GC − BC) = g
′(eC)
u′(WC)
, and
β(GM − BM ) = g
′(eM )
u′(WM )
.
Recall that a strict quasi-concavity of F (·) allows the use of the modified method in
order to solve the firm’s original problem. The following lemma confirms that this
is the case when there is no information friction between the firm and agents.
Lemma 3 F (V ) is strictly concave.
Now, I analyze the property of the firm’s problem using the modified one. The main
concern is the CEO’s expected utility levelV∗.
Proposition 1 If agents are risk-averse,V∗ strictly increases as N increases.
In other words, it is optimal for the firm to offer a contract providing a higher
expected utility to the CEO if the internal pool of candidates for promotion is getting
bigger. Combining this result with Lemma 3 yields the following result.
23This can be easily checked using Jensen’s inequality.
24The second order conditions can be checked easily.
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Corollary 1 CEO’s expected utility is an increasing function in N.
This implies that a CEO can obtain utility beyond her reservation value if a firm is
big enough.25 Although this does not mean that the firm provides a higher com-
pensation to the CEO, this is true when there is no agency problem.
Corollary 2 The optimal CEO compensation W ∗C is an increasing function in N.
However, the following proposition illustrates that there are two restrictions on the
CEO’s compensation level when agents’ effort levels are contractible.
Proposition 2 If every agent is risk-averse, W ∗C = W
∗
M . Moreover, if GC − BC =
GM − BM , thenV∗ is equal to NN+1U M .
The first restriction is that CEO and managers receive exactly the same level of
compensation when there is no information asymmetry. This is true since the firm
wants to reduce the total pay by equally distributing remuneration. According to
this result, if there is no informational friction, there is no wage gap between CEO
and managers.
Moreover, if CEO and managers have the same marginal productivity26 , then
CEO’s expected utility is strictly bounded by the manager’s reservation value. Re-
call that the firm offers the utility V∗ to its CEO only when V∗ ≥ UC . In other
words, if CEO’s reservation value is greater than managers’, the CEO’s individual
rationality constraint always binds regardless of the number of managers. This im-
plies that the CEO’s reservation value should be less than managers’ to obtain both
the wage gap and a positive relationship between CEO compensation and the firm
size, In the next section, I consider the asymmetric information case.
2.6 The Effect of Promotion on CEO Compensation under Moral Hazard
2.6.1 Preliminary - no promotion possibility
In this section, I briefly illustrate several properties of the solution to the firm’s
problem when there is no promotion possibility. Comparing the optimal contract
25Here, the size of a firm is determined by the number of managers or candidates for internal
promotion.
26In this paper, agents’ marginal productivity is measured by β(Gi − Bi ), where i ∈ {C, M }.
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with and without promotion possibility can clarify the effect of promotion incen-
tives on CEO compensation.27 If there is no promotion possibility, the firm’s prob-
lem turns into a simple moral hazard problem and the CEO’s individual rationality
constraint must bind.28 Binding individual rationality constraint yields a limitation
in explaining the trend in CEO compensation. If changes in the firm’s contracting
environment make it require higher effort from the CEO, the firm provides higher
expected pay to its CEO and the ratio of the fixed pay to the incentive pay falls. That
is to say, the theory predicts the fixed pay and the incentive pay should move in the
opposite directions. In practice, however, the base salary, i.e., fixed pay for CEO has
not fallen enough while the incentive pay has risen. In the following section, I illus-
trate how this prediction changes if a firm uses the two incentive schemes, absolute
performance based and relative performance based compensation, together.
2.6.2 Risk-neutral agents
First, I consider risk-neutral agents. The following proposition says that it is optimal
for the firm not to offer a contract providing a higher utility than CEO’s reservation
value to her if all agents are risk-neutral.
Proposition 3 If every agent is risk-neutral, the CEO’s individual rationality con-
straint binds. Specifically, the firm’s profit is a strictly decreasing function inV .
This implies that promotion incentive scheme is dominated by pay for performance
if agents are risk-neutral. According to Lazear and Rosen (1981), a compensation
scheme based on relative ranking achieves the first best allocation if agents are risk-
neutral, which is also true for the incentive scheme based on absolute performance.
Since the promotion rule considered in this paper has a penalty29 compared to the
tournament structure in Lazear and Rosen (1981), the incentive based on promotion
is less efficient than absolute performance-based incentives.30 I analyze how this
observation changes if agents are risk-averse as follows.
27The problem in this section is exactly the same as Grossman and Hart (1983).
28This is true with any finite number of possible outcomes when CEO’s utility function is addi-
tively separable.
29There is a possibility of external hiring.
30If I adopt Promotion rule 2, the two schemes are perfect substitutes. However, under Promo-
tion rule 2, pay for performance scheme still dominates promotion incentive scheme if managers
discount the future.
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2.6.3 The first stage
In this section, I consider a simple situation where the firm’s desired effort levels
are given exogenously. That is, the firm requires fixed effort levels (eC ,eM ) ∈
(0,1) × (0,1) from the CEO and managers, respectively. First of all, the following
lemma guarantees that I can use the modified method to solve the firm’s problem.
Moreover, the strict concavity ensures that the solution of the firm’s problem is
unique.
Lemma 4 If agents are risk-averse, F (V ) is strictly concave.
The next question is how the CEO’s expected utility changes when there is a com-
petition among managers for promotion. First, I consider the effect of the number of
managers on the CEO’s expected utility, which determines the power of promotion
incentives. This is important because the number of candidates for promotion might
be a good proxy of the firm size. For example, Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) use
the number of competitors for a promotion as the measure of the firm size. From
now on, I use the number of managers N to refer the size of a firm.
Proposition 4 If agents are risk-averse,V∗ strictly increases as N increases.
Again, this proposition and the previous lemma lead to the following result.
Corollary 3 CEO’s expected utility rises as N increases.
Hence, the firm raises the promotion incentive, although the power of it decreases
as the competition gets severe. From this result, one can confirm that the firm wants
to divide payments between absolute and relative performance based compensation
depending on the size of internal labor market. In other words, firms effectively
employ a hybrid incentive scheme not just one of the two schemes. Moreover, if
the CEO’s required effort level does not change as the number of candidates varies,
the rise in CEO’s expected utility yields a higher expected compensation to CEO.
Corollary 4 The expected compensation to CEO increases as N grows.
Therefore, it is optimal for a firm to provide a higher compensation to the CEO
when there are more candidates for internal promotion. Therefore, the increase in
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promotion incentives might play a significant role in the rise of CEO compensation.
When it comes to the wage inequality between CEO and managers, I can assert that
the size of the firm has a positive correlation with the expected wage gap between
CEO and managers as well as CEO compensation if agents have the log utility
function.
Corollary 5 Suppose that agents have the log utility function. Then, the expected
compensation gap between CEO and managers widens as N increases.
Then, can the CEO compensation still have the upper bound of Proposition 2?31
This question is important since if the compensation has the same upper bound, the
CEO compensation is always lower than managers’ one when the firm requires the
same effort level. However, the following proposition indicates that this is not the
case if there is a moral hazard problem.
Proposition 5 When 0 < eC ≤ eM < 1, there is N̂ such thatV∗ > U M if N > N̂ .
Figure 2.1 numerically illustrates previous results. In this example, the CEO’s indi-
vidual rationality constraint binds when UC = 3, which is the same as the manager’s
reservation value in the example, and N = 1,2, or 3. This means that the CEO’s
compensation level remains at the same level even when the firm size increases.
Namely, the size of the firm and CEO compensation do not have a strictly mono-
tonic relationship. This feature makes this model different from Gabaix and Landier
(2008), where CEO payment monotonically moves with changes in the size of the
firm.32
By comparing this result with Proposition 2, I derive two channels to explain why
the firm increases promotion incentives as N grows. The first channel comes from
the difference between two reservation values UC and U M . If UC is less than U M ,
by offering a higher compensation to the CEO than to the managers, the firm can
reduce overall payouts to agents. The other channel is to reduce the gap between
WGM and W
B
M by increasing the CEO’s expected utility. Note that the inefficiency
of information asymmetry arises when agents are risk-averse if the firm does not
31If I consider Promotion rule 1 under the first-best case, it can be shown thatV∗ is strictly less
than NN+1UM .
32Gabaix and Landier (2008) use earnings of firms as a proxy of the size of a firm. Analyzing the
relationship between the number of candidates and other measures of the firm size such as earnings,
market values, and sales will be a topic for future research.
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use internal promotion schemes. This is because the wage gap incurs an additional
cost to the firm. Hence, the firm can partly remove the inefficiency by increasing
promotion incentives, which reduces the wage gap. This effect gets stronger as N
grows because promotion incentives affects N managers’ wage gaps.
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Figure 2.1: CEO’s expected utility for UC = 0 (solid line) or UC = 3 (dashed line)
when U M = 3. Other parameters are GC = GM = 1,000, BC = BM = 0, α = 0.05,
β = 0.45, eC = 0.35, eM = 0.43, u(x) = log(x) and g(a) = − 1a−1 − a − 1.
As the next step, I examine how the level of promotion incentives behaves according
to the adjustment of required effort levels. The following proposition shows how
this changes.
Proposition 6 Suppose that u
′′(x)
u′(x)3 is a decreasing function in x. If agents are risk-
averse, V∗ strictly decreases as eC increases while V∗ strictly increases when eM
increases.
One interesting result is that the firm provides a higher expected utility to the CEO
when it requires less effort from her. This makes sense when CEO compensation
is related to her incentives as well as promotion incentives for managers. This
result gives an important implication about promotion incentives. Recall that the
degree of promotion incentives is determined by the level of V∗. Therefore, if the
firm requires a high (low) effort from the CEO, it reduces (increases) the promotion
incentives. This implies that if a change in contracting environments yields a growth
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in the CEO’s marginal productivity, then the firm decreases the CEO’s expected
utility reducing promotion incentives.
The sufficient condition regarding agents’ utility functions for Proposition 6 holds
for all CARA utility functions and CRRA utility functions with a coefficient of
relative risk aversion higher than one half.
When the firm uses relative as well as absolute performance based incentive schemes,
the gap between the managers’ wage for a good and a bad performance could shrink
to zero.33 In other words, it can be optimal for a firm to focus on promotion incen-
tives instead of performance tied compensation.
Proposition 7 Assume that limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. Then, for a given (N,eC ,eM ), there
is Û M such that
(WGM )
∗ ≤ (W BM )∗
if U M ≥ Û M .
Therefore, if people do not consider the possibility of promotion when they analyze
executives’ compensations they can misinterpret the incentives behind them. That
is, although managers’ compensation does not depend on their output, their wages
have already reflected incentives through the promotion possibility. Figure 2.2
illustrates this result. As the managers’ reservation value increases from 8 to 9, the
situation of (WGM )
∗ ≤ (W BM )∗ happens when N < 4. It is worth mentioning that
this result does not mean that managers have less utility when they make a good
outcome rather than a bad outcome. If managers achieve a good outcome, they
obtain utility through two channels: 1) utility from the first period’s wage, WGM ,
in the first period and 2 ) utility from the promotion possibility, P(e−M )V , in the
second period. On the other hand, a bad outcome only gives them the wage in the
first period, W BM . For the sum of expected utilities, the firm has to offer a higher
utility for a good outcome than a bad outcome in order to induce a positive effort
from managers. That is, u(WGM ) + P(e−M )V must be greater than u(W BM ).
The previous result illustrates that promotion incentive can dominate the incentive
associated with pay for performance. The following result shows that the opposite
situation can also happen.34
33Similar result holds under the Promotion Rule 2. The difference is that W ∗g > W ∗b always holds
when N = 1.
34For this result, I drop Assumption 3. That is, I allow corner solutions.
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Corollary 6 For a given (N,eC ,eM ), there is U˜ M such that
V∗ = 0
if U M ≤ U˜ M .
That is, the pay for performance incentive scheme might dominate the promotion
based scheme. In this case, there is no incentive for the firm to introduce a hier-
archical structure. One can interpret the previous two results in two ways. First,
if a managers’ reservation value is really high (low) and the CEO’s individual ra-
tionality constraint does not bind, a firm should focus on the promotion (pay for
performance) incentive scheme. Also, if the CEO’s reservation value is really high,
the firm would prefer the promotion based incentive scheme to the pay for perfor-
mance incentive scheme.
2.6.3.1 The effect of internal competition on firm’s profit per agent
Up to this point, I focus on how the two incentive schemes interact in a firm. Here,
I turn to another question: why does the firm use a hierarchical structure based on
the competition among managers by paying higher compensation to the CEO? In
order to answer this question, I focus on the firm’s profit per agent measured by
Π(V∗ |N ) ≡ 1
N + 1
F (V∗ |N ).
In order to concentrate on the effect of competition between managers, I assume
that G ≡ GC = GM and B ≡ BC = BM . In particular, I try to answer the question:
can firms increase the profit per agent by adopting a hierarchical structure? The
following result shows what the firm can do by introducing internal competition
between managers.
Proposition 8 If 1 > eM > eC > 0, there is (G∗,B∗) such that for G−B ≥ G∗−B∗,
Π(V∗ |N ) > Π(V∗ |1) for a given N. Moreover, for a given G − B ≤ O, there is N̂
such that Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1) if N > N̂ , where O is derived in the Appendix.
Moreover, for a given G − B ≤ O, there is N̂ such that Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1) if
N > N̂ and eM ∈ (eC , e¯M], where O and e¯M are derived in the Appendix.
Figure 2.3 illustrates this result graphically. Under the given parameters, the profit
per agent is maximized when N = 2 if UC = 0 and when N = 3 if UC = 3. The lat-
ter case means that the firm can increase its profit by hiring three managers and one
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Figure 2.2: Managers’ wage levels for U M = 8 (up) and U M = 9 (down) when
UC = 0. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.1.
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CEO with internal competition compared to the situation where there are two lower-
level managers and two upper-level managers without any internal competition. In
the second scenario, there is no competition for promotion among managers, but
the decision is only determined by their own performances. These two scenarios
are represented by N = 3 case and two N = 1 structures.
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Number of managers
Π
(V
∗
|N
)
UC = 0 UC = 3
Figure 2.3: Firm’s profit per agent for UC = 0 (solid line) or UC = 3 (dashed line)
when U M = 3. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.1.
Moreover, the following result extends Proposition 8 with the log utility function
and eC = eM = e. The difference is that the previous result comes from the man-
agers’ higher contribution to the firm’s output than the CEO’s. However, the fol-
lowing proposition is related to the reduction in managers’ wages. That is, as the
number of managers increases, the firm reduces WGM by raising promotion incen-
tives.
Proposition 9 Suppose that agents have the log utility function, u(x) = log(x).
Also, assume that lime→1 g′(e) = ∞. Then, for a given N ≥ 2, there is (U∗M ,U∗∗M ,e∗)
such that Π(V∗ |N ) > Π(V∗ |1) if e > e∗ and U M ∈ [U∗M ,U∗∗M ), where U∗M < U∗∗M .
Moreover, for a fixed (U M ,e), there is N
∗ ≥ 1 such that Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1) if
N ≥ N∗.
Both Proposition 8 and 9 illustrate that the profit per agent decreases beyond some
point of N . In other words, the relationship between the profit per agent and the
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number of managers is not monotonic.
2.6.4 The second stage
In this section, I relax the condition that the effort levels are determined exoge-
nously. In order to make the analysis more tractable, I impose the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 4 The agents’ cost function g(·) satisfies g′′′(·) ≥ 0 with lime→1 g′(·) =
∞. Also, the two parameters in the probability of good outcome s(e) = α + βe sat-
isfies α + β ≤ 12 . u′′(x)/u′(x)3 is a decreasing function in x.
This assumption provides a sufficient condition for concavity of the firm’s objective
function with respect to agents’ effort level for a givenV . This allows one to focus
on the first order condition with respect to agent’s effort when solving the problem.
Intuitively, these conditions together make the firm’s payout more rapidly increase
as the firm requires a higher effort from an agent. It is worth mentioning the condi-
tion that α+ β ≤ 12 . Different from Lazear and Rosen (1981), the agent’s output has
only two possible outcomes, good or bad. Under this binary output process, change
of its mean by controlling the agent’s effort inevitably leads to change of the vari-
ance. Moreover this variance is equal to zero if s(e) is zero or one, which eliminates
the moral hazard problem since the realized output perfectly reveals the agent’s ex-
erted effort. In particular, a probability around s(e) = 1 could be problematic since
the variance of the output decreases as s(e) increases. This yields a tension between
a higher wage and a lower agency problem around s(e) equal to one. By restricting
the two parameters in the given way, I can constrain the variance and the mean of
the output to have a positive relationship. However, this assumption can be relaxed
if the cost function g(e) is sufficiently convex. This condition makes the growth of
the wage component dominate the decrease of the agency problem when the firm
requires a higher effort even if this reduces the variance of the output.
2.6.4.1 Optimal CEO effort choice
I relax the condition of exogenous effort choice in this section: I allow the firm to
optimally choose the CEO’s effort level in order to maximize its profit, still fixing
the managers’ effort level. I assume that the function F (V ) satisfies the strict quasi-
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concavity condition in order to solve the firm’s original problem using the modified
one.35
Assumption 5 If agents are risk-averse, F (V ) is strictly quasi-concave.
The following result confirms that the CEO’s expected utility is still an increasing
function in the size of the firm. Moreover, the CEO’s optimal effort level decreases
as the firm size increases.
Proposition 10 When agents are risk-averse, V∗ is a strictly increasing function
in N while e∗C is a strictly decreasing function in N.
Intuitively, under the operational structure characterized by agents’ independent
outputs, the relative importance of the CEO’s output, compared to the managers’
total output, decreases as the number of managers increases. Therefore, the firm
uses the CEO’s position as a bonus rather than an output source. For the purpose of
reducing the cost of increasing promotion incentives, the firm decreases the CEO’s
effort level.
It is important to note that a higher promotion incentive does not directly imply a
higher expected compensation in this case. The movements of the optimal effort
level and the promotion incentive predict the change of expected compensation
in the opposite directions when the firm size grows. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5
illustrate an example for given parameters to see how CEO compensation changes
as the firm size grows. Figure 2.4 shows that the relationship between CEO effort
level and the ratio of CEO’s fixed pay to incentive pay remains the same as the
prediction without promotion possibility: the ratio increases as the firm requires a
lower effort level from the CEO. Also, a moral hazard model without promotion
possibility predicts lower compensation and incentive pay when a firm requires a
lesser effort level. However, the two variables in Figure 2.5 present the opposite
results. This result demonstrates that the trade-off between the required effort level
and compensation could be reversed if people take into account the presence of
internal labor markets. As a special case, if agents have the log utility function, the
following corollary shows that CEO’s incentive pay rises as the firm size increases
although it requires lower effort from the CEO.
35Numerically, this condition is investigated, and I confirm that the condition holds generally.
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Corollary 7 Suppose that agents have the log utility function, u(x) = log(x).
Then, CEO’s incentive pay measured by (WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗ rises as N increases.
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Figure 2.4: CEO effort level (solid line) and the ratio of CEO’s fixed pay relative to
incentive pay (dashed line) for UC = 0 and U M = 3. Other parameters are the same
as those in Figure 2.1 except eC .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of managers
CE
O
 C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
In
ce
nt
iv
e 
Pa
y
CEO Compensation (WG
C
)∗ − (WB
C
)∗
Figure 2.5: CEO compensation (solid line) and the level of incentive pay (dashed
line) for UC = 0 and U M = 3. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure
2.4.
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2.6.4.2 General case
In this section, I mainly deal with the numerical examples illustrating that the previ-
ous results still hold when the firm chooses both effort levels eC and eM optimally.
In addition, I analytically show that e∗C < e
∗
M could be a consequence of the firm’s
optimal decision.36 Again, I assume that the function F (V ) satisfies the desired
condition.37
Assumption 6 If agents are risk-averse, F (V ) is strictly quasi-concave.
First, Proposition 11 shows that the firm can optimally require a higher effort from
managers than that of the CEO. Figure 2.6 illustrates this numerically.
Proposition 11 Suppose that U M = 0, then there exists N̂ such that e
∗
M > e
∗
C if
N > N̂ .
This implies that it can be optimal for a firm to provide an expected utility to the
CEO beyond her and managers’ reservation values since Proposition 5 only re-
quires eC ≤ eM . Also, the firm can raise its profit per agent by adopting the internal
labor market based on competition between managers as the same reason. Figure
2.7 and 2.8 confirm these observations. In particular, in this example, CEO’s ex-
pected utility is higher than managers’ reservation value if N is greater than or equal
to three. Also, Figure 2.8 shows that the firm’s profit per agent is maximized when
the number of managers is equal to three.
Furthermore, Figure 2.9 demonstrates that (W BM )
∗ could be greater than (WGM )
∗ as
U M increases from 6 to 7. In particular, (W
B
M )
∗ is greater than (WGM )
∗ if N ∈ [5,54].
That is, the firm can optimally reduce the dependency of managers’ compensation
on their performance.
2.7 The Effect of Job Security on Promotion Incentives
As the first extension of the benchmark model, I analyze the effect of employment
structure on promotion incentives in this section. In particular, I focus on how the
level of promotion incentives changes according to the firm’s policy on the execu-
tives’ job security. This question is important since issues related to executives’ job
36Recall that Proposition 5 and 8 depend on this feature.
37The condition is checked numerically.
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Figure 2.6: CEO effort level (solid line) and Manager’s effort level (dashed line) for
UC = 0 and U M = 3. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.1 except
eC and eM .
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Figure 2.7: CEO’s expected utility for UC = 0 (solid line) or UC = 3 (dashed line)
when U M = 3. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.8: Firm’s profit per agent when UC = 0 (solid line) or 3 (dashed line) when
U M = 3. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.7.
security have received significant attention from both researchers and practition-
ers. For example, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) illustrate that bad performance related
to negative shocks causes a forced CEO turnover. Hence, in order to understand
executives’ compensation more clearly, it is valuable to examine the effect of exec-
utives’ job security on their compensation. Throughout the section, I treat agents’
effort levels as exogenously given.
2.7.1 The effect of managers job security on promotion incentives
So far I assume that managers leave the firm if they are not promoted to CEO al-
though they perform well in their position. In this section, I consider a slightly dif-
ferent employment structure. Namely, even if managers fail to be promoted to CEO,
they can stay in the firm one more period as senior managers if their performance is
good.38 However, the senior managers do not have any chance for promotion. That
is, senior managers retire regardless of their outcomes. Except this strengthened
job security for managers, every employment structure is the same as the bench-
mark model. That is, the firm still hires N managers from an external labor market
every period, and uses the same promotion rule. Then, does the firm have an in-
centive to provide more utility to the CEO than other successful managers? That is,
38Since managers do not have any chance of promotion if they face a bad outcome in the first
period under promotion rule 1, it does not affect the result in terms of promotion incentives whether
managers can stay in the firm after a bad outcome.
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Figure 2.9: Managers’ wage levels for U M = 6 (up) and U M = 7 (down) when
UC = 0. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.7.
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can promotion incentives still contribute to the increase in CEO compensation?
Denote the senior manager’s compensation by (WGGM ,W
GB
M ), which are tied to a
good and bad outcome, respectively. Note that only managers with a good outcome
remain in the firm as senior managers. Also, I use the term eM2 to distinguish
the senior manager’s effort from the (young) manager’s effort, eM1. The difference
from the benchmark model is that successful managers obtain the expected utility,
s(eM2)u(WGGM ) + (1 − s(eM2))u(WGBM ) − g(eM2),
though they are not picked as the CEO.39 I denote this utility by UM2 for brevity.
Then, I show that managers’ compensation scheme satisfies
u(WGM ) = U M + g(eM1) + (1 − s(eM1))
g′(eM1)
β
− P(e−M )V − (1 − P(e−M ))UM2
u(W BM ) = U M + g(eM1) − s(eM1)
g′(eM1)
β
u(WGGM ) = UM2 + g(eM2) + (1 − s(eM2))
g′(eM2)
β
u(WGBM ) = UM2 + g(eM2) − s(eM2)
g′(eM2)
β
.
The first equation illustrates that the manager’s wage tied to good outcome depends
on the senior manager’s expected utility, UM2 as well as the promotion incentive,V .
Moreover, this wage and the senior manager’s compensation satisfy the following
relationship according to Rogerson (1985a)
1
u′(WGM )
= δ

s(eM2)
u′(WGGM )
+
1 − s(eM2)
u′(WGBM )
 . (2.9)
For this problem, the main concern is the difference between the CEO’s expected
utility (V∗) and senior managers’ expected utility (U∗M2). If senior managers have
higher expected utility than the CEO, promotion incentives do not play any effective
role as an incentive tool. In this case, managers do not want to be promoted to the
CEO. Hence, from now on, I add one more constraint in the firm’s problem, call
this promotion constraint.
V ≥ UM2 (Promotion Constraint)
The following result indicates when the promotion constraint does not bind.
39The detail of the firm’s problem can be found in Appendix A.2.1.
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Proposition 12 Assume that u
′′(x)
u′(x)3 is a decreasing function in x. Then, if δ is suf-
ficiently large40 , there is (eˆC , N̂ ) such that V∗ > U∗M2 when eC ≤ eˆC and N ≥ N̂ ,
where eˆC < eM2. Moreover,V∗ is an increasing function in N whenV∗ ≥ U∗M2.
Therefore, the firm can still optimally provide its CEO a compensation beyond her
reservation value even if managers have strong job security. That is, Proposition 4
still holds under this extension. This means that promotion incentives contribute the
rise in CEO compensation when the size of the firm is large and the firm requires
less effort from CEO than managers, even if managers have job security.
2.7.2 The effect of CEO job security on promotion incentives
In the benchmark model, a CEO leaves the firm after one period regardless of her
performance. In this section, I assume differently that a CEO will stay and work
one more period if she performs well in the first period. In other words, the CEO
will be sacked as punishment for bad performance. Regarding managers, I maintain
the same structure as the benchmark model. That is, only the manager promoted to
the CEO remains in the firm and works one more period. In this section, I slightly
modify Assumption 2.
Assumption 7 The firm offers contracts based on agents’ positions and the senior-
ity of its CEO. That is, it offers three (possibly) different types of contracts: 1) CEO,
2) managers with new CEO, and 3) managers with CEO close to retirement.
Under this assumption, the firm can offer different contracts to managers according
to the length of the CEO’s remaining term. Therefore, the extension allows one to
examine managers’ cohort effects as well as the effect of the CEO’s job security. 41
Similar with section 2.4, I reduce the firm’s problem to a more tractable form under
Assumption 742 .
The following proposition tells how the level of promotion incentives changes ac-
cording to the change of CEO job security. More formally, call the case where a
CEO is sacked if her performance is bad in the first period “unguaranteed job se-
curity". On the contrary, name it “guaranteed job security" if a CEO is not fired
regardless of the first period’s performance. By comparing these situations, one can
40The condition for δ can be found in the proof.
41By the cohort effects, I mean that a cohort who earn more on entry maintains its advantage
through time according to Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994).
42The detail of the firm’s problem can be found in Appendix A.2.2.
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see when the firm puts more weight on promotion incentives. In particular, I focus
on the level of promotion incentives by fixing the required effort at the same level
for both cases.
Proposition 13 Assume that lime→1 g′(e) = ∞ and limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. Also, sup-
pose that the firm requires an effort level eC anf eM from the CEO and managers, re-
spectively, in every period. Then, there is e∗C ∈ (0,1) such thatV∗(eC) ≥ V̂∗(eC) if
eC ∈ [e∗C ,1) and δ is sufficiently high43 , whereV∗(eC) and V̂∗(eC) are the optimal
level of promotion incentives for unguaranteed and guaranteed job security cases,
respectively, for a given eC . Moreover, for the sufficiently high δ, if V̂∗(0) > 0,
there is an interval [e∗C , e¯C], where e¯C ∈ (e∗C ,1), such that V∗(eC) > V̂∗(eC) for
eC in the interval.
It is important to know that the CEO’s individual rationality constraint binds in both
cases if one does not consider promotion possibilities. However, taking into account
promotion possibilities gives a different answer. That is, it shows that a CEO can
receive a favorable contract when her job security is less guaranteed. This result
is also related to the tension between CEO incentives and managers’ incentives.
If the firm does not guarantee CEO job security, it gives more promotion chances
to its managers. On the other hand, raising promotion incentive is more costly to
the firm under the guaranteed situation than the other case since this make the firm
need to pay more in the second period. Hence, when the firm requires a higher
effort from the CEO, it wants to emphasize more the incentive for the CEO under
the guaranteed situation. This emphasis yields fewer promotion incentives than the
unguaranteed case.
Moreover, it can be shown that WGM1 > W
G
M2 if eM1 = eM2. Hence, managers’ wage
can exhibit a gap between cohorts although their abilities and required effort are the
same. The reason is straightforward. The promotion possibility of managers relies
on the timing they enter the firm: managers working with a new CEO expect less to
be promoted than managers below a CEO who is about to retire, other things being
equal. This affects managers’ wages in an unambiguous way.
Now, I extend the above model allowing managers stay in the firm one more period
if their performance is good although they are not promoted to the CEO. Then,
do the managers who start a career with a new CEO still earn more money than
43The condition for δ can be found in the proof.
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managers starting with CEO close to retirement the second period? The following
result shows that this is the case if the promotion is desirable for managers.
Proposition 14 Suppose that the firm requires the same effort (eM11,eM12) = (eM21,
eM22), where eMi j is the required effort level in the period j from managers with
a new CEO (i = 1), or managers with CEO close to retirement (i = 2). Then,
(U2M1)
∗ > (U2M2)
∗ ifV∗ > (U2M1)∗. This also implies that (WGM1)∗ > (WGM2)∗.
Hence, this model can also predict a cohort effect. That is, the expected wage
level of managers who have a lesser chance of promotion can be larger than that of
managers having better chance in their whole careers. The condition that being the
CEO is strictly beneficial than staying in the manager position is closely related to
Proposition 12. Although I do not formally analyze the condition, if the firm does
not require a high effort from the CEO in her second period, Proposition 12 might
hold since the firm optimally distributes the cost of raising promotion incentives.
2.8 Complementary Tasks: Multiplication Specification
I study how the firm’s operational structure affects the firm’s optimal contract in this
section. Until now, I assume that a CEO’s contribution to the firm’s profit is inde-
pendent of managers’ outputs. As the second extension of the benchmark model, I
investigate how the previous results change if there is a dependency between them.
In particular, I consider the following firm’s output structure:
[s(eC)GC + (1 − s(eC))BC] E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 ,
where the CEO’s task has a multiplication effect on the managers’ aggregated out-
put through the function f (·). For the function f (·), I impose some assumptions.
Assumption 8 The function f (·) satisfies f (·) > 0, f ′(·) > 0, and limx→∞ f ′(x) >
0.
The first two conditions are quite general. The last condition rules out the case when
the size effect disappears since the firm size N only affects the firm’s output through
the function f (·). For example, a linear function taking positive numbers on its do-
main satisfies all requirements. Also, I adopt Assumption 4 for the same reason as
mentioned above. Note that the argument of the function f (·) is [iGM + (N − i)BM],
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i = 0, . . . ,N . In order to assure that the argument is a strictly increasing function
in the number of managers, I assume that BM > 0. Under these assumptions, I an-
alyze the following problem with an exogenously given managers’ effort level eM
like in Section 2.6.4.1.
max
V∈[0,∞)
F (V ),where
F (V ) = max
{(eC ,WGC ,W BC ), (WGM ,W BM )}
[s(eC )GC + (1 − s(eC ))BC ] E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi


− s(eC )WGC − (1 − s(eC ))W BC
− N[s(eM )WGM + (1 − s(eM ))W BM ]
subject to four constraints, (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8).
The distinction between the independent and the multiplication specification is
whether the marginal productivity of the CEO changes according to the size of
the firm. Since the multiplication specification assumes an increasing productivity,
the CEO’s task is more crucial to the output when the firm is larger. This change of
the CEO’s role yields a different result from Proposition 10.
Proposition 15 Assume that limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. Then, there is N̂ such that V∗ is
a decreasing function in N while e∗C is a strictly increasing function in N. Also, if
V∗ > 0,V∗ strictly decreases as N grows.
Recall that Proposition 10 says that the promotion incentive increases as the firm
size grows, and the firm requires less effort from the CEO. However, Proposition
15 reveals that the exactly opposite situation happens if the size of the firm is suf-
ficiently large, and the marginal contribution of the CEO’s effort increases with
the firm size. Figure 2.10 and 2.11 show numerical examples under the multiplica-
tion specification. Figure 2.10 illustrates a non-monotonic relationship between the
promotion incentive and the number of managers. Especially, if CEO’s reservation
value is equal to one, which is exactly the same as managers’ reservation value in
the example, the CEO’s individual rationality constraint binds when N is less than 7
or greater than 22. Also, Figure 2.11 shows that the CEO’s effort level increases as
N grows. Intuitively, the firm wants the CEO to exert more effort since her marginal
productivity grows as the number of managers increases. However, the concavity
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of the CEO’s utility function makes it very costly for the firm to induce her to exert
more effort especially when eC is high. Hence, the firm puts more emphasis on the
CEO’s absolute performance-based compensation not the promotion incentive for
managers. Namely, by reducing the promotion incentive, the firm can increase the
CEO’s effort level at a lower cost.
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Figure 2.10: CEO’s expected utility under a multiplication specfication for UC = 0
(solid line) or UC = 1 (dashed line) when U M = 1. Other parameters are GC = 1.7,BC = 0.7, GM = 35, BM = 5, f (x) = x, α = 0.1, β = 0.4, eM = 0.22, u(x) =
log(x) and g(a) = − 1a−1 − a − 1.
2.9 Comparing Two Promotion Rules
In this section, I explain when promotion rule 1 can be preferred to promotion
rule 2 by the firm. Consider the situation where managers’ abilities are private
information to them. Recall that a manager’s effort affects the probability of good
outcome by the function s(e) = α + βe. In the following model, managers’ ability
is determined by β. Specifically, assume that β can be one of two values, β¯ and β,
with the probability q ∈ (0,1) and 1 − q, respectively. Also, assume that the two
values satisfy β¯ > β > 0 and β¯ ≤ 12 − α. Call the agent with β = β¯ by high type
(H) and the agent with β = β by low type (L). For brevity, I denote the probability
of good performance for a given e by sH (e) and sL (e) according to manager’s type.
If the firm hires the CEO from the external labor market, they also have the same
prior probability about types of agents. That is, the firm’s prior probability that a
CEO from the external labor market is high type is q. In order to focus on the effect
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Figure 2.11: Under a multiplication specification, CEO effort level (solid line) and
the ratio of CEO’s fixed pay relative to incentive pay (dashed line) for UC = 0 and
U M = 1. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.10.
of promotion rules, I additionally assume that N is equal to 2 in this section. Then,
the firm’s problem is the following:
max
(WC ), (eL,eH ,WGM ,W
B
M )
γE[β |eH ,eL] −WC + E[ΠM |(eH ,eL ,WGM ,W BM )]
subject to
u(WC ) ≥ UC (IRC )
sH (eH )[u(WGM ) + P(e−M )VC ] + (1 − sH (eH ))[u(W BM ) + R(e−M )VC ] − g(eH ) ≥ UM (IRH )
sL (eL )[u(WGM ) + P(e−M )VC ] + (1 − sL (eL ))[u(W BM ) + R(e−M )VC ] − g(eL ) ≥ UM (IRL )
eH ∈ arg max
eˆ
sH (eˆ)[u(WGM ) + P(e−M )VC ] + (1 − sH (eˆ))[u(W BM ) + R(e−M )VC ] − g(eˆ) (ICH )
eL ∈ arg max
eˆ
sL (eˆ)[u(WGM ) + P(e−M )VC ] + (1 − sL (eˆ))[u(W BM ) + R(e−M )VC ] − g(eL ) (ICL ),
where E[ΠM |(eH ,eL,WGM ,W BM )] represents the expected profit from two managers44
, and E[β |eH ,eL] is the expected β when the firm requires eH and eL from high-
type and low-type managers, respectively. γ determines the firm’s benefit of hiring
high-type CEO. More formally, γ is the firm’s marginal benefit from higher ex-
pected CEO’s β. Also, the managers’ promotion probability when their outcome is
44The exact expression can be found in Appendix A.2.3.
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good (P(e−M )) and bad (R(e−M )) are
P(e−M ) =
2 − sH (eH )q − sL (eL)(1 − q)
2
, and
R(e−M ) =

0 under promotion rule 1
1−sH (eH )q−sL (eL )(1−q)
2 under promotion rule 2
.
Here, I only consider a pooling equilibrium so that the firm provides the same con-
tract regardless of managers’ types.45 In this problem, moral hazard aspects related
to the CEO are ignored. However, a hired CEO’s ability, which determines her pro-
ductivity, depends on the promotion rule and managers’ compensation. Specifically,
the choice of promotion rule determines the functional form of E[β |eH ,eL] while
the compensation affects managers’ effort choice.46 Moreover, I simply assume
that agents’ cost function is a quadratic function, that is, g(e) = κe
2
2 with κ > 0.
The following result illustrates that the firm will prefer the promotion rule 1 to the
promotion rule 2 if the benefit from hiring a high type CEO is big enough.
Proposition 16 There is γˆ > 0 such that the profit under promotion rule 1 is strictly
greater than that under promotion rule 2 if γ ≥ γˆ.
That is, if the firm emphasize the role of internal promotion as a screening device,
promotion rule 1 will be optimally chosen rather than promotion 2.
2.10 Discussion
In this section, I connect the previous results with two lines of literature: 1) CEO
compensation, and 2) Empirical studies in tournament literature.
2.10.1 Implications for the trend in executive compensation
CEO compensation and the wage gap between CEO and other managers have re-
ceived extensive attention from both researchers and media. Since the influential
work by Gabaix and Landier (2008),47 researchers have focused on the size of the
firm in order to explain the rise of CEO compensation. However, the relationship is
not monotonic from a long-term perspective as Frydman and Saks (2010) and Fryd-
man and Jenter (2010) illustrate. Here, I connect my model with the non-monotonic
relationship between the two factors.
45The argument in this section still holds even when one considers a separating equilibrium if the
firm determines its promotion decision based on managers’ outputs not revealed types.
46The functional form can be found in Appendix A.2.3.
47See also Tervio (2008).
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First, I illustrate that the promotion incentive channel predicts that CEO compensa-
tion increases non-monotonically as the size of the firm, measured by the number
of internal candidates for the CEO position, grows. Corollary 4 and Figure 2.1
demonstrate this relationship. In Figure 2.1, when the CEO’ reservation value is
equal to the managers’, the CEO’s expected utility and compensation remains a
constant up to the point that N is equal to 3 although the firm size increases since
the CEO’s individual rationality constraint binds. However, beyond this point, the
CEO’s expected utility and the size of the firm show a monotonic relationship. This
rise of CEO’s expected utility leads to the increase of CEO’s compensation accord-
ing to Corollary 4 if her effort level remains a constant. Moreover, Figure 2.5
shows that this can also be the case when the firm optimally choose the CEO’s
effort level.
Also, my model suggests that the rise of promotion incentives might play a key
role in the growth of the wage gap between CEO and managers during the past
30 years but not before 1980. Therefore, similar with the previous argument, the
relationship between the wage gap and the firm size is not monotonic since the
CEO’s compensation does not change if her individual rationality constraint binds.
However, if the number of managers is high enough such that the CEO’s individual
rationality constraint does not bind, the wage gap might start to widen as Figure
2.12 illustrates.48
It is worth mentioning that the rise of promotion incentives can also affect the CEO’s
pay for performance incentives. Basically, the CEO’s incentive payment, such as
stock options and restricted stock, has a positive correlation with the required effort
level. However, if researchers take into account promotion incentives, this relation-
ship can be reversed. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show this possibility. In this example, the
CEO’s incentive payment expressed by (WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗ increases although the firm
requires less effort from her as the size of the firm grows.
2.10.2 Implications for empirical research on tournament theory
Since the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), an extensive empirical litera-
ture studies the implications of tournament theory. Executive compensation is one
of the most studied applications in order to test the implications. In these applica-
tions, researchers have used the wage gap between CEO and the next level execu-
tives as the measure of promotion incentives based on Lazear and Rosen (1981).49
48When UC = UM = 3, the wage gap reduces up to N is equal to 3, which is the smallest N that
the CEO’s individual rationality constraint does not bind, in this example.
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However, to the best of my knowledge, the interaction between CEO incentives,
which depend on the role of CEO in a firm, and promotion incentives has not been
considered. The interaction, however, should be useful in understanding the cause
of the wage gap in a firm as well as CEO compensation. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission announced that it adopted a rule that required a public
company to disclose the ratio of its CEO to the median compensation of its employ-
ees. Hence, if researchers misinterpret the meaning of the ratio, it could lead to a
distortion in the wage structure or incentives.
In this section, I compare Proposition 10 and 15, and derive an important implica-
tion regarding a measure of promotion incentives. The important message is that
it can be misleading to use the wage gap between CEO and managers as the mea-
sure of promotion incentives. The reason for this is that two factors, high-powered
incentives for CEO and strong promotion incentives, both should result in a high
CEO compensation and a large wage gap when other conditions remain the same.
Moreover, when the CEO is risk-averse, the two factors are negatively correlated
according to Proposition 6. Therefore, researchers need to disentangle these effects
in order to measure promotion incentives properly.
One possible way of identifying promotion incentives is to see CEO’s base salary
(W BC in my model). To increase CEO’s effort level, the base salary should decrease
because of moral hazard problem. Thus, the fall of base salary is related to the
demand for higher effort from CEO. On the other hand, when a firm wants to in-
crease promotion incentives for the lower-rung executives or employees, the CEO’s
base salary should increase. In particular, Proposition 10 predicts that enhancing
promotion incentives leads to the increase in CEO’s base salary.
Unfortunately, this identification strategy based on base salary may not work when
a firm is small. Under the multiplication specification, for instance, a CEO’s ef-
fort level and promotional incentives can move in such a way that they affect the
base salary in the opposite directions. Despite this limited applicability, I expect
that the CEO’s base salary can still be useful for identifying promotion incentives
for two reasons. First, this undesired situation happens when the size of the firm
is small, which makes the problem less of a concern. For small firms, the CEO’s
individual rationality constraint binds or promotion incentives may dominate the ef-
fect of high-powered incentives for CEO. In the former case, the growth in the firm
size does not yield the increase in promotion incentives and base salary. Therefore,
49Lazear and Oyer (2012) and Waldman (2012) provide reviews on the literature.
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the base salary can weakly identify promotion incentives. In the latter case, as the
firm size grows, I expect that the promotion incentive will be the major driving
force of the base salary movement. Second and more importantly, the dataset that
economists mostly use consists of large firms. For example, ExecuComp dataset
only contains public firms. For firms large enough, I expect that promotion incen-
tives move in the opposite direction of CEO effort level based on Proposition 15.
As an example of this prediction, Figure 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate two numerical
examples based on given parameters. As these two figures show, the expected wage
gap measured by:
E[WC] − E[WM] = [s(eC)WGC + (1 − s(eC))W BC ] − [s(eM )WGM + (1 − s(eM ))W BM]
grows as the number of managers increases regardless of the direction of promotion
incentives. On the other hand, CEO’s base salary, overall, captures the change of
promotion incentives. This is especially true when the number of managers is large
enough as the theory predicts. The future research is to study this relationship
under a more complex operational structure. However, unless promotion incentives
and the CEO’s required effort level move in opposite directions, researchers can
exploit the CEO’s base salary in order to identify promotion incentives. Moreover,
this property is generally applicable to other problems if the organizer of a contest
needs to provide incentives to the winner of the contest.
2.11 Conclusion
I examine the effect of a managers’ possibility of promotion on executive compen-
sation. Using a theoretical model which incorporates both relative and absolute
performance based compensation, I find that it is optimal for a firm to provide
a compensation to its CEO higher than her reservation value in order to incen-
tivize lower-rung executives. In particular, this is true if agents are risk-averse,
the CEO’s marginal productivity is independent of firm size, and there are enough
number of competitors for promotion. Therefore, the promotion possibilities yield
the growth of CEO compensation as well as create a wage gap between the CEO
and other executives. Moreover, promotion incentives reduce the dependence of
managers’ compensation on their performance. As a justification for the hybrid in-
centive scheme, I examine the effect of it on a firm’s profit per agent. The result
illustrates that firms can increase their profit per agent by introducing a promotion
structure based on competition among managers. In addition, the relation between
the CEO’s task and the managers’ outputs significantly affects the CEO’s compen-
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Figure 2.12: CEO’s expected utility (solid line), CEO’s base salary (dotted line),
and Wage gap between CEO and manager (dashed line) under the independent
specification for UC = 0. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.13: CEO’s expected utility (solid line), CEO’s base salary (dotted line),
and Wage gap between CEO and manager (dashed line) under a multiplication spec-
ification for UC = 0. Other parameters are the same as those in Figure 2.10.
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sation. In particular, if there is a complementarity between them, the contribution
of promotion incentives to CEO compensation can vanish. These results give valu-
able implications for CEO compensation. Researchers need to take into account
the promotion possibility besides performance based compensation when they an-
alyze CEO compensation. Also, interpreting the role of the CEO in a firm is of
importance when one tries to answer why CEO compensation has risen.
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C h a p t e r 3
INCENTIVE CONTRACT FOR A LONG-TERM PROJECT WITH
MORAL HAZARD
3.1 Introduction
In many cases, a firm’s project requires long-term investment or R&D before it
starts generating a positive cash flow to the firm. For example, an automobile com-
pany invests its resources in order to develop a new model, and the new car provides
a profit after the development is completed. A hired manger is in charge of such a
project. However, it is difficult for investors to observe the manager’s effort level.
The manager may enjoy some private benefits instead of exerting effort. In this pa-
per, I analyze the optimal contract problem under a moral hazard setting where an
agent controls the investment process for a project.
I study a continuous-time moral hazard model in order to examine the optimal con-
tract. This modeling is desirable since it is tractable and easily comparable to the
existing literature. Specifically, I model a long-term investment by an arithmetic
Brownian motion. An agent’s effort choice is reflected in the drift term in the in-
vestment process. That is, the agent’s effort helps the investment process complete
more quickly on average. This investment does not generate any cash flow before
it reaches a fixed threshold. However, once the project is completed, it delivers a
stream of positive cash flow to the investors without agent’s further effort.
First, I characterize the incentive compatibility condition in a general contracting
space. Also, I study two essential elements of the incentive contract, the completion
payment and the termination level. However, the presence of two state variables, the
agent’s continuation value and the investment level, makes the model intractable.
Hence, I focus on a restricted contracting space for the baseline model. In the
baseline model, contracting space is restricted to include only the termination level
and the final completion payment fixed at the beginning of the contract. Under these
restrictions, I find a unique incentive-compatible contract maximizing the investors’
profit. Despite the inherent limitation of the contract, it can serve as a benchmark for
a more complex contracting space. In addition, I extend the baseline model to allow
for one-time adjustment of the termination level with an intermediate compensation.
In my extended model, the payoff for the investors slightly increases compared to
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the baseline model.
Moreover, I compare my model with DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). In their
model, the agent directly controls the drift of the cash flow process. I will call
such projects as short-term projects hereafter since such projects do not require any
time interval between the agent’s effort and cash flow. Under a comparison rule,
I compare the expected profit the investors obtain from the two different types of
projects. More specifically, I fix a set of parameters that make the two projects yield
the same profit when there is no information asymmetry. However, the comparison
of two projects with moral hazard problem shows that the short-term project can
be preferred to the long-term project by the investors. This implies that the short-
termism (often criticized as a moral hazard problem of agent) can actually arise for
the sake of the principal. I expect that the results can provide a new insight to the
short-termism issue in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 analyzes the agent’s incentive compatibility and essential components
of the incentive-compatible contract under a general contracting space. In Section
4, I examine the optimal contract under a restricted contracting space and provide
some comparative statics. Section 5 compares the optimal contract for long and
short-term projects. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to several streams of the literature. First of all, this
paper builds on the literature of a hidden-action principal-agent problem, introduced
by Hölmstrom (1979). Among many works in this literature, Spear and Srivastava
(1987) and Rogerson (1985a) are related to my paper. They analyze a dynamic
principal-agent model in discrete-time setting. Since the seminal work of Sannikov
(2008), many researchers follow the novel technique to analyze an agency problem
in continuous-time setting.1 For example, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Zhu
(2013b), Biais et al. (2007), and He (2009) have used the methodology in order
to analyze a dynamic principal-agent model where the agent controls a cash flow
process. While the existing literature has full tractability since they consider only
one state variable, my model requires two state variables, which makes the problem
intractable. One notable exception is Cvitanic, Wan, and Yang (2013), who analyze
1Cvitanic´, Wan, and Zhang (2009) use a stochastic maximum principle approach in order to
characterize optimal contract in a similar setting.
50
moral hazard and adverse selection in continuous-time setting. In this paper, they
consider two states variables: the agent’s continuation value and temptation value.
Also, there is literature on optimal contracting problem for a long-term project. For
example, Zhu (2013a) studies a myopic agency problem where there exists a tension
between a short-term benefit and long-term cost. On the other hand, Sannikov
(2013) studies the situation where the agent’s effort has a persistent effect on the
future output. My modeling of long term project is closely related to Georgiadis
(2014). However, Georgiadis (2014) focuses more on agents’ behavior in a group
although he also considers a simple contracting problem. In this paper, I consider
an extended contracting space compared to the one in Georgiadis (2014).
Another closely related research area is experimentation. For instance, Manso
(2011), Hörner and Samuelson (2013), and Guo (2014) study the contracting prob-
lem when players do not know the profitability of a risky project. The main dif-
ference between this literature and my model is that players know the quality or
profitability of the project in my model. However, the profitability is unknown in
the literature of experimentation. While the agent’s past behavior is reflected in
the posterior belief on the quality of the project in the experimentation literature,
it is directly reflected in the current investment level in my model. Hence, the two
models have different implications. If players’ main concern is the unknown quality
of project, the experimentation model would be more appropriate. However, if the
main concern is the accumulated effort or development to complete a project, my
model specification would be more suitable.
3.3 The Model
I consider a continuous-time principal-agent model, where a principal or investors
need to hire an agent in order to operate an investment process or a R&D process.
If the principal decides not to hire the agent, both players receive their reservation
values. The firm’s cash flow process evolves according to
dYt = κ1{τ=τu ,τ≤t}dt,
where κ is a constant, and τ is a stopping time depending on the investment process.
Specifically, the stopping time τ = min[τu, τd] is decided by the investment process
{It }0≤t≤τ such that
τu = inf{s |Is ≥ I¯ for s ∈ [0,∞)} and τd = inf{s |Is ≤ I (Hs) for s ∈ [0,∞)},
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where I¯ is exogenously given but I (t) is determined by investors. Also, Hs denotes
a history of investment process until time s. Therefore, τ is a I- measurable stopping
time. I¯ and I (Ht ) represent the completion level and the termination level of the
investment, respectively. Therefore, the term κ1τ=τu means that if the investment
process reaches the completion level before the principal terminates the project, the
successful project starts generating cash flow at rate κ from the moment without
any agency problem. Note that I (Ht ) could be a negative infinity for every Ht .
In this case, the principal never terminates the investment. In this paper, I model
the publicly observable investment process by the following arithmetic Brownian
motion:
dIt = at dt + σdZt ,
where σ is a constant and Z = {Zt ,Ft ; 0 ≤ t < ∞} is a standard Brownian motion.
The drift term at ∈ {0, µ}, where µ > 0, is decided by the agent’s binary effort
choice. Each choice gives a different cost to the agent. If the agent chooses “shirk-
ing” (at = 0), then she enjoys private benefit φdt for each time t. On the other hand,
if she chooses “working” (at = µ), then there is no private benefit.
Under this environment, a contract Γ = (C, I,B,A) specifies a cumulative interme-
diate compensation C = {Ct }t≥0 to the agent, a lower bound I, the bonus payment
B = (Bu,Bd) at time τ, where Bu is compensated to the agent if τ = τu and Bd
is provided if τ = τd , and a recommended effort process A = {at }t≥0. All four
components are adapted to I.
Two players, the principal and the agent, are both risk-neutral. The principal or
investors discount the future at rate r > 0, and the agent discounts at ρ > r. The
agent is protected by limited liability. This implies dCt ≥ 0 for all t and B ≥ 0. For
simplicity, assume that both players’ reservation values are 0. Also, I assume that
investors possess full bargaining power.
In this paper, I say that a contract Γ is incentive-compatible if it induces the agent to
work until completion or termination. That is, a contract Γ is incentive-compatible
if A = {at = µ}0≤t<τ is a solution to the following agent’s problem:
max
a={at ∈{0, µ} | 0≤t<τ }
Ea
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt
(
dCt + φ
(
1 − at
µ
)
dt
)
+ e−ρτ (Bu1{τ=τu } + Bd1{τ=τd } )
]
.
Note that the expectation depends on the effort process a = {at ∈ {0, µ} | 0 ≤ t <
τ}. From now on, I suppress a in the expectation operator if the effort process is
A = {at = µ}0≤t<τ for brevity. Moreover, I assume that parameters κ and φ satisfy
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κ > φ. This is a necessary condition for the incentive-compatible contract to be
socially optimal.
The principal’s problem is to find an incentive-compatible contract Γ maximizing
his discounted expected profit
E
[
−
∫ τ
0
e−rt dCt + e−rτ
(
κ
r
1{τ=τu } − Bu1{τ=τu } − Bd1{τ=τd }
)]
− C0,
where a constant C0 is the setup cost for the project. Note that if φ = 0, the principal
can achieve the first best profit by choosing I = −∞, {Ct = 0}0≤t<τ, and Bu = Bd =
0, and the agent always exerts effort until the completion.2 This policy gives the
profit
exp

−−µ +
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
( I¯ − I0)

 κr − C0
to the principal and the reservation value to the agent. From now on, I call this
profit the first best profit.
3.4 Incentive Compatibility
In this section, I characterize the agent’s incentive compatibility condition and
two essential components of the optimal incentive-compatible contract, I and Bu.
Among two components, Bu does not appear in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
since the contract is only terminated when the agent’s continuation value reaches
zero in their problem. On the other hand, the possibility of a finite I is not consid-
ered in Georgiadis (2014).
Before I analyze the incentive compatibility condition, I put some restriction on
the choice of C and I in order to obtain tractability. Specifically, I only allow
a finite number of intermediate compensation and a finite number of termination
level updating based on the investment level. Denote Kc and Kd as the number of
intermediate compensation and the number of termination level updating. Then,
i-th intermediate compensation Ci is provided according to the threshold Ic,i such
that
dCt = Ci if t = inf{s |Is ≥ Ic,i for s ∈ [τc,i−1,∞)} and t < inf{s |Is ≤ I (s) for s ∈ [0,∞)},
where
τc,i ≡ inf{s |Is ≥ Ic,i for s ∈ [τc,i−1,∞)} for i = 1,2,3, . . . ,Kc and τc,0 = 0.
2I implicitly assume that the agent works if both actions give the same utility to the agent.
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On the other hand, the j-th termination level I j is adjusted by the thresholds Id,j
such that
I (Ht ) = I j if t = inf{s |Is ≥ Id,j for s ∈ [τd,j−1,∞)} and t < inf{s |Is ≤ I (s) for s ∈ [0,∞)},
where
τd,j ≡ inf{s |Is ≥ Id,j for s ∈ [τd,j−1,∞)} for i = 1,2,3, . . . ,Kd and τd,0 = 0.
Later, I demonstrate that the second restriction is closely related to the first restric-
tion. For brevity, I define a threshold Iu,k ∈ {Ic,1, . . . , Ic,Kc , Id,1, . . . , Id,Kd } such that
dCt = Ck , and I (Ht ) = I k
when
t = inf{s |Is ≥ Iu,k for s ∈ [τu,k−1,∞)} and t < inf{s |Is ≤ I (Hs) for s ∈ [0,∞)},
where
τu,k ≡ inf{s |Is ≥ Iu,k for s ∈ [τu,k−1,∞)} for i = 1,2,3, . . . ,Ku and τu,0 = 0,
allowing Ck = 0 and I k = I k+1, where Ku is the number of any intermediate com-
pensation or termination level updating. Therefore, Ku ≤ Kc + Kd . Therefore, Iu,k
represents the updating point of the intermediate compensation or the termination
level.
First, I analyze the agent’s problem and find the incentive-compatible condition. I
denote the agent’s continuation value at time t by W (It |I,C,B,a). That is,
W (It |I,C,B,a) =
Eat
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)
(
dCs + φ
(
1 − as
µ
)
ds
)
+ e−ρτ (Bu1{τ=τu } + Bd1{τ=τd })
]
.
I can rewrite this continuation value using τu,k . Denote W k (It |I,C,B,a) as the
agent’s continuation value for It ∈ [Iu,k−1, Iu,k ). That is,
W k (It ) =
Eat
[∫ τˆ
t
e−ρ(s−t)φ
(
1 − as
µ
)
ds + e−ρτˆ[(Ck+1 + W k+1(Iu,k ))1{τˆ=τu,k } + Bd1{τˆ=τd }]
]
,
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where τˆ = min[τu,k , τd] is a stopping time.
The agent chooses her effort level maximizing her continuation value each time t.
This maximization problem satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
ρW k dt = max
α
[
φ
(
1 − α
µ
)
dt + α
∂W k
∂I
dt +
1
2
σ2
∂2W k
∂I2
dt
]
subject to the boundary conditions
W k (I k−1) = Bd and W k (Iu,k ) = Ck+1 + W k+1(Iu,k )
for k = 1,2, . . . ,Ku.
I can characterize the incentive-compatibility condition using the equation.
Proposition 17 The contract Γ is incentive-compatible if
∂W k
∂I
≥ φ
µ
for every I k−1 < I < Iu,k and k = 1,2, . . . ,Ku.
Intuitively, if the agent shirks at time t, she obtains a private benefit φdt. However,
she loses µWI dt since the drift term is 0. Hence, by setting µ∂W k/∂I ≥ φ, the
principal can incentivize the agent. Combining the incentive-compatibility condi-
tion and the limited liability condition yields the following proposition.
Proposition 18 There is no incentive-compatible contract satisfying Bu = 0.
This says that the principal has to compensate for the completion of the investment
in order to incentivize the agent. Unless the principal provides the payment for
completion, the agent has an incentive to delay the completion since she can only
enjoy the private benefit before the completion. Note that the limited liability ex-
cludes a negative payment which can make the agent incentivized with Bu = 0. In
addition to this bonus payment, Proposition 19 shows that a finite lower bound I
is the other essential component for the incentive compatibility and a positive profit
to investors.
Proposition 19 The optimal incentive-compatible contract Γ satisfies I k > −∞ for
every k.
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Although the probability of completion is equal to one if I (Ht ) equal to negative
infinity for every Ht , it is not optimal for the principal to set I (Ht ) as such. If
the current investment level is really low at time t, it takes long time to complete
the investment. Therefore, for the agent, it would be better to enjoy the private
benefit than to exert effort to complete the project unless she will be compensated
big enough in the future. However, the compensation that makes the agent work
yields a negative profit to the principal at the very low level I. Also, the investment
level can get to the low level with a positive probability. Hence, the principal cannot
achieve both objectives, incentive-compatibility and positive profit, simultaneously
if the principal does not set a finite termination level.
Proposition 18 and 19 indicate that the optimal incentive-compatible contract has
to include a positive Bu and a finite I (Ht ) for every t. Generally, those Bu and
I (Ht ) can change as the investment level and the agent’s continuation value change.
However, this general case is difficult to analyze since this problem requires to solve
a partial differential equation instead of an ordinary differential equation. Therefore,
I characterize the incentive compatibility condition by imposing some restrictions
on the dependence of C and I upon the investment level.
3.5 Lower Bound
It is difficult to find a general optimal contract since the principal’s value function
depends on two state variables I and W . In this section, I restrict the contracting
space and find the optimal contract under that restriction. Formally, I restrict the
contracting space to Γ = (I,B,A) such that I and B are constant. That is, I do not
allow any intermediate compensation, adjustable lower bound, and adjustable bonus
payment. This contract can be interpreted as a lower bound for the general optimal
contract since the restricted contracting space includes two essential components in
the simplest way. Although this is very restrictive, the contract could be close to
the optimal one in some cases. For instance, companies may not have enough cash
or budget to provide any intermediate compensation. Also, they may not be able to
update the initial agreement for some reasons. In these cases, investors may focus
on the final payment or fix the termination level at the beginning of employment.
3.5.1 Optimal Contract under the Restricted Contract Space
Under this restricted contracting space, the agent’s continuation value is
Wt (I,B,a) = Eat
[∫ τ
t
e−ρs
(
φ
(
1 − as
µ
)
ds
)
+ e−ρτ (Bu1{τ=τu } + Bd1{τ=τd })
]
.
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If the effort process is A = {at = µ}0≤t<τ, Wt (I,B,a) can be written as3
Wt (I,B, A) = exp(η
−I + η+It ) − exp(η−It + η+I)
exp(η−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I) Bu
+
exp(η−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
exp(η−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)Bd ,
where
η− =
−µ − √µ2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
and η+ =
−µ + √µ2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
.
This equation enables one to find the final payment in a closed form. I characterize
it later. Under this condition, the principal’s problem is expressed by
max
(I,Bu ,Bd )∈IC
E
[
e−rτ
(
κ
r
1{τ=τu } − Bu1{τ=τu } − Bd1{τ=τd }
)]
= max
(I,Bu ,Bd )∈IC
[
exp(ν−I + ν+I0) − exp(ν−I0 + ν+I)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)
(
κ
r
− Bu
)
−exp(ν
−I0 + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I0)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I) Bd
]
,
where
ν− =
−µ − √µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
, ν+ =
−µ + √µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
,
and IC means the set of (I,Bu,Bd) satisfying the incentive-compatibility condition.
Since the setup cost does not affect the principal’s choice of the optimal contract
if he hires the agent, I suppress C0 in this section.4 Now, I characterize each
component of the optimal contract.
Lemma 5 The optimal Bd is equal to zero.
When the principal can’t adjust the lower bound and bonus payments, Bd only
makes the incentivization more difficult since Bd gives an incentive to shirk. Hence,
I define the principal’s choice set as (I,Bu) without loss of generality.
Lemma 6 For given I, the optimal bonus payment is
Bu(I) = exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
φ
µ
,
3The related mathematical result is stated in Appendix B.2.
4Unless the principal’s discounted expected profit is greater than C0, the principal does not hire
the agent. However, if he decides to hire the agent, C0 does not affect the choice of I and B since C0
is a sunk cost. Hence, without loss of generality, I ignore C0 or assume C0 = 0 in the analysis.
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where
I∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I, I¯
]
.
In order to incentivize the agent with any I on [I, I¯], the slope of the continuation
value with respect to I must be greater than φµ for all I ∈ [I, I¯] by Proposition 17.
For given I, the unique completion payment comes from the strict convexity of ∂W∂I
and the compactness of [I, I¯]. Here, one can see why the lower bound is essential
part for the optimal contract. For a given I, ∂W∂I is minimized at the point I
∗. If I
approaches to negative infinity, I∗ also goes to negative infinity. That is, there is no
finite completion payment Bu providing incentives since Bu goes to positive infinity
as I approaches to negative infinity. It is worth mentioning that I∗ is strictly greater
than I . This means that ∂W∂I is strictly greater than
φ
µ for I ∈ [I, I∗). That is, for I in
that region, the completion payment is provided more than needed to incentivize the
agent at each point. This means that when I decreases the principal can incentivize
the agent without increasing the completion payment in this region. On the other
hand, for I ∈ (I∗, I¯], the principal has to increase the completion payment as I
decreases. Mathematically, this is reflected in the convexity of W for I ∈ (I∗, I¯],
while W is concave in the region, [I, I∗). Therefore, when the investment level falls
close to I, there is a “self-incentive” effect. This effect does not arise if I = −∞. In
this case, W is convex on the whole region. Now, the principal’s problem is reduced
to find the optimal I maximizing his discounted expected profit at time 0.
Proposition 20 For given parameters (r > 0, ρ > r, µ > 0,σ > 0, κ > 0, φ, I¯, I0)
such that
κ
r
− Bu(I0) > 0, (3.1)
there exists a unique optimal contract (I,Bu) providing a positive expected dis-
counted profit to the principal. In this contract, Bu satisfies
Bu(I) = exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
φ
µ
,
where
I∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I, I¯
]
,
and I is the solution to the equation
P′(I)
(
κ
r
− Bu(I)
)
− P (I) ∂Bu(I)
∂I
= 0,
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where
P (I) = exp(ν
−I + ν+I0) − exp(ν−I0 + ν+I)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I) , and
P′(I) = −2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
exp
(
−2µ
σ2
I
)
exp(ν−I0 + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I0)
[exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)]2 .
If the condition (3.1) does not hold, there is no incentive-compatible contract pro-
viding a positive profit to the principal.
In the remaining paper, I call this contract the baseline contract. Figure 3.1 shows
the optimal choice of I when (r = 0.1, ρ = 0.15, µ = 10,σ = 3, κ = 15, φ = 3, I0 =
0, I¯ = 50).
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Figure 3.1: The optimal I = −2.6729 and Bu = 41.0295.
Although I drop the possibility of an intermediate payment to the agent in the base-
line contract, this restriction is not severe if the principal can’t adjust the termination
level in the middle of investment for some reason. For example, if the verification
of investment performance incurs some cost, the principal may want to avoid a fre-
quent update of the termination level. The following corollary formally states that
the intermediate compensation is closely related to the adjustment of the termina-
tion level.
Corollary 8 For a fixed I, a finite intermediate payment is not optimal in the set of
incentive-compatible contract.
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Corollary 8 has two implications. First, it says that if the principal can’t adjust the
termination level after the initiation of the contract, he has to focus on the com-
pletion payment. Intuitively, the intermediate compensation has no role for incen-
tivization after it is paid to the agent. Hence, the principal has to provide Bu(I)
eventually in order to fully incentivize the agent. This means that the intermediate
compensation only increases the principal’s cost if the termination level is fixed.
Second, this implies that if the principal provides an intermediate compensation, he
has to modify the termination level. In subsection 3.5.3, I examine how the contract
changes in this case.
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, I analyze some comparative statics of the optimal contract under the
restricted contracting space as in the previous section. The main interests are the
optimal termination level, the completion probability, and the players’ discounted
expected utilities. First, I define the completion probability as a function of I0 and
I.5 Formally,
P(I0, I) = Pr (τ = τu |I0) = exp(−δI) − exp(−δI0)
exp(−δI) − exp(−δ I¯) ,
where δ = 2µ
σ2
. Table 3.1 summarizes the analytical findings of comparative statics.
∂I∗ ∂U0 ∂W0 ∂P
∂φ + − ± −
∂I0 + + ± ±
Table 3.1: Comparative Statics for the Baseline Contract
It is particularly interesting to understand the effect of the private benefit and the
initial investment level because they play an important role in the following section
where I compare my model with another model based on a different specification.
First, I analyze the effect of the private benefit the agent can enjoy. As the benefit
increases, the optimal termination level increases and principal’s expected profit
decreases. The intuition is clear. The completion probability also decreases as the
termination level increases. On the other hand, the agent’s expected utility can go
either way. Note that as φ increases above a certain level, the expected profit is
negative and the agent will not be employed in the first place. Therefore, if φ is big
enough, the agent’s expected utility will be zero. For φ = 0, it gives zero utility to
5See Appendix B.2 for the related mathematical result.
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the agent while the principal obtains the first-best profit. Hence, the effect depends
on the value of φ.
Second, I also examine the effect of the initial investment level I0. As the initial in-
vestment level gets close to I¯, the project is getting closer to the completion. There-
fore, the optimal termination level and the principal’s expected profit increase. On
the other hand, the direction of the agent’s discounted expected utility and comple-
tion probability can be positive or negative. The completion probability decreases
if the principal increases the optimal termination level significantly compared to
the increment of the initial investment level. The decrease of the agent’s utility
can be demonstrated indirectly through the principal’s first-best profit. Denote the
first-best value of the profit by FB(µ, I0). That is,
FB(µ, I0) = exp
(
−ν+( I¯ − I0)
)
.
Then, doing simple calculations gives
∂FB(µ, I0)
∂µ
=
1√
µ2 + 2rσ2
ν+( I¯ − I0)FB(µ, I0) > 0, and
∂2FB(µ, I0)
∂µ∂I0
=
1√
µ2 + 2rσ2
ν+FB(µ, I0)(ν+( I¯ − I0) − 1) < 0 if ν+( I¯ − I0) < 1.
As one can see, the effect of µ decreases if the initial level is really close to I¯. This
implies that the role of the agent’s effort decreases when the initial level is close to
I¯. Hence, the agent’s utility can decrease. Note that, in the extreme case, I0 = I¯,
there is no need to hire the agent for the completion. Hence, in this case, the agent
obtains zero utility. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 illustrate the comparative static
results for the case (r = 0.1, ρ = 0.15, µ = 10,σ = 3, κ = 15, φ = 3, I0 = 0, I¯ =
50) varying parameters I0 and φ. One thing to note is that the agent’s discounted
expected utility sharply decreases when I0 is really close to I¯. From this result, I
can anticipate that the agent prefers the project which is moderately far from the
completion level. That is, she may prefer the project taking more time to the one
that is closer to the completion. However, she does not prefer a project which is far
from the completion. This result can be connected to the short-termism problem
in the literature; agents prefer a moderately short-term project compared to a long-
term project, but they prefer a moderately short-term project to a very short-term
project.
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Figure 3.2: Comparative Statics with respect to I0
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Figure 3.3: Comparative Statics with respect to φ
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3.5.3 One Step Further
In this section, I extend the contracting space. In contrast to the baseline contract, I
allow one time adjustment of the termination level with an intermediate compensa-
tion denoted by C, which can be zero. In this case, the principal’s problem is much
more complex since the final payment and the intermediate compensation depend
on three thresholds ( Î, I1, I2), where Î, I1, and I2 denote the updating point, the first
termination level, and the updated termination level, respectively. More specifi-
cally, the first termination level is set at I1. However, if the investment level reaches
Î before it drops to the first termination level, the termination level is adjusted to
I2 paying the intermediate compensation C to the agent. The following proposition
shows the existence of the optimal contract and illustrates the optimal payments as
the function of three threshold levels.
Proposition 21 Suppose that parameters (r > 0, ρ > r, µ > 0,σ > 0, κ > 0, φ, I¯, I0)
satisfy the condition
κ
r
− Bu(I0) > 0.
Then, there exists a solution ( Î, I1, I2,C,B) to the principal’s problem, and the op-
timal B and C are given as follows :
B(I2) ≡
exp(η−I2 + η
+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
η+ exp(η−I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η−I∗∗ + η+I2)
φ
µ
,
where
I∗∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I2, I¯
]
,
and
C( Î, I1, I2) ≡ max

φ
µ
exp(η− I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η− I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η− I∗ + η+I1)
− P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B(I2),0
 ,
where
I∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I1, Î
]
.
From now on, I call this contract the extended contract. Note that this contract
includes the baseline contract since setting Î = I¯, I1 = I
∗, and I2 = I¯ gives the same
profit to the principal as (I∗,Bu(I∗)). Hence, this extended contract must provide at
least the same profit as the baseline contract. Figure 3.4 illustrates the principal’s
discounted expected profit when (r = 0.1, ρ = 0.15, µ = 10,σ = 3, κ = 15, φ =
3, I¯ = 50) varying I0 from 0 to 50.
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Figure 3.4: The baseline and extended contracts - Principal
This example shows that the extended contract provides slightly higher profit to the
principal. According to the numerical example, the extended contract gives 1.29
percent higher profit to the principal when I0 is equal to zero. At this point, the
optimal ( Î, I1, I2) is (24.2084, −2.7348,20.3077), and (C,B) is (8.1294,29.1332).
On the other hand, the baseline contract is (I,Bu) = (−2.6729,41.0295) with the
same parameters. Also, the extended contract provides 2.85 percent higher profit to
the principal when I0 = 48.78. with ( Î, I1, I2) = (49.3877,47.1187,47.7064) and
(C,B) = (0,10.7773). At this point, the baseline contract is (I,Bu) = (47.1143,
16.3975). Surprisingly, the principal can achieve higher profit by adjusting the ter-
mination level without any intermediate payment. However, in this case, two ter-
mination levels should be very close in order to fully incentivize the agent. For
the future research, it would be interesting to analyze a more extended case where
frequent updating is allowed.
3.6 Comparison with DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) find the optimal contract when the agent controls
the drift of a cash flow process. That is, the cash flow process evolves as
dYt = aˆt dt + σˆdẐt ,
where aˆt could be µˆ or zero according to the agent’s effort choice and Ẑ = { Ẑt , F̂t ; 0 ≤
t < ∞} is a standard Brownian motion. If the agent shirks (aˆt = 0), she enjoys the
private benefit φdt.
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The following Proposition rephrases the result in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),
which characterizes the optimal contract implementing high effort until the termi-
nation.
Proposition 22 (Proposition 1 and 7 in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)) The con-
tract that maximizes the principal’s profit and delivers the value W0 ∈ [0,Ŵ ] to the
agent takes the following form : Wt evolves according to
dWt = ρWt dt − dCt − φ
(
1 − at
µˆ
)
+ φ(dYt − µˆdt).
When Wt ∈ [0,Ŵ ), dCt = 0. When Wt = Ŵ , payments dCt cause Wt to reflect at Ŵ .
If W0 > Ŵ , an immediate payment W0 − Ŵ is made. The contract is terminated at
time τ when Wt reaches 0. The principal’s expected payoff at any point is given by
a concave function b(Wt ), which satisfies
rb(W ) = µˆ + ρW b′(W ) +
1
2
φ2σˆ2b′′(W )
on the interval [0,Ŵ ], b′(W ) = −1 for W ≥ Ŵ , and boundary conditions b(0) = 0
and rb(Ŵ ) = µˆ − ρŴ .
In contrast to my model, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) consider a project in which
the agent controls the cash flow directly. For instance, in an automobile company,
a manager may control sales or production of existing models. Such tasks can
be understood as a short-term project. On the other hand, development of a new
model is considered as a long-term investment project. If the company faces limited
resources, it should decide between short-term and long-term projects. Hence, it is
worth comparing two different types of projects to see which project the firm will
pursue.
The difference between DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and my model has an impor-
tant implication. There are two main differences. First of all, the current investment
level It plays a key role in my model. It measures the distance to the completion
level. The lower the current level is, the longer the project remains incomplete on
average. Secondly, the long-term project can be ended by both completion and
termination. If the long-term project is completed, then it generates the cash flow
without an agent. Hence, the firm does not suffer from an agency problem after
it finishes the project. On the other hand, the firm pursuing a short-term project
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constantly encounters the agency problem unless they fire the agent giving up the
additional cash flow. Hence, one can see that there is a tension between the length
of agency problem and its intensity when a principal chooses its project. Specifi-
cally, if I0 is closer to I¯, the expected time to completion will be shorter. On the
other hand, if I0 is far from I¯, it is expected to take a long time to finish the project.
Therefore, the length of agency problem is determined by the distance between I0
and I¯. However, in the long term project, the agency problem can be more severe.
Since the agent can’t enjoy the private benefit once the project is completed, the
agent has higher incentive to shirk delaying the completion of the project. When
it comes to the short-term project, this type of incentive does not exist since the
contract runs out only when the firm fires the agent. This implies that the long-term
project can be worse than the short-term project with respect to the agency prob-
lem. Based on these implications, I numerically compare two projects from the
principal’s perspective in the following.
Before I compare the two contracts, I need to decide how to specify parameters be-
cause the comparison depends on the way I set the parameters. First, note that pa-
rameters (r, ρ, µ( µˆ), φ,σ(σˆ)) appear in both specifications. In order to reduce com-
plexity in comparison, I use the same values of those parameters for both models.
Note that the long-term project also depends on four additional variables; κ,C0, I0,
and I¯ . Since only the distance between I0 and I¯ matters, I fix I0 as zero without loss
of generality. After that, I specify κ and C0 according to the following equations
µˆ
r
= exp
(
−ν+( I¯ − I0)
) κ
r
− C0, and (3.2)
0 = exp
−
√
2r
σ
( I¯ − I0)
 κr − C0. (3.3)
The equation (3.2) says that both specifications provide the same profit to the prin-
cipal when there is no moral hazard problem. On the other hand, the equation (3.3)
means that both projects provide the same profit if at = aˆt = 0 all the time. That is,
if the principal can operate each project without a manager or agent, both projects
give the same profit. These two conditions make the two project comparable in the
sense that they have the same net present value ignoring the cost and the benefit
related to the agent.
Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6, and Figure 3.7 show the numerical results based on param-
eters (r = 0.1, ρ = 0.15,σ = σˆ = 12, µ = µˆ = 10, I0 = 0) varying the degree of
agency problem (φ) for three different I¯, 10, 50, and 100. The results show that the
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long-term project could provide higher profit to the principal when the completion
level is close enough to the initial level and the agent’s private benefit is not high
enough. However, if I¯ is very far from the initial investment level, the long-term
project provides lower profit than the short-term for all φ values. These results pro-
vide one important implication regarding “short-termism” : if one take into account
the agency problem, the short-term project could be the best choice for the principal
or investors.
This comparison has two critical limitations. First of all, the parameter σ (σˆ) does
not have the same effect on both specifications. In DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),
σˆ only affects the principal negatively since it reflects the unobservability of the
agent’s action. On the other hand, in my specification, higher σ can provide higher
profit to the principal because a higher volatility can help the investment process to
reach the completion level. This property is reflected in the equation (3.3). That
is, the long-term project provides a positive profit to the principal although the drift
term is equal to zero if there is no setup cost. This is different from the short-term
project which gives zero profit if the drift term of cash flow process is equal to zero.
The other limitation arises from the setup cost C0. If C0 is fixed, the principal’s profit
is a strictly increasing function in I0 by the comparative static result. However, if
C0 satisfied the condition (3.3), the principal’s profit can decrease as I0 increases
since the setup cost is also an increasing function in I0. Figure 3.8 shows that this
could happen under the parameters (r = 0.1, ρ = 0.15,σ = 12, µ = 10, I¯ = 100)
varying I0 from 0 to I¯ .
In summary, two observations (a higher σ can increase the principal’s profit and
I0 closer to I¯ can decrease the principal’s profit) make the interpretation not clear.
Nonetheless, this result can provide a research direction regarding the short-termism
issues.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison between the short-term and long-term contract when I¯ =
10.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison between the short-term and long-term contract when I¯ =
50.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison between the short-term and long-term contract when I¯ =
100.
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Figure 3.8: Principal’s discounted profit as I0 changes.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the optimal contract problem when the agent controls a
long-term investment process. I characterize the incentive compatibility condition
in the general contracting space. The characterization shows that there are two
essential components for the optimal incentive-compatible contract, a termination
level and a completion payment. Based on these results, I find the optimal con-
tract under a restricted contracting space which includes the two components in a
tractable way. This result shows that the principal can obtain a positive profit while
fully incentivizing the agent. Moreover, the comparative static results demonstrate
that the agent prefers a project which is moderately far from the completion level
while the principal always prefers the project closer to the completion. Also, I ex-
tend the contracting space by adding a one-time intermediate compensation and
termination level updating. The numerical results show that this extension makes
the principal slightly better off. Finally, I compare my result with DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006). This comparison gives an interesting insight regarding the short-
termism problem. That is, the principal herself could prefer a short-term project to
a long-term project if there is an agency problem.
In the future research, a more complex or general contracting space can be con-
sidered. This analysis can provide a tighter comparison between a long-term and
short-term project. Also, one can incorporate a repeated relation between the prin-
cipal and the agent. That is, after the completion of the long-term project, the
principal may re-hire the manager by assigning another long-term investment or
short-term project to her. I expect that a repeated relation would reduce the agency
cost. In the aspect of model specification of a long-term project, one can introduce
a time-varying cost or κ. These settings will make the problem more difficult since
the value of the project changes over time. Another interesting direction is to com-
bine my model with the short-term project model such that an agent can assign her
time or effort between two projects in order to maximize her utility according to the
contract. To characterize optimal contract with multi-tasks is an interesting topic
for future research.
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C h a p t e r 4
A CAREER CHOICE PROBLEM WITH INFORMATION
ASYMMETRY IN ABILITY
4.1 Introduction
Many scholars study two-sided matching problems between agents and organiza-
tions. They mostly focus on finding matching mechanisms satisfying some prop-
erties or the properties of a given mechanism. That is, researchers have examined
how the mechanism works after agents decide a set of organizations to be matched
with. When it comes to a career choice problem, however, people first think about
which career path to pursue and then decide what to do in a specific labor market.
In this context, a labor market should be interpreted as the aggregation of possible
career paths in a particular field. For example, each labor market has a certain re-
quirement such as MBA degree or a medical degree. In this paper, I examine how
people behave when there is more than one labor market on the market side with an
emphasis on agents’ career choice.
I consider agents with different ability level such as academic ability or commu-
nication skill. I assume that the agents’ abilities are independently and identically
distributed and the distribution is common knowledge to every agent. However,
each agent’s ability is private information. On the market side, throughout the pa-
per, I focus on the case with two labor markets. For example, I can consider two
markets for undergraduate students: 1) career path with a postgraduate degree and
2) career path without a postgraduate degree. A college student can enter an eco-
nomics Ph.D. program to be an economist or pursue an accounting career with a
bachelor’s degree. In order to focus on the information asymmetry between agents,
I assume that agents and career paths are matched according to their ranking (posi-
tive assortative matching) after agents make their career decisions. In other words,
an agent with higher ability experiences a better career path in each market.
Two labor markets are distinguished by its payoff distribution. I assume that one
market’s upper bound and lower bound are both higher than those of the other mar-
ket. In terms of the above example, the best career path with a postgraduate degree
is better than the best path with a bachelor’s degree and also the worst situation with
a graduate education is better than the worst case without a postgraduate degree.
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Agents choose one labor market to enter and this career decision is irreversible. The
irreversibility and incomplete information produce the tension between the proba-
bility of being matched and the expected payoff.
The tension results from two key elements of the model. First, the two labor mar-
kets may differ in competitiveness. In this paper, competitiveness of a market is
defined as the ratio of the number of applicants who apply to the market to the
number of career paths in it. Notice that the more competitive the market is, the
lower the acceptance rate is in that market. Going back to the example of under-
graduate students, if the number of agent pursuing a graduate education are much
larger than the number of jobs requiring postgraduate degrees, then the employment
rate of graduate schools would be very low. In this case, even though career paths
with postgraduate degree provide much better payoffs, students may participate in
the less desirable market. The other component to consider is the applicants’ rel-
ative ranking in each market. The ranking is important even when markets have
enough career paths for applicants since a low-ranked agent in one market could
get a higher payoff in the other market. That is, the outcome of the career choice is
not straightforward since the information about ability is private information when
agents make their choice over two markets.
In order to analyze the agents’ behavior in this setting, I consider a symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Importantly, I find that there is no pure strategy equi-
librium and there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which agents are divided
into two groups according to their ability. Members of the high ability group uses
a pure strategy and only apply to the more desirable market. On the other hand,
members of the low ability group apply to both markets with positive probability.
Also, in order to investigate the effect of asymmetric information on the market
side, I consider the competitiveness of a market. The analysis illustrates which
market is to be more competitive with the presence of information asymmetry. De-
spite some limitations, I believe that the results can serve as benchmark for more
complex environment and research.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the model of career choice. Section 4 introduces a simple exam-
ple and section 5 defines the equilibrium and shows its existence and uniqueness.
In section 7, I introduce the concept of competitiveness and compare the competi-
tiveness of each market. Section 7 extends the model and section 8 concludes.
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4.2 Related Literatures
This paper is closely related to several streams of literatures. First of all, the model
is based on two-sided matching problem. Since Gale and Shapley (1962) propose
the deferred acceptance algorithm, two-sided matching markets have been exten-
sively studied1 . Especially, Roth (1984) and Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)
introduce two-sided matching concept in order to analyze medical residencies and
school choice problem, respectively. While they deal with only one market, hospi-
tals or schools, on the side of organizations, I consider two markets case.
Second, this model contains a signaling problem. By choosing a market, agents
can reveal or signal their private information to organizations. Since the seminal
work by Spence (1973), signaling problems have been much studied in economics.
Particularly, Spence (1973) analyzes a situation with costly signal when there is a
private information. This paper shows that education may serve as signal conveying
information of agents’ type. Recently, Bilancini and Boncinelli (2013) develop a
model where disclosure of information is costly only for one side although both
sides have private information. On the other hand, Satterthwaite and Shneyerov
(2007) consider dynamic matching model under two-sided incomplete information
and participation costs. Unlike other papers, my model does not include any explicit
cost of revealing the private information, but implicit cost incurred by exclusiveness
of the two markets.
Finally, this paper can be interpreted as an extension of career or major choice
problem in labor economics. There is a huge literature in labor economics focus-
ing on major or career choice problem2 . Most of the literature considers dynamic
choice models where agents’ ability and preferences are unknown and have some
uncertainty. Therefore, these studies focuses on agents’ optimal choice when they
have imperfect information of their own characteristics. Noticeably, McCann et al.
(2015) study dynamic model where agents can choose between becoming teacher
and worker in a firm when individuals are characterized with two characteristics:
communication and cognitive skills. However, they do not consider any informa-
tional friction. In contrast with these literatures, in my paper, every agent knows
their own ability exactly and preferences and agents’ types are fixed. Therefore, the
key factor affecting agents’ choice problem is the uncertainty on relative ranking
among agents.
1See Roth (2008).
2See Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012)
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4.3 Model
4.3.1 Preliminaries
Consider the following career choice problem. One side is composed of agents
having private information on their ability. On the other side, there are two exclusive
labor markets; each market consists of a set of career paths. The distributions of
the two markets’ payoffs are common knowledge and the possible outcomes’ upper
bound and lower bound of one market are both higher than those of the other market.
From now on, I call the market with higher bounds a high-paying career, and the
other market a low-paying career.
Agents decide which career to pursue between these two labor markets. For sim-
plicity, I assume that the cost of market participation is zero, which implies that ev-
ery agent enters one of two markets. Moreover, in this paper, I exclude a possibility
of pursuing both careers simultaneously.3 Once agents make their career choices
over two markets, participants and possible career paths are matched according to
their ranking (positive assortative matching). That is, the best agent among those
pursuing the high-paying career experiences the best path of the high-paying career.
If the number of participants in the high-paying career or the low-paying career is
greater than the number of possible career paths in a market, low-ranked agents are
unmatched and gain the outside option for the market. In the benchmark model, I
assume that the unmatched agents cannot apply to the other market even when there
are remaining positions in that market.
4.3.2 Agents
There are I agents and their (one dimensional) ability θi, i = 1, . . . , I, is a pri-
vate information. However, the fact that θi is independently distributed according
to a distribution function F (·) is common knowledge. I assume that the function
F (θ) is continuously differentiable on a finite support [θ, θ¯] with F′(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ¯). There are n possible career paths in the high-paying career which are
represented by H1,H2, . . . ,Hn, and m paths in the low-paying career, represented
by L1,L2, . . . ,Lm. I consider the case that I ≥ n + m and n,m ≥ 2. Every agent has
the following identical preferences over possible career paths:
H1  H2  · · ·  Hn, L1  L2  · · ·  Lm, H1  L1, and Hn  Lm.
3Although this is a limitation, it may not be severe if career paths include career-change in the
future.
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Moreover, if an agent pursuing the high-paying career is unmatched, she will get
the outside option, OH . Also, unmatched low-paying career participants obtain the
outside option, OL. The two outside options satisfy Hn  OH , Lm  OL and
L1  OH , where the last condition makes the career choice problem not trivial.4 I
do not impose any other restriction on the relationship between OH and OL. That
is, OH  OL, OL  OH , and OH ∼ OL are all possible. For completeness, I assume
that every career path is acceptable to all agent and the two outside options are
preferred to the outcome from non-participation. Therefore, agent i’s action space
consists of
Ai = {H ,L}, i = 1,2, . . . ,N,
where H and L denote the participation in the high-paying career and the low-
paying career, respectively.
I denote the utility of an agent by u(M) when she is matched with a career path
M . Here, I assume that agents’ utility does not depend on their ability but only the
matched career path. Moreover, I consider the case where agents and career paths
in each market are matched based on the ranking in ability and payoff. That is, a
higher ability agent gets a better payoff in each market. I also assume that every
agent is appropriate to all career paths regardless of their ability.
4.3.3 Sequence of the Game
The game is played according to following steps:
1. Agents observe their ability θi, i = 1, . . . , I.
2. Agents decide whether to pursue the high-paying career or the low-paying
career.
3. Agents are matched with career paths according to their ranking.
4. If the number of agents who participate in one of two labor markets is greater
than the number of possible paths, then low-ranked agents remain unmatched
and obtain the outside option associated with the market.
4If OH % L1, every agent pursues the high-paying career for sure.
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4.3.4 Equilibrium Concept
I focus on a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium to characterize the agents’ be-
havior in the career choice problem. Recall that an agent i’s action space is com-
posed of two elements:
Ai = {H , L}.
Therefore, for a given other agents’ strategy s−i, she chooses her strategy to maxi-
mize her expected utility:
s∗i (s−i) = arg maxsi∈∆(Ai )
E[u(·) |(si, s−i)].
From now on, I suppress the subscript i for brevity since I consider a symmetric
equilibrium.
4.4 Simple Example
In this section, I consider a simple example in order to illustrate the tension between
pursuing a more desirable career and the probability of employment. In the econ-
omy, there are four agents and their abilities are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. On
the other hand, there are two high-paying career paths and two low-paying career
paths. Every agent has the following identical utility function:
u(H1) = 4,u(H2) = 2,u(L1) = 3,u(L2) = 1, and u(OH ) = u(OL) = 0,
where Hi and Li, i = 1,2, represent high-paying and low-paying career paths, re-
spectively. Also, OH and OL denote the outside options for each labor market.
If there is no information asymmetry, agents and career paths are matched in the
following way:
µComplete =

H1 H2 L1 L2S1 S3 S2 S4

 ,
where Si represents ith ranked agent.5 Therefore, under the complete information,
agents choose their career based on their relative ranking compared to other agents
since this ranking determines their payoffs. However, when there is information
asymmetry, agents have to make decision without the information about the rank-
ing.
5Without loss of generality, I can ignore the case where some agents have the same ability since
the distribution function for the ability is continuous.
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In equilibrium, there is a cut-off (θ̂ ≈ 0.8318) such that agents above the cut-off
ability pursue the high-paying career and agents below the cut-off attend both la-
bor markets with a positive probability. The solid line in Figure 4.1 indicates the
equilibrium strategy for each type under incomplete information6 . That is, g(θ) is
the probability that an agent with ability θ pursues the high-paying career. In order
to compare this with the complete information case, Figure 4.1 also includes the
ex-ante probability (dotted line) that each agent with ability θ concentrates on the
high-paying career. In other words, the probability of being first or third ranked
among four agents.
It is worth mentioning that high-ability agents (θ ≥ θ̂) pursue the high-paying career
with probability one under incomplete information although there is a chance that
they are ranked second or fourth. Based on the equilibrium strategy and the ex-
ante probability, the solid line and dotted line in Figure 4.2 illustrate the expected
utility when agents follow the strategy with information asymmetry and the ex-
ante expected utility of each type with complete information, respectively. The
result shows that the cut-off type agent experiences the biggest utility loss when
agents’ ability is private information compared to the complete information case. I
generalize this example and characterize the equilibrium behavior in the following
sections.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium strategy g(θ)
4.5 Equilibrium
4.5.1 Pure Strategy Equilibrium
First, I prove that there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in this problem.
Proposition 23 There is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
6See the appendix for the derivation.
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Figure 4.2: Expected Utilities
Intuitively, there must exist a cut-off such that agents with higher ability than the
cut-off pursue the high-paying career with probability one since they are matched
with H1 with very high probability. Notice that an agent with the cut-off ability
must obtain the same expected utility whatever she does in the equilibrium. Now,
assume that there is a non-degenerate interval below the cut-off such that agents
with ability in the interval use pure strategy. Denote this interval by [a,b], where
a < b. If an agent with ability a uses the same (pure) strategy as one with ability
b, her expected utility should be strictly less than that of the agent with ability b
in equilibrium. However, if she uses the other (pure) strategy7 , she can obtain the
same expected utility as the agent with ability b since there is no competitors with
ability θ ∈ (a,b) . This is a contradiction. Hence, there is no symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium.
4.5.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
In this section, I examine the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 24 Among integrable functions g(θ), there exists a unique symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium (s∗). This has the following form:
Agents with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursue the high-paying career with probability one. On
the other hand, agents with ability θ < θ̂ pursue the high-paying career with proba-
bility g(θ) and the low-paying career with probability 1− g(θ), where g(θ) is given
by:
g(θ) = − N (θ)M (θ) − N (θ) , θ ≤ θ < θ̂,
7Note that there are only two pure strategies: H and L.
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where
M (θi ) =
∂E[u(·) |(si (θi ) = H , s∗−i (θ−i ))]
∂θi
and N (θi ) =
∂E[u(·) |(si (θi ) = L, s∗−i (θ−i ))]
∂θi
.
I provide the sketch of the proof of this proposition. Details are in the appendix.
Proof 2 Claim 1 The cut-off ability θ̂ is strictly greater than θ, the lower bound of
the type space.
If every agent pursues the high-paying career, low ability agents can increase their
expected utility by deviating from the strategy since they will be matched with L1
for sure if they participate in the other labor market. Hence, the cut-off must be
strictly greater than θ.
For the next claim and the rest of this paper, I define a function D(·) as the difference
in the expected utility between pursuing the high-paying career and the low-paying
career:
D(θ) = E[u(·) |(si (θ) = H , s∗−i (θ−i))] − E[u(·) |(si (θi) = L, s∗−i (θ−i))].
Also, I introduce two functions:
P (a,b) :=
(∫ b
a
f (θ)g(θ)dθ
)
, and Q(a,b) =
(∫ b
a
f (θ)(1 − g(θ))dθ
)
.
P (a,b) represents the ex-ante probability that an agent pursues the high-paying
career with ability θ ∈ (a,b) Similarly, Q(a,b) is the ex-ante probability that an
agent attend the labor market of the low-paying career paths with ability θ ∈ (a,b).
Claim 2 There exists a unique value of Q(θ, θ̂) ∈ (0,1) such that D(θ) = 0.
For the lowest ability agent, the only factor to take into consideration is the prob-
ability that other agents participate in the labor market of the low-paying career
paths (Q(θ, θ̂)) or the probability that other agents pursue the high-paying career
(1−Q(θ, θ̂)) since it is not possible (probability is zero) that there is an agent whose
ability is less than or equal to θ. Since D(θ) should be zero in equilibrium, Q(θ, θ̂)
must have the unique value to guarantee the condition, D(θ) = 0.
Claim 3 There exists a unique θ̂ < θ¯ such that D(θ̂) = 0 and D(θ) = 0.
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First, note that D(θ¯) = u(H1) − u(L1) > 0 since she will be matched with the
best career path in the labor market she attends. Therefore, the cut-off θ̂ should be
strictly lower than the upper bound, θ¯. The condition D(θ¯) > 0 also implies that it
is better for a high-ability to pursue the high-paying career since the probability of
being matched with the career path H1 is very high. However, this chance decreases
as the ability gets lower. At the end, for an agent with the cut-off ability θ̂, both
strategies should provide the same expected utility in equilibrium. That is, D(θ̂)
should be zero, and there is a unique θ̂ satisfying this condition and D(θ) = 0.
In words, given an environment, Claim 2 tells us that the ex-ante probability that
an agent participates in the labor market of the low-paying career paths should
be fixed. This fixed probability leads us to Claim 3, which determines the cut-off
ability. That is, there is a certain cut-off such that an agent with a higher ability
than the cut-off use the pure-strategy (pursue the high-paying career).
Claim 4 For given θ̂∗ and Q(θ, θ̂∗), there is a unique value of Q(θ, θ) satisfying
D(θ) = 0 for each θin(θ, θ̂).
Since Q(θ, θ̂) and θ̂ are fixed, Q(θ, θ) determines the value of D(θ). For a given θ,
this claim means that there is a unique probability g(θ) since Q(θ, θ) only depends
on g(θ). Therefore, in equilibrium, an agent with ability θ ∈ [θ̂, θ¯) pursues the high-
paying career with probability one, and an agent with ability θ ∈ [θ, θ̂) pursues the
low-paying career with probability 1 − g(θ) ∈ (0,1).
4.5.3 Characterization
I have proved the existence of the equilibrium strategy g(θ) for each agent with
ability θ. In this section, I characterize the equilibrium strategy. In particular, I
show that there is a discontinuity of g(θ) at θ̂.
Proposition 25 g(θ) has a discontinuity at θ̂ . That is, lim
θ↑θ̂
g(θ) < 1 = g(θ̂).
Proof 3 Proof is in the Appendix.
This implies that the two groups, the high-ability group and the low-ability group,
are strictly divided. In other words, around the cut-off ability, a small difference in
ability causes a significant change in agent’s behavior.
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4.6 Competitiveness
In this section, I assume that I = n + m. Define the level of competitiveness of
a labor market including b ∈ {n,m} career paths by I
∫ θ¯
θ
f (θ)r (θ)dθ
b , where r (θ) is
the probability that an agent with ability θ participates in the market. Therefore,
the competitiveness of a market measures the expected number of applicants to the
market compared to the available career paths of the market.
Therefore, the competitiveness of the high-paying career is
I
∫ θ¯
θ
f (θ)g(θ)dθ
n
=
I (1 − Q∗)
n
,
and that of the low-paying career is
I
∫ θ¯
θ
f (θ)(1 − g(θ))dθ
m
=
IQ∗
m
.
Note that if the information is complete, both markets have the same competitive-
ness equal to one. In order to compare competitiveness of the two markets in equi-
librium, I define two variables:
E[H ] :=
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
u(OH )
(m
I
) j (n
I
) I−1− j
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
u(HI− j )
(m
I
) j (n
I
) I−1− j
and
E[L] :=
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
u(OL)
(m
I
) j (n
I
) I−1− j
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
u(LI− j )
(m
I
) j (n
I
) I−1− j
.
Here, E[H ] (E[L]) represents the expected utility of an agent with the lowest abil-
ity among all agents if she pursue the high-paying career (the low-paying career)
and all other agents randomly choose their career path according to the ratio of
available career paths of a marker to the total number of career paths. That is, other
agents pursue the high-paying career path with probability nI and the low-paying
career path with probability mI .
Proposition 26 If E[H ] is greater(smaller) than E[L], the high-paying career
path is more (less) competitive than the low-paying career path.
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Proof 4 Proof is in the Appendix.
Competitiveness of a labor market has important meaning since unbalanced com-
petitiveness implies inefficient allocation of human capital. In particular, if the com-
petitiveness of a market is greater than one, some agents in this market may end up
unemployed, while other marker could experience a shortage of labor supply.
4.7 Extension
4.7.1 Endogenous Outside Option
Up to this point, I have considered a situation where agents choose their action si-
multaneously and two markets are exclusive. This situation is proper if two markets
are divided physically or each career path has a specific requirement. For example,
a migrant worker has to decide where he settles in order to find a job. Once he
has decided where to move, then it is difficult to move again due to moving costs.
Therefore, he has to choose where to go based on possible jobs and competition in
that area. However, in some cases, agents can still try to pursue the other career
after they experience a career failure. For instance, a student who fails to pass the
CPA exam might pursue a finance career instead. Although his comparative advan-
tage is low compared to students who have prepared for a long time to become a
financial analyst, he might still prefer having a job to being unemployed. In order
to incorporate this situation, in this section, I consider a model where the outside
option OH is determined endogenously. In particular, agents who pursue the high-
paying career can be matched with the remaining slots in the other market if they
do not succeed in the high-paying career. In addition, I add one more assumption
on agents’ preferences over career paths, Hn  L1. That is, the worst outcome in
the high-paying career is preferred to the best low-paying career path. This implies
that the high-paying career dominates the low-paying career in all possible payoffs.
The sequence of the game is the following:
1. Agents observe their type θi.
2. Agents decide whether to pursue the high-paying career or the low-paying
career.
3. Agents are matched with career paths according to their ranking.
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4. If the number of agents who purse the low-paying career is greater than
the number of low-paying career paths, then low-ranked agents remain un-
matched and obtain the outside option.
If the number of agents who pursue the high-paying career is greater than the
number of high-paying career paths, the unmatched agents will be matched
with the remaining low-paying career paths according to their ranking after
the first round matching.
Unmatched agents after the second round matching get the outside option.
The following proposition shows that agents behave in the similar way as Proposi-
tion 24 in equilibrium.
Proposition 27 There does not exist any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Also,
among integrable functions g(θ), there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium. This has the following form: Agents with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursue the
high-paying career with probability one. On the other hand, agents with ability
θ < θ̂ pursue the high-paying career path with probability g(θ), where g(θ) is
given by:
g(θ) = − Ne(θ)Me(θ) − Ne(θ) , θ ≤ θ < θ̂,
where
Me (θi ) =
∂E[u(·) |(si (θi ) = H , s∗−i (θ−i ))]
∂θi
and Ne (θ) =
∂E[u(·) |(si (θi ) = L, s∗−i (θ−i ))]
∂θi
.
Proof 5 Proof is in the Appendix.
Note that this situation can be interpreted as a dynamic situation with a discount
factor equal to one. That is, agents who pursue the high-paying career at t = 1 can
attend the other labor market in the second round if they are not successful in their
first career.
The next question is how this opportunity for changing career affects agent’s equi-
librium behavior. In particular, when does the opportunity make the high-paying
career more desirable? In order to answer this question, I compare the equilibrium
cut-off ability for the exogenous outside option case with that for the endogenously
determined outside option case.
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Proposition 28 Denote θ̂ as the equilibrium cut-off when OH is given exogenously
and θ̂e as the equilibrium cut-off when the outside option is determined endoge-
nously with u(OL) = 0. Then, there is a value 0 < K < u(Hn) such that if
u(OH ) > K , then θ̂ < θ̂e. However, if u(OH ) < K , then θ̂ > θ̂e. Moreover,
θ̂ = θ̂e if u(OH ) = K .
Proof 6 Proof is in the Appendix.
In words, if the outside option given exogenously for an agent to pursue the high-
paying career is greater (lower) than a certain value K , the equilibrium cut-off
ability for the endogenous outside option case is greater (lower) than the equilib-
rium cut-off for the exogenous outside option case. Intuitively, if the outside option
for pursuing the high-paying career is high enough, an agent with ability θ̂e strictly
prefers the outside option OH to the opportunity that she can attend the other labor
market if she is not successful in her career. This implies θ̂ < θ̂e. On the other
hand, if both outside options (OH and OL) represent the same status such as “Un-
employment” (u(OH ) = u(OL) = 0), an agent with ability θ̂e prefers the case with
endogenous outside option case since she has one more chance to get a job, which
is better than being unemployed.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the equilibrium behavior in a career choice problem when
there are two exclusive labor markets with different payoff distributions. The result
shows that there is a cut-off point in ability such that agents are divided into two
groups. Members of the high ability group pursue the career where the best outcome
is possible. On the other hand, members of the low ability group attend both labor
markets with positive probability which depends on their ability. Moreover, if one
consider the probability that an agent pursue the high-paying career as a function
of agent’s ability, this function also sharply divides agents into two groups. In
particular, this function has a jump discontinuity at the cut-off point though this
function is continuous in each group.
Going back to the high-paying versus the low-paying career example, this equi-
librium behavior is consistent with reality in a sense that well-qualified students
pursue the career with the best career path without fear of failure. On the other
hand, students who are not strong enough spend much time agonizing over which
career to pursue. This agony leads different market choice although students are
84
similar. That is, these students use a mixed strategy in the aspect of game theory.
Among a number of interpretations of mixed strategy equilibrium, the following
interpretation from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) would be appropriate for this
situation:
A player’s action is a response to his guess about the other player’s
choice; guessing is a psychological operation that is very much delib-
erate and not random.
One contribution of this paper is to provide a way of introducing multi-markets on
the organization side in matching problems. The paper also contributes to the lit-
erature of career choice problem in labor economics. Most papers in the literature
have focused on uncertainty over the agent’s own ability and learning. However,
this paper shows that the information about own ability is not sufficient to explain
one’s career choice. Since people usually have to compete for jobs or positions
with competitors they do not know well, their relative ranking, which is uncertain,
is really important for their career choice. I believe that incorporating the mod-
elling assumption in this paper into existing literature would give us much more
satisfactory explanation.
In future research, more complex type spaces or heterogeneous preference relations
can be incorporated into the model in order to reflect a career specific or general
skills and students’ different preference relations over career paths. Also, one can
focus on the behavior of the organization side. Organizations might have some re-
quirements for applicants to elevate overall quality of its members. For example, a
market could impose restrictions on applicants’ quality by requiring some special-
ized test score. Moreover, one can consider a model where payoff distribution is
endogenously determined. Despite the simple structure of the model in this paper,
I believe that this model can be used as a starting point of the future research on
more realistic career choice problems with information asymmetry.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Derivation of P(e−Mi )
Note that
P(e−Mi ) =
N−1∑
j=0
1
j + 1
(
N − 1
j
)
s(e−Mi ) j (1 − s(e−Mi ))N−1− j
=
1
N s(e−Mi )
N−1∑
j=0
(
N
j + 1
)
s(e−Mi ) j+1(1 − s(e−Mi ))N−1− j
=
1
N s(e−Mi )


N∑
s=0
(
N
s
)
s(e−Mi )s (1 − s(e−Mi ))N−s − (1 − s(e−Mi ))N


=
1 − (1 − s(e−Mi ))N
N s(e−Mi )
.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Denote the firm’s profit when the CEO’s IR condition binds as Π. Then, the firm’s optimal
profit must be greater than or equal to Π.
First, for an action (e∗C ,e
∗
M ) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1], I show that there exists a solution (WGC ,W BC ,
WGM ,W
B
M ) to the firm’s problem. Note that when the CEO’s IR condition binds the firm’s
problem is reduced to the case of Grossman and Hart (1983). Hence, a solution exists
to this restricted problem. Now, I show that I can artificially bound the constraint set of
(WG
C
,W BC ,W
G
M ,W
B
M ). They are bounded below by two IR conditions. Moreover, they are
also bounded above since the firm’s optimal profit is lower than Π and the firm’s profit is
a strictly decreasing function in all four components in (WG
C
,W BC ,Wg ,Wb ) without a lower
bound. Also, the constraint set is closed according to two IC and two IR conditions. Hence,
there exists a solution by the Extreme value theorem. The remaining proof exactly follows
the proof in Grossman and Hart (1983).
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose this is not true. That is,
s(eM )u(WGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(W BM ) − g(eM ) + s(eM )P(e−M )VC > UM .
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Then, choosing new wage scheme (ŴGM ,Ŵ
B
M ) = (W
G
M − 1,W BM − 2), where 1 > 0 and
2 > 0, satisfying
u(WGM ) − u(W BM ) = u(ŴGM ) − u(Ŵ BM ) and
s(eM )u(ŴGM ) + (1 − s(eM ))u(Ŵ BM ) − g(eM ) + P(e−M )VC ≥ UM
gives a higher profit to the firm without affecting other constraints. Hence, the wage scheme
(WGM ,W
B
M ) is not optimal.
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Note that
∂F (V )
∂V = −
1
u′(WC )
+
1
u′(WM )
using the envelope theorem.
Differentiating this with respect toV gives
∂2F (V )
∂V2 =
u′′(WC )
u′(WC )3
+
1
N
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
+
u′′(WC )
u′(WC )3
g′(e∗C )
∂e∗C
∂V −
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
g′(e∗M )
∂e∗M
∂V
=
u′′(WC )
u′(WC )3
− u
′′(WC )
u′(WC )3
g′(e∗C )
u′′ (WC )
u′ (WC )2
g′(e∗C )
u′′ (WC )
u′ (WC )2
g′(e∗
C
)2 − g′′(e∗
C
)
+
1
N
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
− u
′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
g′(e∗M )
1
N
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM )2
g′(e∗M )
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM )2
g′(e∗M )2 − g′′(e∗M )
=
u′′(WC )
u′(WC )3

1 −
u′′ (WC )
u′ (WC )2
g′(e∗C )
2
u′′ (WC )
u′ (WC )2
g′(e∗
C
)2 − g′′(e∗
C
)


+
1
N
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3

1 −
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM )2
g′(e∗M )
2
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM )2
g′(e∗M )2 − g′′(e∗M )


< 0.
That is, F (V ) is a strictly concave function.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1
It is enough to show that
∂2F (V )
∂N∂V > 0.
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Notice that
∂2F (V )
∂N∂V = −
1
N2
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
V − u
′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
g′(e∗M )

 −β(GM − BM )
1
N 2
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM )
β2(GM − BM )2u′′(WM ) − g′′(e∗M )

V
= − 1
N2
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3

1 − β(GM − BM )
u′′ (WM )
u′ (WM ) g
′(e∗M )
β2(GM − BM )2u′′(WM ) − g′′(e∗M )

V
= − 1
N2
u′′(WM )
u′(WM )3
(
1 − β
2(GM − BM )2u′′(WM )
β2(GM − BM )2u′′(WM ) − g′′(e∗M )
)
V
> 0.
A.1.6 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose this is not the case. From the first order condition
β(GC − Bc ) = g
′(eC )
u′(WC )
,
it can be shown that e∗C and W
∗
C move in the opposite direction since the left hand side
is a constant. Therefore, e∗C should increase if W
∗
C decreases. Since V∗ increases as N
increases, W ∗C must increase according to
u(W ∗C ) = V∗ + g(e∗C ).
This contradicts the premise that W ∗C decreases. Hence,
∂W ∗C
∂N
> 0.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the first order condition is
− 1
u′(W ∗
C
)
+
1
u′(W ∗M )
= 0.
Hence, W ∗C should be the same as W
∗
M .
If GC − BC = GM − BM , using the previous result and two first order conditions, it can be
shown that
g′(e∗C ) = g
′(e∗M ).
That is, e∗C = e
∗
M .
Also, this result and the two individual rationality constraints imply that
u(WM ) − g(eM ) + 1NV
∗ = V∗ + 1
N
V∗ = UM .
Hence,
V∗ = N
N + 1
UM .
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A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that when agents are risk-neutral
∂F (V )
∂V = −s(eC ) − (1 − s(eC )) + N ∗ s(eM )P(e−M )
= −1 + (1 − (1 − s(eM ))N )
< 0
using the envelope theorem.1 Hence, the firm’s profit decreases as the level ofV increases.
A.1.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Using the envelope theorem,
∂F (V )
∂V = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+ N s(eM )P(e−M )
1
u′(WGM )
.
Differentiating this with respect toV gives
∂2F (V )
∂V2 = s(eC )
u′′(WG
C
)
u′(WG
C
)3
+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3
+ N s(eM )P(e−M )2
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
< 0.
A.1.10 Proof of Proposition 4
It is enough to show that
∂2F (V )
∂N∂V > 0.
Note that
∂2F (V )
∂N∂V = −(1 − s(eM ))
N log(1 − s(eM )) 1
u′(WGM )
+ [1 − (1 − s(eM ))N ]∂P(e−M )
∂N
V u
′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
> 0,
where
∂P(e−M )
∂N
=
1
s(eM )N2
[
− log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))N N − 1 + (1 − s(eM ))N
]
< 0
since k (s) ≡ − log(1− s)(1− s)N N−1+ (1− s)N is equal to zero when s = 0 and k′(s) < 0.
Here, I use the condition thatV ≥ 0.
A.1.11 Proof of Corollary 4
Denote the expected compensation to CEO by E[WC ],
E[WC ] = s(eC )WGC + (1 − s(eC ))W BC .
1In equilibrium, s(eM ) is equal to s(e−M ) since I am considering a symmetric equilibrium.
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Since ∂V∗∂N > 0, it is enough to show that
∂E[WC ]
∂V =
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
> 0.
A.1.12 Proof of Corollary 5
I need to show that the wage gap[
s(eC )(WGC )
∗ + (1 − s(eC ))(W BC )∗
]
−
[
s(eM )(WGM )
∗ + (1 − s(eM ))(W BM )∗
]
widens as N increases. Since (1− s(eM ))(W BM )∗ has a fixed value regardless of the number
of managers, it is enough to show that[
s(eC )(WGC )
∗ + (1 − s(eC ))(W BC )∗
]
− s(eM )(WGM )∗
is an increasing function in N . When agents have the log utility function, the first order
condition with respect toV is
s(eC )(WGC )
∗ + (1 − s(eC ))(WGC )∗ = (1 − (1 − s(eM ))N )(WGM )∗ .
Since the left hand side of the equation is a strictly increasing function inV and ∂V∗∂N > 0,
this side strictly increases as N increases. Hence,
∂
∂N
(1 − (1 − s(eM ))N )(WGM )∗ = − log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))N (WGM )∗
+ (1 − (1 − s(eM ))N )
∂(WGM )
∗
∂N
> 0.
Since[
s(eC )(WGC )
∗ + (1 − s(eC ))(W BC )∗
]
− s(eM )(WGM )∗ = (1− s(eM )− (1− s(eM ))N )(WGM )∗
(A.1)
∂
∂N
{ [
s(eC )(WGC )
∗ + (1 − s(eC ))(W BC )∗
]
− s(eM )(WGM )∗
}
=
− log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))N (WGM )∗ + (1 − s(eM ) − (1 − s(eM ))N )
∂(WGM )
∗
∂N
> − log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))N (WGM )∗ + (1 − s(eM ) − (1 − s(eM ))N )·
log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))N (WGM )∗
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
= − s(eM )
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N log(1 − s(eM ))(1 − s(eM ))
N (WGM )
∗
> 0
when N > 1. Also, when N = 1, the wage gap is equal to zero according to A.1. On the
other hand, the gap has a positive value when N = 2 since (WGM )
∗ > 0. Therefore, the
expected compensation gap is a strictly increasing function in N .
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A.1.13 Proof of Proposition 5
First, I consider a case when eC = eM .
Note that
F (UM |N ) = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
,
where
u(WGC ) = UM + g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC ))
g′(eC )
h′(eC )
,
u(W BC ) = UM + g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
h′(eC )
, and
u(WGM ) = UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
h′(eM )
− P(e−M )UM .
Denote the difference between 1/u′(WG
C
) and 1/u′(W BC ) by D.
For given (1 − s(eC ))D >  > 0, there is N̂ such that
1
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − (1 − s(eM ))
N
u′(WG)
< 
when N ≥ N̂ since P(e−M ) → 0 and (1 − s(eM ))N → 0 as N → ∞. Therefore, when
N ≥ N̂ ,
F (UM |N ) = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(Wg )
> − s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1
u′(WG
C
)
− 
= (1 − s(eC ))

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 − 
> 0.
Since F (V|N ) is a strictly concave inV ,V∗ > UM when N ≥ N̂ .
Second, I show that there is N∗ such thatV∗ > UM if N > N∗ when 0 < eC < eM < 1.
There are two possibilities;
s(eM )
u′(WGM )
≥ 1
u′(WG
C
)
or
s(eM )
u′(WGM )
<
1
u′(WG
C
)
whenV = UM and N = 1.
1.
(
s(eM )
u′ (WGM )
≥ 1
u′ (WGC )
)
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This condition implies that
F (UM |1) = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
s(eM )
u′(WGM )
≥ (1 − s(eC ))

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)


> 0.
Since ∂V∗∂N > 0,V∗ > UM for every N.
2.
(
s(eM )
u′ (WGM )
< 1
u′ (WGC )
)
Again, denote the difference between 1/u′(WG
C
) and 1/u′(W BC ) by D. Then, for
given (1 − s(eC ))D >  , there exists N̂ such that
0 ≤ 1
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − (1 − s(eM ))
N
u′(WGM )
< .
Therefore, when N ≥ N̂ ,
F (UM |N ) = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
> − s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1
u′(WG
C
)
− 
= (1 − s(eC ))

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 − 
> 0.
Since F (V|N ) is a strictly concave inV ,V∗ > UM when N ≥ N̂ .
A.1.14 Proof of Proposition 6
Under the given assumption, it can be shown that
∂2F (V )
∂V∂eC = −β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 + s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g′′(eC )β

 u′′(WGC )u′(WG
C
)3
− u
′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3


< 0,
∂2F (V )
∂V∂eM = N β
(1 − s(eM ))N−1
u′(Wg )
− [1 − (1 − s(eM ))N ]
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
(
(1 − s(eM )) g
′′(eM )
β
− ∂P(e−M )
∂eM
V
)
> 0.
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A.1.15 Proof of Proposition 7
First, I show thatV∗ increases as UM increases. From the first order condition with respect
toV∗:
− s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
= 0,
∂V∗
∂UM
=
[1 − (1 − s(eM ))N ] u
′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
s(eC )
u′′ (WGC )
u′ (WGC )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ (W BC )
u′ (W BC )3
+ N s(eM )P(e−M )2
u′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
> 0.
Note that for a given (N,eM ), (WGM )
∗ = (W BM )
∗ if
V∗ = g
′(eM )
βP(e−M )
since u(WGM ) − u(W BM ) = g
′ (eM )
β − P(e−M )V . For given (N,eC ,eM ), denoteV satisfying
(WGM )
∗ = (W BM )
∗ by V̂ . That is,
V̂ = g
′(eM )
βP(e−M )
> 0.
Then,
∂F (V|UM )
∂V
V=V̂ = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
There are two possible cases, ∂F (V|UM )∂V
V=V̂ ≥ 0 and ∂F (V|UM )∂V V=V̂ < 0.
If ∂F (V|UM )∂V
V=V̂ ≥ 0, then V∗ > V̂ . This implies that (WGM )∗ ≤ (W BM )∗ . Suppose that
∂F (V|UM )
∂V
V=V̂ < 0. SinceV is fixed at V̂ ,
lim
UM→∞
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
= ∞.
Hence, there is 0 < U∗M < ∞ such that
∂F (V|UM )
∂V
V=V̂ = 0.
Since ∂V∗∂UM > 0, (W
G
M )
∗ ≤ (W BM )∗ if UM ≥ U∗M .
A.1.16 Proof of Corollary 6
It is enough to show that there is UM such that W
B
C ≥ WGM whenV = 0 since this implies
that
∂F (V )
∂V
V=0 < 0.
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Note that
u(W BC ) − u(WGM ) = g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
β
−UM − g(eM ) − (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
whenV = 0. Hence, if
UM ≤ g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
β
− g(eM ) − (1 − s(eM )) g
′(eM )
β
,
W BC ≥ WGM .
Since ∂V∗∂UM > 0 and there is U˜M such thatV
∗ > 0 according to Proposition 7, there exists
U˜M such thatV∗ = 0 with ∂F (V )∂V V=V∗ = 0. Also, if UM is less than U˜M , the solution is
V∗ = 0 with ∂F (V )∂V V=V∗ < 0.
A.1.17 Proof of Proposition 8
Before I prove the proposition, I show that V∗ is bounded for every N . The first order
condition with respect toV implies that (WGM )∗ > (W BC )∗ for every N . Therefore,
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
− P(e−M )V∗ ≥ V∗ + g(eC ) − s(eC ) g
′(eC )
β
.
Since 0 ≤ P(e−M ) ≤ 1,
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
− g(eC ) + s(eC ) g
′(eC )
β
> V∗,
where the left hand side does not depend on N .
First, I denote the optimal compensations by (WG
C
(N ),W BC (N ),W
G
M (N ),W
B
M ) for a given
N .2
Then, the difference between the two profit per agent is
2(N + 1)(Π(V∗ |N )−Π(V∗ |1)) = (N − 1)(s(eM ) − s(eC ))(G − B)
− 2WC (N ) + (N + 1)WC (1) − 2NWM (N ) + (N + 1)WM (1),
where
WC (N ) = s(eC )WGC (N ) + (1 − s(eC ))W BC (N )
WM (N ) = s(eM )WGM (N ) + (1 − s(eM ))W BM (N ).
Since V∗ is bounded, optimal compensations (WC (N ),WM (N ),WC (1),WM (1)) are also
bounded. Also, they are not depend on G and B. Hence, there is G∗ − B∗ such that the
difference has a positive value for a given N since s(eM ) > s(eC ).
2Note that W BM does not depend on the number of candidates.
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For the second part, I impose a restriction on eM . Namely, for a given eC . eM satisfies the
condition that
V∗ (eC ,eM |N = 1) + g
′(eC )
β
− g
′(eM )
β
≥ 0,
where V∗ (eC ,eM |N = 1) is the optimal V when N = 1 for a given (eC ,eM ). Since
V∗ (eC ,eM |N = 1)+ g
′ (eC )
β − g
′ (eM )
β > 0 if eM = eC , there is e¯M such thatV∗ (eC ,eM |N =
1) + g
′ (eC )
β − g
′ (eM )
β ≥ 0 if eM ∈ (eC , e¯M ].
Note that
Π(V∗ |N )−Π(V∗ |1) = N − 1
2(N + 1)
(s(eM ) − s(eC ))(G − B)
− 1
2
s(eM )(WGM (N ) −WGM (1))
+
1
2(N + 1)
[−(N − 1)WM (N ) − 2WC (N ) + (N + 1)WC (1)]
<
N − 1
2(N + 1)
(s(eM ) − s(eC ))(G − B)
− 1
2
s(eM )(WGM (N ) −WGM (1))
+
1
2(N + 1)
[−(N − 1)WM (N ) − 2WC (N ) + (N − 1)WM (1) + 2WC (N )]
=
N − 1
2(N + 1)
(s(eM ) − s(eC ))(G − B)
− N
N + 1
s(eM )(WGM (N ) −WGM (1)).
The inequality holds since WC (N ) > WC (1) and WM (1) > WC (1). Note that WC (N ) >
WC (1) is true because ∂V
∗
∂N > 0. On the other hand, the condition imposed on eM guaran-
tees that WM (1) > WC (1).3 Here, I show that WM (1) > WC (1) if eM ∈ (eC , e¯M ]. The
first order condition with respect toV when N = 1 is
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
(1))
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
(1))
=
s(eM )
u′(WGM (1))
,
which implies that u(WGM (1)) > u(W
G
C
(1)). Therefore,
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
> 2V∗ + g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC )) g
′(eC )
β
.
This inequality and the condition on eM imply that
u(W BM ) = UM + g(eM ) − s(eM )
g′(eM )
β
> V∗ + g(eC ) − s(eC ) g
′(eC )
β
+V∗ + g
′(eC )
β
− g
′(eM )
β
≥ V∗ + g(eC ) − s(eC ) g
′(eC )
β
= u(W BC (1)).
3If agents have the log utility function, the condition is not needed.
99
Therefore, WM (1) > WC (1).
Hence, if
G − B < 2N
N − 1
s(eM )
s(eM ) − s(eC )
[
WGM (N ) −WGM (1)
]
,
Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1).
Notice that there is N̂ such that WGM (N ) > W
G
M (1) if N > N̂ since P(e−M ) converges to
zero as N approaches infinity andV∗ is bounded. Let O denote
inf
N∈[N̂,∞)
2N
N − 1
s(eM )
s(eM ) − s(eC )
[
WGM (N ) −WGM (1)
]
.
Then, Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1) if N > N̂ and G − B ≤ O.
A.1.18 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof 7 First, note that
Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) = (N + 1)WC (1) − 2WC (N ) + (N + 1)WM (1) − 2NWM (N )
2(N + 1)
,
where WC (k) and WM (k) represent CEO’s and managers’ expected compensation when
the firm hires k managers4 , respectively. When agents have the log utility function, the first
order condition with respect toV is
s(e)WGC (N ) + (1 − s(e))W BC (N ) = (1 − (1 − s(e))N )WGM (N ).
Using this condition, it can be shown that
Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) = s(e)[WGM (1) −WGM (N )]
− (1 − s(e))(1 − (1 − s(e))
N−1)WGM (N )
N + 1
− N − 1
2(N + 1)
(1 − s(e))W BM .
This indicates that Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) < 0 if WGM (N ) > WGM (1).
Also, when u(x) = log(x) and eC = eM = e,V (N ) is5
V∗ (N ) = − 1
1 + P(e−M )
·
log

s(eC ) exp
[
g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC )) g
′ (eC )
β
]
+ (1 − s(eC )) exp
[
g(eC ) − s(eC ) g
′ (eC )
β
]
(1 − (1 − s(eM ))N ) exp
[
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM )) g
′ (eM )
β
] 
= − 1
1 + P(e−M )
log

s(e) + (1 − s(e)) exp
[
− g′ (e)β
]
(1 − (1 − s(e))N ) exp
[
UM
] 
=
1
1 + P(e−M )
UM +
1
1 + P(e−M )
log

(1 − (1 − s(e))N )
s(e) + (1 − s(e)) exp
[
− g′ (e)β
]  .
4These are defined in A.1.17.
5In this proof, I explicitly indicate the dependency of the variable on N .
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Note that when UM = − log

s(e)
s(e)+(1−s(e)) exp
[
− g′ (e)β
]  ,V∗ (1) = 0, and
V∗ (N ) = 1
1 + P(e−M )
log
[
(1 − (1 − s(a))N )
s(a)
]
.
Therefore, Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) is greater than 0 if
s(e) −
[
N s(e) + 1 − (1 − s(a))N
N + 1
]
exp[−P(e−M |N )V∗ (N )]
− N − 1
2(N + 1)
(1 − s(e)) exp
(
−g
′(e)
β
)
> 0.
This is equivalent to
1 >
N
N + 1
1 + P(e−M |N )
[N P(e−M |N )]
P (e−M |N )
1+P (e−M |N )
+
N − 1
2(N + 1)
1 − s(e)
s(e)
exp
(
−g
′(a)
β
)
.
For a fixed N, the first term on the right hand side is increasing in the agents’ effort level e
since
∂
∂e

 1 + P(e−M |N )
[N P(e−M |N )]
P (e−M |N )
1+P (e−M |N )

 = − log[N P(e−M |N )]
(1 + P(e−M |N ))[N P(e−M |N )]
P(e−M |N )
1+P (e−M |N )
∂P(e−M |N )
∂e
> 0.
Also, the first term on the right hand side is bounded above by 1. On the other hand, the
second term on the right hand side is decreasing in a and converges to zero as a goes to 1.6
Therefore, there is e∗ (N ) ∈ (0,1) such that
1 >
N
N + 1
1 + P(e−M |N )
[N P(e−M |N )]
P (e−M |N )
1+P (e−M |N )
+
N − 1
2(N + 1)
1 − s(e)
s(e)
exp
(
−g
′(e)
β
)
holds if e ≥ e∗ (N ). That is, Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) is greater than zero.
However, for fixed e and N, there is U∗M such that Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) < 0 if UM >
U∗M (N ). Notice that
WGM (1) −WGM (N ) = exp
[
g(e) + (1 − s(e)) g
′(e)
β
]
·[
exp
[−V∗ (1)] − exp [−P(e−M |N )V∗ (N )] ] ,
which is less than zero if V∗ (1) > P(e−M |N )V∗ (N ). The difference between these two
terms is
V∗ (1) − P(e−M |N )V∗ (N ) =
(
1
2
− 1
1 + P(e−M |N )
)
UM + R(N,e), (A.2)
6This result relies on the condition that lime→1 g′(e) = ∞.
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where R(N,e) is a constant only depending on N and e not UM . Since P(e−M |N ) is strictly
less than 1 when N ≥ 2, there is U∗M (N ) such that WGM (1) < WGM (N ) if UM > U∗M (N ).
This implies that Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) < 0 when UM > U∗M (N ).
Now, I show that ∂
2
∂(UM )
2 [Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] < 0 if ∂∂UM [Π(V
∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] ≤ 0.
Suppose that
∂
∂UM
[
Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] = s(e)
2
WGM (1)
− N
N + 1
s(e)WGM (N ) −
N − 1
2(N + 1)
(1 − s(e))W BM
has a negative value. Then,
∂2
∂(UM )
2 [Π(V∗ |N )−Π(V∗ |1)] =
s(e)
4
WGM (1) −
N
N + 1
s(e)
1 + P(e−M |N )W
G
M (N )
− N − 1
2(N + 1)
(1 − s(a))W BM
<
s(e)
4
WGM (1) −
N
N + 1
s(e)
2
WGM (N )
− N − 1
4(N + 1)
(1 − s(a))W BM
=
1
2
[
s(e)
2
WGM (1) −
N
N + 1
s(e)WGM (N ) −
N − 1
2(N + 1)
(1 − s(e))W BM
]
=
1
2
∂
∂UM
[
Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] ≤ 0.
When Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) > 0 as UM = − log

s(a)
s(a)+(1−s(a)) exp
[
− g′ (a)β
]  ≡ U0M , there
are two possible cases.
1.
(
∂
∂UM
[Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] ≤ 0
)
Since there is U∗M (N ) such that Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) < 0 when UM > U∗M (N ),
there is a unique ÛM (N ) such thatΠ(V∗ |N )−Π(V∗ |1) > 0 if UM ∈
[
U0M ,ÛM (N )
)
.
2.
(
∂
∂UM
[Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] > 0
)
.
The condition that ∂
2
∂(UM )
2 [Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] < 0 if ∂∂UM [Π(V
∗ |N )−Π(V∗ |1)]
= 0 implies that there is a unique UM such that
∂
∂UM
[Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1)] = 0.
Hence, there is a unique ÛM (N ) such that Π(V∗ |N ) − Π(V∗ |1) > 0 if UM ∈[
U0M ,ÛM (N )
)
.
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Lastly, I show that there is N∗ such that WGM (1) < W
G
M (N ) if N ≥ N∗ for a given (UM ,e).
This implies that Π(V∗ |N ) < Π(V∗ |1) > 0. In the equation (A.2), R(N,e) is equal to
R(N,e) =
1
2
log

 s(e)s(e) + (1 − s(e)) exp [− g′ (a)β ]


− P(e−M |N )
1 + P(e−M |N ) log

 1 − (1 − s(e))
N
s(e) + (1 − s(e)) exp
[
− g′ (e)β
]

 .
Since
(
1
2 − 11+P(e−M |N )
)
UM > 0, it is enough to show that R(N,e) > 0 if N ≥ N∗ . The
first term of R(N,e) does not depend on N and has a strictly positive number. Denote this
number by C. On the other hand, the second term is always less than
P(e−M |N )
1 + P(e−M |N ) log

 1s(e) + (1 − s(e)) exp [− g′ (a)β ]

 , (A.3)
which is strictly decreasing function in N and converges to zero. Hence, there is N∗ such
that (A.3) is less than C if N ≥ N∗. This implies that R(N,e) > 0.
A.1.19 Proof of Proposition 10
Note that
∂2F
∂V∂N = −(1 − s(eM ))
N log(1 − s(eM )) 1u′(Wg ) > 0,
∂2F
∂(−eC )∂N = 0, and
∂2F
∂V∂(−eC ) = s(eC )
∂2WG
C
∂V∂eC + (1 − s(eC ))
∂2W BC
∂V∂eC + β

∂WGC∂V − ∂W
B
C
∂V


= −s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )
β

 u′′(WGC )u′(WG
C
)3
− u
′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3


+ β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 .
This result shows that ∂V∗∂N ≥ 0 and
∂e∗C
∂N ≤ 0 according to Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
First, consider e∗C as a function of V . Then, under the condition that u′′(x)/u′(x)3 is a
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decreasing function in x,
∂2F
∂V∂N =
−β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 + s(e∗C ) u′′(WGC )u′(WG
C
)2
∂WG
C
∂e∗
C
+(1 − s(e∗C ))
u′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)2
∂W BC
∂e∗
C

∂e∗C
∂N
− (1 − s(eM ))N log(1 − s(eM )) 1u′(Wg )
> 0
since ∂e
∗
C
∂N ≤ 0. This implies that ∂V
∗
∂N > 0. Now, consider the first order condition with
respect to eC :
β(G − B) = β(WGC −W BC ) + s(e∗C )
∂WG
C
∂eC
+ (1 − s(eC ))
∂W BC
∂eC
= β(WGC −W BC ) + s(e∗C )(1 − s(e∗C ))
g′′(e∗C )
β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 .
The right hand side of the equation is a strictly increasing function in e∗C if g
′′′(eC ) ≥ 0
and a strictly decreasing function inV . Hence, ∂V∗∂N > 0 indicates that
∂e∗C
∂N < 0.
A.1.20 Proof of Corollary 7
Note that
∂
∂N
[(WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗] =
∂V
∂N

1
u′((WG
C
)∗)
− 1
u′((W B
C
)∗)
+

 1 − s(e∗C )u′((WG
C
)∗
+
s(e∗C )
u′((W B
C
)∗)

 g′′(e∗C )β ∂e
∗
C
∂V

=
∂V
∂N
[
(WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗ +
(
(1 − s(e∗C ))(WGC )∗ + s(e∗C )(W BC )∗
) g′′(e∗C )
β
∂e∗C
∂V
]
when agents have the log utility function. Also, it can be shown that
∂e∗C
∂V = −
(
β + s(e∗C )(1 − s(e∗C ))
g′′ (e∗C )
β
)
((WG
C
)∗ − (W BC )∗)
D1 + D2
,
where
D1 =
(
β(1 − 2s(e∗C ))
g′′(e∗C )
β
+ s(e∗C )(1 − s(e∗C ))
g′′′(e∗C )
β
)
((WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗)
D2 =
(
β + s(e∗C )(1 − s(e∗C ))
g′′(e∗C )
β
)
g′′(e∗C )
β
((1 − s(e∗C ))(WGC )∗ + s(e∗C )(W BC )∗).
Hence,
∂
∂N
[(WGC )
∗ − (W BC )∗] =
(WG
C
)∗ − (W BC )∗
D1 + D2
D1 > 0.
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A.1.21 Proof of Proposition 11
Note that when V = 0, e∗C = e∗M by two first order conditions. Also, this implies that
WG
C
= WGM . Therefore,
∂F (V )
∂V
V=0 = −
s(e∗C )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(e
∗
C )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(e∗M ))N
u′(WGM )
= (1 − s(e∗C ))

1 − (1 − s(e∗C ))N−1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 .
Since WG
C
> W BC and (1− s(e∗C ))N−1 → 0 as N → ∞, there is N̂ such that ∂F (V )∂V V=0 > 0
if N > N̂ . This implies that V∗ > UM = 0 when N > N̂ . As a next step, I show that the
promotion incentive is bounded regardless of the firm size.
Claim 5 The optimal promotion incentiveV∗ is bounded for any N.
Proof 8 First, fix (eM ) ∈ (0,1) for a given N. Denote the optimal V by V∗ (eC ) for a
given eC . Recall that
∂V∗ (eC )
∂eC
< 0. Therefore,
V∗ (eC ) ≤ V∗ (0).
When eC = 0, the first order condition with respect toV is
− 1
u′(WF
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(e))N
u′(WGM )
= 0,
where u(WFC ) = V∗ (0). It can be easily shown that
V∗ (0) = u(WFC ) < u(WGM ) = UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
− P(e−M )V∗ (0),
implying that
V∗ (0) < 1
1 + P(e−M )
[
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
]
.
Notice that this bound does not depend on eC . Now, suppose that
V = 1
1 + P(e−M )
[
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
]
.
Then, the manager’s wage for good performance satisfies
u(WGM ) =
1
1 + P(e−M )
[
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
]
≥ 1
2
[
UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
]
.
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The bound for u(WGM ) does not depend on N. This result means that the firm has to pay the
wage satisfying the lower bound if it requires an effort level eM form its managers. Since
the wage approaches infinity as eM converges to one, there is e¯M < 1 such that e∗C ≤ e¯M re-
gardless of N and eC . Hence,V∗ is bounded by 11+P(e¯−M )
[
UM + g(e¯M ) + (1 − s(e¯M )) g
′ (e¯M )
β
]
,
which is less than
[
UM + g(e¯M ) + (1 − s(e¯M )) g
′ (e¯M )
β
]
. I denote this bound by V¯ . This
upper bound does not depend on N.
Based on this result, I show the following result.
Claim 6 There is N¯ such that (WGM )
∗ > (W BM )
∗ if N > N¯ .
Proof 9 Recall that
(WGM )
∗ ≤ (W BM )∗
if and only if
g′(e∗M )
β
≤ P(e−M )V∗ .
Since e∗M ≥ eM , where eM is the firm’s optimal effort choice whenV = 0, and P(e−M ) →
0 as N → ∞, there exists N¯ such that
g′(e∗M )
β
≥ g
′(eM )
β
> P(e−M )V¯ ≥ P(e−M )V¯
if N > N¯ . Therefore, (WGM )∗ > (W BM )∗ if N > N¯ .
Now, I show that e∗M > e
∗
C if N > N
∗ ≡ max{N̂ , N¯ }.
Note that two optimal effort levels e∗C and e
∗
M are decided by two first order conditions for
a givenV:
β(G − B) = β(WGC −W BC ) + s(e∗C )
∂WG
C
∂eC
+ (1 − s(eC ))
∂W BC
∂eC
= β(WGC −W BC ) + s(e∗C )(1 − s(e∗C ))
g′′(e∗C )
β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 , and
(A.4)
β(G − B) = β(WGM −W BM ) + s(e∗M )
∂WGM
∂eM
+ (1 − s(e∗M ))
∂W BM
∂eM
= β(WGM −W BM ) + s(e∗M )(1 − s(e∗M ))
g′′(e∗M )
β

 1u′(WGM ) −
1
u′(W BM )


− s(e∗M )
∂P(e∗−M )
∂eM
1
u′(WGM )
V . (A.5)
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If V is equal to UM = 0, two conditions yield e∗C = e∗M . The right hand side of (A.4) is a
strictly increasing function in V while that of (A.5) is a strictly decreasing function in V
since
∂JC (V ,eC )
∂V = β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 − s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g′′(eC )β

 u′′(WGC )u′(WG
C
)3
− u
′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3

 > 0,
∂JM (V ,eM )
∂V = −βP(e−M )
1
u′(WGM )
+ s(eM )(1 − s(eM )) g
′′(eM )
β
P(e−M )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
− s(eM ) ∂P(e−M )
∂eM
1
u′(WGM )
− s(eM ) ∂P(e−M )
∂eM
P(e−M )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
V
= s(eM )(1 − s(eM )) g
′′(eM )
β
P(e−M )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
− β(1 − s(eM ))N−1 1
u′(WGM )
− s(eM ) ∂P(e−M )
∂eM
P(e−M )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
V < 0,
where
JC (V ,eC ) = β(WGC −W BC ) + s(eC )(1 − s(eC ))
g′′(eC )
β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 , and
JM (V ,eM ) = β(WGM −W BM ) + s(eM )(1 − s(eM ))
g′′(eM )
β

 1u′(WGM ) −
1
u′(W BM )


− s(eM ) ∂P(e−M )
∂eM
1
u′(WGM )
V ,and
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
=
β
s(eM )
[(1 − s(eM ))N−1 − P(e−M )] < 0.
In addition, the following results
∂JC (V ,eC )
∂eC
= 2g′′(eC )

 1 − s(eC )u′(WG
C
)
+
s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)

 − g′′(eC )

 s(eC )u′(WG
C
)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)


− s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )2
β2
(1 − s(eC ))
u′′(WG
C
)
u′(W B
C
)3
+ s(eC )
u′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3

+ s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′′(eC )
β

 1u′(WG
C
)
− 1
u′(W B
C
)

 > 0,
∂JM (V ,eM )
∂eM
=
∂JC (V ,eC )
∂eC
eC=eM − 2β
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
1
u′(WGM )
V
+
2s(eM )(1 − s(eM ))
g′′(eM )
β
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
V − s(eM )
(
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
)2
V2

u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
− s(eM ) ∂
2P(e−M )
∂(eM )2
1
u′(WGM )
V
=
∂JC (V ,eC )
∂eC
eC=eM + β2(N − 1)(1 − s(eM ))N−2
1
u′(WGM )
V
+
2s(eM )(1 − s(eM ))
g′′(eM )
β
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
V − s(eM )
(
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
)2
V2

u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
> 0,
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where
∂2P(e−M )
∂(eM )2
=
β2
N s(eM )3
[
−N (N − 1)s(eM )2(1 − s(eM ))N−2
+2 − 2(1 − s(eM ))N−1 − 2(N − 1)s(eM )(1 − s(eM ))N−1
]
= − β
2
s(eM )
(N − 1)(1 − s(eM ))N−2 − 2 βs(eM )
∂P(e−M )
∂eM
≥ 0,
validate the first order approach.
Hence, e∗C < e
∗
M sinceV∗ > UM = 0 when N > N̂ .
A.1.22 Proof of Proposition 12
For a given (V ,N ), U∗
M2 is determined by the equation (2.9). I denote this by U
∗
M2(V ,N )
to explicitly express the dependency. The first order condition with respect to V and the
equation (2.9) imply thatV∗ and U∗
M2(V∗,N ) satisfy
s(eC )
u′((WG
C
)∗)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′((W B
C
)∗)
+
(1 − s(eM1))N
u′((WGM )∗)
= δ

s(eM2)
u′((WGGM )∗)
+
1 − s(eM2)
u′((WGBM )∗)
 ,
where the first order condition with respect toV is
∂F (V )
∂V = −
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+ N s(eM1)·

1
u′(WGM )
(
P(e−M ) + (1 − P(e−M )) ∂UM2(V )
∂V
)
− δ
(
N s(eM1) − 1 + (1 − s(eM1))N
)  s(eM2)u′(WGGM ) + 1 − s(eM2)u′(WGBM )

 ∂UM2(V )∂V
= − s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
1 − (1 − s(eM1))N
u′(WGM )
by (2.9).
Note that (1−s(eM1))
N
u′ (WGM )
approaches zero as N goes to infinity. Also, when eC = eM2, V =
UM2, and δ = 1, the condition is equal to
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
=
s(eM2)
u′(WGGM )
+
1 − s(eM2)
u′(WGBM )
.
Since the left hand side of this equation is a strictly increasing function in eC andV , there
is N̂ , eˆC < eM2 such that
s(eˆC )
u′(WG
C
)
+
1 − s(eˆC )
u′(W B
C
)
+
(1 − s(eM1)) N̂
u′(WGM )
< δ

s(eM2)
u′(WGGM )
+
1 − s(eM2)
u′(WGBM )

when V = UM for a sufficiently large δ. This implies that for given (δ,eC ,eM1,eM2,N ),
where eC ≤ eˆC < eM2 and N ≥ N̂ ,V∗ > U∗M2(V∗,N ).
108
Now, I show thatV∗ is an increasing function in N > N̂ whenV∗ ≥ U∗
M2(V∗, N̂ ).
First, note that for a givenV and N ,
∂U∗
M2(V ,N )
∂N
= −
u′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
∂P(e−M1)
∂N (V −U∗M2(V ,N ))
u′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
(1 − P(e−M1)) + δ
[
s(eM2)
u′′ (WGGM )
u′ (WGGM )3
+ (1 − s(eM2)) u
′′ (WGBM )
u′ (WGBM )3
] .
Therefore,
∂2F (V )
∂N∂V = −(1 − s(eM1))
N log(1 − s(eM1)) 1
u′(WGM )
+ [1 − (1 − s(eM1))N ]
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
·[
∂P(e−M1)
∂N
(V∗ −U∗M2) + (1 − P(e−M1))
∂U∗
M2(V ,N )
∂N
]
= −(1 − s(eM1))N log(1 − s(eM1)) 1
u′(WGM )
− [1 − (1 − s(eM1))N ]
s(eM2)
u′′(WGGM )
u′(WGGM )3
+ (1 − s(eM2))
u′′(WGBM )
u′(WGBM )3
 > 0.
Moreover,
∂2F (V )
∂V2 = s(eC )
u′′(WG
C
)
u′(WG
C
)3
+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3
+ (1 − (1 − s(eM1))N )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
[
P(e−M1) + (1 − P(e−M1))
∂U∗
M2(V ,N )
∂V
]
= s(eC )
u′′(WG
C
)
u′(WG
C
)3
+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′(W BC )
u′(W B
C
)3
+ (1 − (1 − s(eM1))N )
u′′(WGM )
u′(WGM )3
·

P(e−M1)
δ
[
s(eM2)
u′′ (WGGM )
u′ (WGGM )3
+ (1 − s(eM2)) u
′′ (WGBM )
u′ (WGBM )3
]
(1 − P(e−M1)) u
′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
+ δ
[
s(eM2)
u′′ (WGGM )
u′ (WGGM )3
+ (1 − s(eM2)) u
′′ (WGBM )
u′ (WGBM )3
]

< 0,
where I exploit
∂U∗
M2(V ,N )
∂V = −
P(e−M1)
u′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
(1 − P(e−M1)) u
′′ (WGM )
u′ (WGM )3
+ δ
[
s(eM2)
u′′ (WGGM )
u′ (WGGM )3
+ (1 − s(eM2)) u
′′ (WGBM )
u′ (WGBM )3
]
using the implicit function theorem.
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A.1.23 Derivation of the Firm’s Problem in Section 2.7.2
The firm’s problem can be written as
max
C,M1,M2
E0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)

subject to (IRC ), (ICC ), (IRM1), (ICM1), (IRM2), (ICM2),
where
P1(C,M1,M2 |H0) = PC (C) + PM (M1)
Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1) =

PC (C) + NPM (M1) ifHt−1 ∈ S1
NPM (M2) ifHt−1 ∈ S2
with
PC (C) = s(eC1)(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC1))(BC −W BC )
+ δs(eC1)[s(eC2)(GC −WGGC ) + (1 − s(eC2))(BC −WGBC )]
PM (Mi ) = s(eMi )(GM −WGMi ) + (1 − s(eMi ))(BM −W BMi )
C = (WGC ,W
B
C ,W
GG
C ,W
GB
C )
Mi = (WGMi ,W
B
Mi ).
Also,Ht denotes the CEO’s seniority and outcome at time t. Hence,
Ht ∈ {(C1,GC ), (C1,BC ), (C2,GC ), (C2,BC )},
where Ci is equal to C1 (C2) if the CEO is her first period (second period) in the position.
For brevity, I use two terms, S1 and S2, in order to represent
S1 = {(C1,BC ), (C2,GC ), (C2,BC )}
S2 = {(C1,GC )},
respectively.
Then,
E0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)
 = PC (C) + NPM (M1)
+ δs(eC1)
NPM (M2) + δE0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)


+ δ(1 − s(eC1))E0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)
 ,
where I exploit
E0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)
 = Es

∞∑
t=s+1
δt−(s+1)Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)

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ifHs ∈ S1. Therefore,
E0

∞∑
t=1
δt−1Pt (C,M1,M2 |Ht−1)
 =
1
(1 − δ)(1 + δs(eC1)) [PC (C) + NPM (M1) + δs(eC1)NPM (M2)] .
Since I treat eC1 as an exogenous variable, the firm’s problem is to choose (C,M1,M2)
maximizing
PC (C) + NPM (M1) + δs(eC1)NPM (M2).
A.1.24 Proof of Proposition 13
The firm’s problem for guaranteed situation is to choose V̂ ∈ [0,∞) maximizing F̂ (V̂ )
defined by7
F̂ (V̂ ) ≡ max
Â
s(eC )(GC − ŴGC ) + (1 − s(eC ))(BC − Ŵ BC )
+ δs(eC )[s(eC )(GC − ŴGGC ) + (1 − s(eC ))(BC − ŴGBC )]
+ δ(1 − s(eC ))[s(eC )(GC − Ŵ BGC ) + (1 − s(eC ))(BC − Ŵ BBC )]
+ N
[
s(eM )(GM − ŴGM1) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM − Ŵ BM1)
]
+ δN
[
s(eM )(GM − ŴGM2) + (1 − s(eM ))(BM − Ŵ BM2)
]
subject to
u(ŴGC ) = V + g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC ))
g′(eC )
β
− VG2 ,
u(Ŵ BC ) = V + g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
β
− V B2 ,
u(ŴGGC ) = V
G
2 + g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC ))
g′(eC )
β
,
u(ŴGBC ) = V
G
2 + g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
β
,
u(Ŵ BGC ) = V
B
2 + g(eC ) + (1 − s(eC ))
g′(eC )
β
,
u(Ŵ BBC ) = V
B
2 + g(eC ) − s(eC )
g′(eC )
β
,
u(ŴGM1) = UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
,
u(Ŵ BM1) = UM + g(eM ) − s(eM )
g′(eM )
β
,
u(ŴGM2) = UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s((eM ))
g′((eM )
β
− P(e−M )V , and
u(Ŵ BM2) = UM + g(eM ) − s(eM )
g′(eM )
β
,
7I use the hat notation to indicate guaranteed job security case.
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where
Â = {(ŴGC ,Ŵ BC ,ŴGGC ,ŴGBC ,Ŵ BGC ,Ŵ BBC ), (ŴGM1,Ŵ BM2), (ŴGM2,Ŵ BM2)},
VG2 = s(eC )u(Ŵ
GG
C ) + (1 − s(eC ))u(ŴGBC ) − g(eC ), and
V B2 = s(eC )u(Ŵ
BG
C ) + (1 − s(eC ))u(Ŵ BBC ) − g(eC ).
Then, the first order condition with respect toV for unguaranteed situation is
− s(eC )
u′(WG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
)
+ δ(1− s(eC )) 1 − (1 − s(eM ))
N
u′(WG
M1)
+ δs(eC )
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WG
M2)
= 0.
On the other hand, the condition for guaranteed case is
− s(eC )
u′(ŴG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(Ŵ B
C
)
+ δ
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(ŴG
M2)
= 0.
First, I show that there is δ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that (V B2 )∗ < V̂ for a given V̂ ∈ [0,∞). Note
that V̂ and (V B2 )∗ satisfy
1
u′(Ŵ B
C
)
− δ

s(eC )
u′(Ŵ BG
C
)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(Ŵ BB
C
)
 = 0.
Suppose that δ = 1. Then, the equation cannot hold if V̂ ≤ (V B2 )∗ since this inequality
implies that (Ŵ BG
C
)∗ > (Ŵ BBC )
∗ ≥ (ŴG
C
)∗. Here, the first inequality holds since eC > 0
and the last inequality holds as a strict inequality unlessV = (V B2 )∗ = 0. Since this is true
for all V̂ ∈ [0,∞), there is δ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that (V B2 )∗ < V̂ .
There are two possible cases when eC = 0: 1) V̂∗ (0) > 0, and 2) V̂∗ (0) = 0, where
V̂∗ (eC ) is the optimal promotion incentive for a given CEO’s effort level eC . First, I show
that ∂(V
B
2 )
∗
∂V̂ > 0 and
∂V̂∗ (eC )
∂eC
< 0 when V̂∗ (eC ) > 0 for eC ∈ (0,1). Notice that, by the
implicit function theorem,
∂(V B2 )
∗
∂V̂
=
u′′ (Ŵ BC )
u′ (Ŵ BC )3
u′′ (Ŵ BC )
u′ (Ŵ BC )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ (Ŵ BGC )
u′ (Ŵ BGC )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ (Ŵ BBC )
u′ (Ŵ BBC )3
] > 0.
Also, this means that ∂(V
B
2 )
∗
∂V̂ is less than 1. Likewise, 0 <
∂(VG2 )
∗
∂V̂ < 1. Hence,
∂V̂∗ (eC )
∂eC
= −
∂2 F̂ (V̂∗ )
∂eC∂V̂
∂2 F̂ (V̂∗ )
∂V̂2
< 0,
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where
∂2F̂ (V̂∗)
∂eC∂V̂
= −β

1
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)
− 1
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)
 + s(eC )
u′′((ŴG
C
)∗)
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)3
(1 − s(eC ))
g′′(eC )
β
− ∂(V
G
2 )
∗
∂eC

+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′((Ŵ BC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)3
−s(eC )
g′′(eC )
β
− ∂(V
B
2 )
∗
∂eC

= β

1
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)
− 1
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)

− s(eC )
u′′((ŴG
C
)∗)
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)3
·

δ
[
β
(
1
u′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )
− 1
u′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )
)
− s(ec )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′ (eC )
β
(
u′′ ((ŴGGC )
∗ )
u′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )3
− u′′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )3
)]
u′′ ((ŴGC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGC )∗ )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )3
]

− (1 − s(eC ))
u′′((Ŵ BC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)3
·

δ
[
β
(
1
u′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )
− 1
u′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )
)
− s(ec )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′ (eC )
β
(
u′′ ((Ŵ BGC )
∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )3
− u′′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )3
)]
u′′ ((Ŵ BC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BC )∗ )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )3
]

+ δs(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )
β
·
1(
u′′ ((ŴGC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGC )∗ )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGGC )∗ )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )
u′ ((ŴGBC )∗ )3
]) ·
1(
u′′ ((Ŵ BC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BC )∗ )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BGC )∗ )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )
u′ ((Ŵ BBC )∗ )3
]) ·

u′′((ŴG
C
)∗)
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)3
u′′((Ŵ BC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)3
s(eC )

 u′′((ŴGGC )∗)u′((ŴGG
C
)∗)3
− u
′′((Ŵ BG
C
)∗)
u′((Ŵ BG
C
)∗)3


+(1 − s(eC ))

 u′′((ŴGBC )∗)u′((ŴGB
C
)∗)3
− u
′′((Ŵ BBC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ BB
C
)∗)3


+ δ

s(eC ) u′′((ŴGGC )∗)u′((ŴGG
C
)∗)3
+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′((ŴGB
C
)∗)
u′((ŴGB
C
)∗)3

 ·
s(eC ) u′′((Ŵ BGC )∗)u′((Ŵ BG
C
)∗)3
+ (1 − s(eC ))
u′′((Ŵ BBC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ BB
C
)∗)3



 u′′((ŴGC )∗)u′((ŴG
C
)∗)3
− u
′′((Ŵ BC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)3

 
< 0,
and
∂2F̂ (V̂∗)
∂V̂2
= s(eC )
u′′((ŴG
C
)∗)
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)3
1 −
∂(VG2 )
∗
∂V̂
 + (1 − s(eC ))
u′′((Ŵ BC )
∗)
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)3
1 −
∂(V B2 )
∗
∂V̂

+ δ(1 − (1 − s(eM ))N )P(e−M )
u′′((ŴG
M2)
∗)
u′((ŴG
M2)
∗)3
< 0,
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where I use the following two results
∂(VG2 )
∗
∂eC
=
1
u′′ (ŴGC )
u′ (ŴGC )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ (ŴGGC )
u′ (ŴGGC )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ (ŴGBC )
u′ (ŴGBC )3
] ·
(1 − s(eC ))
g′′(eC )
β
u′′(ŴG
C
)
u′(ŴG
C
)3
+ δ
β

 1u′(ŴGG
C
)
− 1
u′(ŴGB
C
)


−s(ec )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )
β

 u′′(ŴGGC )u′(ŴGG
C
)3
− u
′′(ŴGB
C
)
u′(ŴGB
C
)3


 , and
∂(V B2 )
∗
∂eC
=
1
u′′ (Ŵ BC )
u′ (Ŵ BC )3
+ δ
[
s(eC )
u′′ (Ŵ BGC )
u′ (Ŵ BGC )3
+ (1 − s(eC )) u
′′ (Ŵ BBC )
u′ (Ŵ BBC )3
] ·
−s(eC )
g′′(eC )
β
u′′(Ŵ BC )
u′(Ŵ B
C
)3
+ δ
β

 1u′(Ŵ BG
C
)
− 1
u′(Ŵ BB
C
)


−s(ec )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )
β

 u′′(Ŵ BGC )u′(Ŵ BG
C
)3
− u
′′(Ŵ BBC )
u′(Ŵ BB
C
)3



based on the implicit function theorem.
For the previous results, I exploit the condition (ŴG
C
)∗ > (Ŵ BC )
∗, (ŴGG
C
)∗) > (Ŵ BG
C
)∗,
and (ŴGB
C
)∗) > (Ŵ BBC )
∗, which all hold since (VG2 )
∗ > (V B2 )
∗. These imply that
1
u′((ŴG
C
)∗)
= δ

s(eC )
u′((ŴGG
C
)∗)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′((ŴGB
C
)∗)

> δ

s(eC )
u′((Ŵ BG
C
)∗)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′((Ŵ BB
C
)∗)

=
1
u′((Ŵ B
C
)∗)
.
Here, I show that why the condition, (VG2 )
∗ > (V B2 )
∗, holds. Suppose (VG2 )
∗ ≤ (V B2 )∗.
Then (ŴG
C
)∗ ≤ (Ŵ BC )∗ according to the same logic above. Note that u((ŴGC )∗) + (VG2 )∗
must be strictly greater than u((Ŵ BC )
∗) + (V B2 )
∗ in order to induce managers to exert a
positive effort. However, two conditions, (VG2 )
∗ ≤ (V B2 )∗ and (ŴGC )∗) ≤ (Ŵ BC )∗, yield
u((ŴG
C
)∗) + (VG2 )
∗ ≤ u((Ŵ BC )∗) + (V B2 )∗. Therefore, (VG2 )∗ must be strictly greater than
(V B2 )
∗.
The next step is to show that there is e¯C ∈ (0,1) such that V̂∗ (eC ) = 0 if eC ∈ [e¯C ,1) and
V̂∗ (eC ) > 0 if eC ∈ [0, e¯C ). Since ∂V̂∗ (eC )∂eC < 0 when V̂∗ (eC ) > 0, it is enough to show
that there is e¯C such that V̂∗ (eC ) = 0. Recall that
∂F̂ (V̂ )
∂V̂
= − s(eC )
u′(ŴG
C
)
− 1 − s(eC )
u′(Ŵ B
C
)
+ δ
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(ŴG
M2)
.
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When V̂ = 0, the last term is a positive constant regardless of the value of eC . On the other
hand, from the condition
1
u′(ŴG
C
)
− δ

s(eC )
u′(ŴGG
C
)
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(ŴGB
C
)
 = 0
it can be shown that the first term approaches negative infinity as eC approaches one because
(VG2 )
∗ ≥ V̂2 = 0 and u((WGGC )∗) approaches positive infinity as eC converges to one.
Hence, there is e¯C supporting the optimal choice of zero promotion incentive. This result
yields that there is eˆC ∈ [0, e¯C ) such that (V B2 )∗ ≤ 0 if eC ∈ [eˆC ,1) since (V B2 )∗ < V̂∗ (eC ).
The remaining proof is to show that V∗ (eC ) ≥ V̂∗ (eC ) when eC ∈ [eˆC ,1). Notice that,
whenV = V̂ ∈ [0,V̂∗ (eC )] for eC ∈ [eˆC ,1),
∂F (V )
∂V >
∂F̂ (V̂ )
∂V̂
since (WG
C
)∗ = (ŴG
C
)∗, (W BC )
∗ < (ŴG
C
)∗, and (WG
M1)
∗ > (ŴG
M2)
∗. Hence, V∗ (eC ) ≥
V̂∗ (eC ) when eC ∈ [eˆC ,1). Moreover, when eC ∈ [eˆC , e¯C ], V∗ (eC ) > V̂∗ (eC ) since
∂F̂ (V̂ )
∂V̂
V̂=V̂∗ (eC ) = 0.
Consider the second case, V̂∗ (0) = 0. In this case, V̂∗ (eC ) = 0 for every eC ∈ (0,1).
Hence,V∗ (eC ) ≥ V̂∗ (eC ) regardless of the value of eC ∈ (0,1).
A.1.25 Proof of Proposition 14
For brevity, I denote eM11 = eM21 by eM1 and eM12 = eM22 by eM2. Suppose that
(U2
M1)
∗ ≤ (U2
M2)
∗. Note that, for a given V , the expected utility for the second period,
U2Mi , is determined according to the equation
1
u′(WGMi )
= δ

s(eMi2)
u′(WGGMi )
+
1 − s(eMi2)
u′(WGBMi )
 ,
i = 1, 2. This equation and the condition that (U2
M1)
∗ ≤ (U2
M2)
∗ imply that (WG
M1)
∗ ≤
(WG
M2)
∗. In order for the inequality to hold, the following must hold:
(1 − s(eC1))P(e−M1)V+(1 − (1 − s(eC1))P(e−M1))(U2M1)∗
≥ P(e−M1)V + (1 − P(e−M1))(U2M2)∗,
which implies that
(1 − P(e−M1))((U2M1)∗ − (U2M2)∗) + s(eC1)P(e−M1)(U2M1)∗ ≥ s(eC )P(e−M )V .
Then, (U2
M1)
∗ must be greater than V since (U2
M1)
∗ ≤ (U2
M2)
∗. This contradicts to the
given condition. Hence, (U2
M1)
∗ > (U2
M2)
∗ if V∗ > (U2
M1)
∗. Moreover, the difference
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between u(WG
M1) and u(W
G
M2) is
u(WGM1) − u(WGM2) = s(eC1)P(e−M )V
−
[
(1 − P(e−M ))(U2M1 −U2M2) + s(eC1)P(e−M1)U2M1
]
,
which has a positive value whenV∗ > (U2
M1)
∗ > (U2
M2)
∗. That is, (WG
M1)
∗ > (WG
M2)
∗.
A.1.26 Proof of Proposition 15
First, I show that there is a constant N̂ such thatV∗ (N + 1) − V∗ (N ) ≤ 0 if N > N̂ .
For a givenV and N , eC (N ) is determined by
E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 β(GC − BC ) = β(WGC (N ) −W BC (N ))
+ s(eC (N ))(1 − s(eC (N ))) g
′′(eC (N ))
β

1
u′(WG
C
(N ))
− 1
u′(W B
C
(N ))
 .
(A.6)
Claim 7 There isM such that
E
 f


N+1∑
i=1
Xi

 − E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 >M
for every N.
Proof 10 For brevity, denote
E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 =
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
by I (N ). Also, I denote
min
i
[
f (iGM + (N + 1 − i)BM ) − f (iG + (N − i)BM )]
by f . Note that there isM f > 0 such that f ≥ M f for every N since f ′(x) > 0 for every
x ≥ 0.
Then,
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I (N + 1)−I (N ) =
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i ·[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) f (iGM + (N + 1 − i)BM ) − f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
]
+ s(eM )N+1 f ((N + 1)GM )
≥
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i ·[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
+ s(eM )N+1 f ((N + 1)GM ) + f .
Denote d(N + 1)s(eM )e by sˆ. Then,
[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
] 
> 0 if i ≥ sˆ
≤ 0 otherwise.
There are two possible cases.
1. (sˆ = N + 1)
Then,
I (N + h) − I (h) ≥
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i ·[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
+ s(eM )N+1 f (NGM )
+ s(eM )N+1
[
f ((N + 1)GM ) − f (NGM )] + f
> s(eM )N+1[ f ((N + h)GM ) − f (NGM )] + f ,
where the last inequality holds since
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i

[
(N + h)!(N − i)!
N!(N + h − i)! (1 − s(eM ))
h − 1
]  = s(eM )N+1.
2. (sˆ < N + 1)
First, notice that if NN+1 > s(eM ), then sˆ < N + 1. That is, if N is sufficiently large,
sˆ < N + 1. In this case,
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I (N + 1) − I (N ) ≥
sˆ−1∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i ·[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
+
N∑
i=sˆ
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i ·[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
f (iGM + (N − i)BM )
+ s(eM )N+1 f (NGM ) + f
>
N∑
i=sˆ
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i
[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
·
[
f (sˆGM + (N − sˆ)BM ) − f ((sˆ − 1)GM + (N − sˆ + 1)BM )]
+ s(eM )N+1 f ((N + 1)GM ) + f
>
N∑
i=sˆ
(
N
i
)
s(eM )i (1 − s(eM ))N−i
[
N + 1
N + 1 − i (1 − s(eM )) − 1
]
·
[
f (sˆGM + (N − sˆ)BM ) − f ((sˆ − 1)GM + (N − sˆ + 1)BM )] + f
> f
Hence
E
 f


N+1∑
i=1
Xi

 − E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 > f ≥ M f > 0.
This result means that eC (N + 1) > eC (N ) ifV is fixed.
Now, I show that there is N˜ such that ∂F (V )∂V < 0 for everyV ∈ [0,V¯]. Note that
∂F (V|N )
∂V = −
s(eC (V ,N ))
u′(WG
C
(V ,eC (V ,N ))
− 1 − s(eC (V ,N ))
u′(W B
C
(V ,eC (V ,N ))
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
≤ − s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(WG
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
− 1 − s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(W B
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
,
where
WGC (V1,eC (V2,N )) = V1 + g(eC (V2,N )) + (1 − s(eC (V2,N )))
g′(eC (V2,N ))
β
W BC (V1,eC (V2,N )) = V1 + g(eC (V2,N )) − s(eC (V2,N ))
g′(eC (V2,N ))
β
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and eC (V2,N ) satisfies
E
 f


N∑
i=1
Xi

 β(GC − BC ) = β(WGC (V2,eC (V2,N )) −W BC (V2,eC (V2,N ))
+ s(eC (V2,N ))(1 − s(eC (V2,N ))) g
′′(eC (V2,N ))
β
·

1
u′(WG
C
(V2,eC (V2,N )))
− 1
u′(W B
C
(V2,eC (V2,N )))

since
∂
∂V1

s(eC (V2,N ))
u′(WG
C
(V1,eC (V2,N ))
+
1 − s(eC (V2,N ))
u′(W B
C
(V1,eC (V2,N ))
 > 0,
∂
∂V2

s(eC (V2,N ))
u′(WG
C
(V1,eC (V2,N ))
+
1 − s(eC (V2,N ))
u′(W B
C
(V1,eC (V2,N ))
 < 0.
SinceV is bounded 1−(1−s(eM ))N
u′ (WGM )
≤ 1
u′ (WGM )
, where WGM satisfies
u(WGM ) = UM + g(eM ) + (1 − s(eM ))
g′(eM )
β
.
Moreover, there is eˆC ∈ (0,1) such that
s(eC )
u′(WG
C
(0,eC ))
+
1 − s(eC )
u′(W B
C
(0,eC )
>
1
u′(WGM )
if eC ≥ eˆC since limeC→1 WGC (0,eC ) = ∞. Since there is N1 such that eC (V¯ ,N ) ≥ eˆC if
N ≥ N1,
∂F (V|N )
∂V ≤ −
s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(WG
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
− 1 − s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(W B
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
+
1 − (1 − s(eM ))N
u′(WGM )
< − s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(WG
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
− 1 − s(eC (V¯ ,N ))
u′(W B
C
(0,eC (V¯ ,N ))
+
1
u′(WGM )
< 0
when N ≥ N1.
Hence,V∗ = 0 if N ≥ N1. Also, this implies that there is N2 < N1 such thatV∗ (N + 1) −
V∗ (N ) < 0 when N ∈ [N2,N1 − 1] if there is N∗ < N1 such thatV∗ (N∗) > 0.
Moreover, e∗C (N + 1) − e∗C (N ) > 0 when N ≥ N2 since
∂E(V ,eC )
∂V > 0 and
∂E(V ,eC )
∂eC
> 0,
where
E(V ,eC ) ≡ β(WGC (V ,eC ) −W BC (V ,eC ))
+ s(eC )(1 − s(eC )) g
′′(eC )
β

1
u′(WG
C
(V ,eC ))
− 1
u′(W B
C
(V ,eC ))

comes from the right hand side of (A.6).
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A.1.27 Proof of Proposition 16
First, note that constraints regarding managers give the following results:
u(WC ) = V
u(WGM ) = UM + g(eL ) + (1 − sL (eL ))
g′(eL )
β
− P(e−M )V ,
u(W BM ) = UM + g(eL ) − sL (eL )
g′(eL )
β
− R(e−M )V , and
eH = eL
β¯
β
for a given (eL ,V ). From now on, I use subscript 1 for promotion rule 1 and subscript
2 for promotion 2 in order to distinguish two problems. For a given eL1 and eL2, denote
the optimal V by V∗1 (eL1) under promotion rule 1 and V∗2 (eL1) under promotion rule 2,
Also, denote the firm’s objective function under promotion rule 1 and promotion rule 2 by
F1(eL1 |γ) and F2(eL2 |γ), respectively, for a given γ. That is,
F1(eL |γ) = γ
[
( β¯ − β)H1(eL ) + β
]
−WC1 + 2[qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL )](G −WGM1)
+ 2[1 − qsH (eH ) − (1 − q)sL (eL )](B −W BM1), and
F2(eL |γ) = γ
[
( β¯ − β)H2(eL ) + β
]
−WC2 + 2[qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL )](G −WGM2)
+ 2[1 − qsH (eH ) − (1 − q)sL (eL )](B −W BM2),
where
H1(eL1) =
qsH (eH1)
qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1)
[
2(qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1)) − (qsH (eH1)
+(1 − q)sL (eL1))2
]
+ q
[
1 − 2(qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1)) + (qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1))2
]
, and
H2(eL2) = q + q(1 − q)(sH (eH2) − sL (eL2)).
Then, the firm’s problem is to choose eL in order to maximize its objective function. Notice
that, for a given eL j ,V∗j (eL j ), j = 1 and 2, satisfies
∂F1(eL1 |γ)
∂V1 = −
1
u′(WC1)
+
2(qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1))
u′(WG
M1)
P(e−M1) = 0, and
∂F2(eL2 |γ)
∂V2 = −
1
u′(WC2)
+
2(qsH (eH2) + (1 − q)sL (eL2))
u′(WG
M2)
P(e−M2)
+
2(1 − qsH (eH2) − (1 − q)sL (eL2))
u′(W B
M2)
R(e−M2) = 0.
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Also, the first order conditions with respect to eL j are
∂F1(eL1 |γ)
∂eL1
= γ( β¯ − β) ∂H1(eL1)
∂eL1
+ 2

q β¯2β + (1 − q) β

 [G − B − (WGM1 −W BM1)]
− 2 κ
β
(1 − sL (eL1))
qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1)
u′(WG
M1)
−sL (eL1) 1 − qsH (eH1) − (1 − q)sL (eL1)
u′(W B
M1)

+ 2
qsH (eH1) + (1 − q)sL (eL1)
u′(WG
M1)
∂P(e−M1)
∂eL1
V∗1 (eL1), and
∂F2(eL2 |γ)
∂eL2
= γ( β¯ − β) ∂H2(eL2)
∂eL2
+ 2

q β¯2β + (1 − q) β

 [G − B − (WGM2 −W BM2)]
− 2 κ
β
(1 − sL (eL2))
qsH (eH2) + (1 − q)sL (eL2)
u′(WG
M2)
−sL (eL2) 1 − qsH (eH2) − (1 − q)sL (eL2)
u′(W B
M2)

+ 2
qsH (eH2) + (1 − q)sL (eL2)
u′(WG
M2)
∂P(e−M2)
∂eL2
V∗2 (eL2)
+ 2
1 − qsH (eH2) − (1 − q)sL (eL2)
u′(W B
M2)
∂R(e−M2)
∂eL2
V∗2 (eL2).
According to Milgrom and Shannon (1994), ∂e
∗
L1
∂γ ≥ 0 and
∂e∗L1
∂γ ≥ 0 since
∂2F1(eL1 |γ)
∂eL1∂γ
= ( β¯ − β) ∂H1(eL1)
∂eL1
= 2( β¯ − β)q(1 − q))

 β¯2β − β

 [1 − qsH (eH1) − (1 − q)sL (eL1)] > 0, and
∂2F2(eL2 |γ)
∂eL2∂γ
= ( β¯ − β) ∂H2(eL2)
∂eL2
= ( β¯ − β)q(1 − q)

 β¯2β − β

 > 0.
Moreover, these inequalities imply that ∂eL1∂γ > 0 and
∂eL1
∂γ > 0 if e
∗
L1 ∈
(
0,
β
β¯
)
and e∗
L2 ∈(
0,
β
β¯
)
, respectively, according to Edlin and Shannon (1998).
Also, there is γ∗1 such that e
∗
L1 =
β
β¯
, which means that eH1 = 1, if γ ≥ γ∗1 since ∂F1 (eL |γ)∂eL
eL1=1
is a strictly increasing function in γ and limγ→∞ ∂F1 (eL |γ)∂eL
eL1=1 = ∞.
Moreover, by the envelope theorem,
∂F1(e∗L1 |γ)
∂γ
= ( β¯ − β)H1(e∗L1) + β, and
∂F2(e∗L2 |γ)
∂γ
= ( β¯ − β)H2(e∗L2) + β.
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Since H1(eL1) > H2(eL1) when eL1 = eL2, there is eˆL1 ∈
(
0,
β
β¯
)
such that H1(eˆL1) >
H2
(
β
β¯
)
. Hence, there is γˆ such that F1(e∗L1 |γ) > F2(e∗L2 |γ) if γ ≥ γˆ.
Now, I show that F1(e∗L1 |γ) < F2(e∗L2 |γ) when γ = 0. This is true since
F2(e∗L2 |γ) ≥ F2(e∗L1 |γ) > F1(e∗L1 |γ).
The second inequality holds since (WG
M1)
∗ = WG
M2 and (W
B
M1)
∗ > W B
M2 if (eL2,V2) =
(e∗
L1,V∗1 ). Hence, γˆ > 0.
A.2 Firm’s Problems in Detail
A.2.1 The Firm’s Problem in Section 2.7.1
Under this extension, the firm’s problem is to chooseV ∈ [0,∞) maximizing F (V ) defined
by
F (V ) ≡ max
{(WGC ,W BC ), (WGM ,W BM ), (WGGM ,WGBM ), }
s(eC )(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC ))(BC −W BC )
+ N
[
s(eM1)(GM −WGM ) + (1 − s(eM1))(BM −W BM )
]
+ δ(N s(eM1) − 1 + (1 − s(eM1))N )[s(eM2)(GM −WGGM ) + (1 − s(eM2))(BM −WGBM )]
subject to
E[U (WGC ,W BC ,eC1)] = V ,
E[U (WGM ,W BM ,eM1)] + s(eM1){P(e−M1)V + (1 − P(e−M1))E[U (WGGM ,WGBM ,eM2)]} = UM ,
eC ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGC ,W BC , eˆ],
eM1 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGM ,W BM , eˆ)] + s(eˆ){P(e−M1)V + (1 − P(e−M1))E[U (WGGM ,WGBM ,eM2)]},
eM2 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGGM ,WGBM , eˆ)],
where
E[U (WG ,W B,e)] = s(e)u(WG) + (1 − s(e))u(W B) − g(e).
Note that the expected number of senior managers in the second period is
N∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
s(eM1)k (1 − s(eM1))N−k (k − 1) =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
ks(eM1)k (1 − s(eM1))N−k
−
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
s(eM1)k (1 − s(eM1))N−k + (1 − s(eM1))N
= N s(eM1) − 1 + (1 − s(eM1))N .
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A.2.2 The Firm’s Problem in Section 2.7.2
The objective of the firm is to chooseV ∈ [0,∞) maximizing F (V ) defined by
F (V ) ≡ max
A
s(eC1)(GC −WGC ) + (1 − s(eC1))(BC −W BC )
+ δs(eC1)[s(eC2)(GC −WGGC ) + (1 − s(eC2))(BC −WGBC )]
+ N
[
s(eM1)(GM −WGM1) + (1 − s(eM1))(BM −W BM1)
]
+ δN s(eC1)
[
s(eM2)(GM −WGM2) + (1 − s(eM2))(BM −W BM2)
]
subject to
E[U (WGC ,W BC ,eC1)] + s(eC1)E[U (WGGC ,WGBC ,eC2)] = V (IRC )
E[U (WGM1,W BM1,eM1)] + s(eM1)(1 − s(eC1))P(e−M1)V = UM (IRM1),
E[U (WGM2,W BM2,eM2)] + s(eM2)P(e−M2)V = UM (IRM2)
eC1 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGC ,W BC , eˆ] + s(eˆ)E[U (WGGC ,WGBC ,eC2)] (ICC1)
eC2 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGGC ,WGBC , eˆ)] (ICC2)
eM1 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGM1,W BM1, eˆ)] + s(eˆ)(1 − s(eC1))P(e−M1)V (ICM1),
eM2 ∈ arg max
eˆ
E[U (WGM2,W BM2, eˆ)] + s(eˆ)P(e−M2)V (ICM2),
where
A = {(WGC ,W BC ,WGGC ,WGBC ), (WGM1,W BM2), (WGM2,W BM2)}, and
E[U (WG ,WB,e)] = s(e)u(WG) + (1 − s(e))u(W B) − g(e).
When the CEO’s individual rationality constraint binds at V , the compensation scheme
(WG
C
,W BC ,W
GG
C
,WGB
C
) for the CEO satisfies
u(WGC ) = V + g(eC1) + (1 − s(eC1))
g′(eC1)
β
− V2,
u(W BC ) = V + g(eC1) − s(eC1)
g′(eC1)
β
,
u(WGGC ) = V2 + g(eC2) + (1 − s(eC2))
g′(eC2)
β
,
u(WGBC ) = V2 + g(eC2) − s(eC2)
g′(eC2)
β
,
where
V2 = s(eC2)u(WGGC ) + (1 − s(eC2))u(WGBC ) − g(eC2)
is the successful CEO’s expected utility in the second period.
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On the other hand, the compensation schemes for managers are characterized by
u(WGM1) = UM + g(eM1) + (1 − s(eM1))
g′(eM1)
β
− (1 − s(eC1))P(e−M1)V ,
u(W BM1) = UM + g(eM1) − s(eM1)
g′(eM1)
β
,
u(WGM2) = UM + g(eM2) + (1 − s((eM2))
g′((eM2)
β
− P(e−M2)V , and
u(W BM2) = UM + g(eM2) − s(eM2)
g′((eM2)
β
.
A.2.3 The Firm’s Problem in Section 2.9
The expected profit from two managers is
E[ΠM |(eH ,eL ,WGM ,W BM )] = q22[sH (eH )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − sH (eH ))(BM −W BM )]
+ 2q(1 − q)[sH (eH )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − sH (eH ))(BM −W BM )
+ sL (eL )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − sL (eL ))(BM −W BM )]
+ (1 − q)22[sL (eL )(GM −WGM ) + (1 − sL (eL ))(BM −W BM )].
Also, the choice of promotion rule determines the expected β when the firm requires eH and
eL from high-type and low-type managers according to 1) when the firm uses promotion
rule 1, E[β |eH ,eL] is equal to
EP1[β |eH ,eL] = qsH (eH )qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL )
[
2(qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL ))
−(qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL ))2
]
+ q
[
1 − 2(qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL )) + (qsH (eH ) + (1 − q)sL (eL ))2
]
,
2) while the expectation has the following value
EP2[β |eH ,eL] = q + q(1 − q)(sH (eH ) − sL (eL ))
if the firm adopts promotion rule 2.
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 17
If the agent chooses a = 0,
ρW k dt = φdt +
1
2
σ2
∂W k
∂I2
dt.
On the other hand, choosing a = µ yields
ρW k dt = µ
∂W k
∂I
dt +
1
2
σ2
∂W k
∂I2
dt.
Therefore, the contract is incentive-compatible if
µ
∂W k
∂I
dt ≥ φdt
for every I and k.
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 18
By the Proposition 17, the incentive-compatible contract must satisfy
∂W k
∂I
≥ φ
µ
for all I ∈ (I k−1, Iu,k ).
Also, the limited liability condition impies that W (I) ≥ 0 for all I ∈ [I, I¯]. Note
that the payment Bu is the same with W ( I¯). Suppose that W ( I¯) = 0. The condition
∂W k (I)/∂I ≥ φ/µ > 0, for all I ∈ (I k−1, Iu,k ) and k, implies that W (I) < 0 for
I < I¯ . This violates the limited liability condition.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 19.
It is enough to show that the principal can’t incentivize the agent by transfering all
output from the project to the agent since it is the maximum transfer for the principal
to the agent without loss. First, suppose that I k = −∞, then every −∞ < It < Iu,k+1
can be reached with a positive probability. Hence, if there exists It such that
Eεt
[
e−ρτ
κ
ρ
 It
]
< E εˆt
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)φds + e−ρτ
κ
ρ
 It
]
,
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where ε = {as = µ}t≤s≤τ and εˆ = {as = 0}t≤s≤τ, then the proof is done. The
difference between them is
Eεt
[
e−ρτ
κ
ρ
 It
]
− E εˆt
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)φds + e−ρτ
κ
ρ
 It
]
=
e−η
+( I¯−It ) κ
ρ
− e−
√
2ρ
σ ( I¯−It )
(
κ − φ
ρ
)
− φ
ρ︸                                             ︷︷                                             ︸
≡ f (It )
.
Since limIt→−∞ f (It ) = −φ/ρ < 0 and f ( I¯) = 0, there is It such that f (It ) < 0.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Since
η− exp(η−It + η+ I¯) − η+ exp(η− I¯ + η+It )
exp(η−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I) Bd < 0
for Bd > 0 and I ≤ It ≤ I¯,
∂Wt (It ,Bu,Bd)
∂It
Bd=0 >
∂Wt (It ,Bu,Bd)
∂It
Bd>0 .
Therfore, by setting Bd = 0, the principal can achieve the incentive compatibility
condition with strictly lower Bu for every I ≤ It ≤ I¯.
B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 6
For given I, the principal has to set
Bu ≥ exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
φ
µ
,
where
I∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I, I¯
]
,
in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility condition for all I ≤ It ≤ I¯ . Notice
that
∂2W
∂I2
=
(η+)2 exp(η−I + η+I) − (η−)2 exp(η−I + η+I)
exp(η−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I) Bu.
This second derivative is equal to zero if
I =
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I ≡ I∗∗.
Also, the second derivative is strictly greater (less) than 0 if I > (<)I∗∗.
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Since the agent’s expected discounted profit
E
[
e−rτ
(
κ
r
1{τ=τu } − Bu1{τ=τu }
)]
=
exp(ν−I + ν+I0) − exp(ν−I0 + ν+I)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)
(
κ
r
− Bu
)
is a strictly decreasing function in Bu, it is optimal for him to set Bu as the minimum
value in the set of Bu’s satisfying the incentive compatibility condition.
B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 20
Recall that the principal’s problem is
max
I
P (I)
(
κ
r
− Bu(I)
)
,
where
P (I) = exp(ν
−I + ν+I0) − exp(ν−I0 + ν+I)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I) , and
Bu(I) = exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
φ
µ
.
First, I show that there is a unique I∗∗ such that if I < I∗∗, the principal’s dis-
counted expected profit is less than 0. There are two possibilities. When I∗ =
1
η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
+ I, I can rewrite Bu(I) by
Bu(I) = exp(η
+( I¯ − I)) − exp(η−( I¯ − I))
(η− − η+) η−η+
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
) η−
η+−η−
φ
µ
.
Notice that this is a strictly decreasing function in I and it is equal to zero when
I = I¯. Therefore, there is a unique I∗∗ such that Bu(I∗∗) = κr . Therefore, choosing I
lower than I∗∗ gives a negative profit to the principal. On the other hand, if I∗ = I¯,
Bu(I) = 1 − exp(−(η
+ − η−)( I¯ − I))
η+ − η− exp(−(η+ − η−)( I¯ − I))
φ
µ
is a strictly decreasing function in I and Bu = 0 when I¯ = I. Therefore, Bu has the
maximum value when
I = I¯ − 1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
.
After some algebra, I can obtain the maximum value of Bu(I)
Bu = φ
ρ
.
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Hence, when I∗ = I¯, Bu(I) is always strictly less than κr since I assume that κ > φ
and ρ > r.
Second, Bu(I) must be greater than Bu(I0) since I can’t be greater than I0 and
Bu(I) is a strictly decreasing function in I. From now on, I focus on the range
I∗∗ ≤ I ≤ I0 without loss of generality.
There are three possible cases.
1.
(
κ
r − Bu(I0) ≤ 0
)
In this case, it is impossible for the principal to achieve a positive utility
regardless of the choice of I since
∂Bu (I)
∂I
=

− φµ η
+ exp(η− I+η+ I¯ )−η− exp(η− I¯+η+ I )
η+ exp(η− I+η+ I ∗ )−η− exp(η− I ∗+η+ I ) < 0 if I
∗ , I¯
− φµ e
(
− 2µ
σ2
( I¯+I )
)
4(µ2+2ρσ2)
σ4
1
[η+ exp(η− I+η+ I¯ )−η− exp(η− I¯+η+ I )]2 < 0 if I
∗ = I¯
.
2.
(
κ
r − Bu(I0) > 0 and I¯ − 1η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
≥ I0
)
In this case, I∗ = I + 1η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
for all I ∈ [I∗∗, I0]. Under this circum-
stance, there is a unique I maximizing the principal’s discounted expected
profit since
∂U0(I)
∂I
= P′(I)
(
κ
r
− Bu (I)
)
−P (I) ∂Bu (I)
∂I
=

P′(I0)
(
κ
r − Bu (I0)
)
< 0 if I = I0
−P (I∗∗) ∂Bu (I )∂I I=I ∗∗ > 0 if I = I∗∗
and
∂2U0(I)
∂I2
= P′′(I)
(
κ
r
− Bu(I)
)
− 2P′(I) ∂Bu(I)
∂I
− P (I) ∂
2Bu(I)
∂I2
< 0
for I∗∗ < I < I0, where
U0(I) = P (I)
(
κ
r
− Bu(I)
)
,
P′(I) = −2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
exp
(
−2µ
σ2
I
)
exp(ν−I0 + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I0)
[exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)]2 ,
P′′(I) = −4 µ
2 + 2rσ2
σ4
exp
(
−2µ
σ2
I
)
exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) + exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)
[exp(ν−I + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I)]3 ·(
exp(ν−I0 + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I0)
)
, and
∂2Bu(I)
∂I2
= −φ
µ
(η−)2 exp(η− I¯ + η+I) − (η+)2 exp(η−I + η+ I¯)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I) .
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3.
(
κ
r − Bu(I0) > 0 and I¯ − 1η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
< I0
)
Now, I∗ could be I + 1η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
or I¯ depending on I. In order to analyze
this situation, consider the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 Denote 1η+−η− ln
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
by T . When κr − Bu(I0) > 0, if there
exists I˜ ∈ ( I¯ − T , I0) such that
∂U0(I)
∂I
I=I˜ = 0,
then
∂2U0(I)
∂I2
I=I˜ < 0.
Proof 11 By the condition ∂U0(I)∂I
I=I˜ = 0,
P′( I˜)
(
κ
r
− Bu( I˜)
)
− P ( I˜)B′u( I˜) = 0.
Therefore,
∂2U0(I)
∂I2
I=I˜ = P′′( I˜)
(
κ
r
− Bu( I˜)
)
− 2P′( I˜)B′u( I˜) − P ( I˜)B′′u ( I˜)
= P′′P ( I˜)B
′
u( I˜)
P′( I˜) − 2P
′( I˜)B′u( I˜) − P ( I˜)B′′u ( I˜)
= −2P ( I˜)B′u( I˜)
1
σ2
(√
µ2 + 2rσ2
1 + exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I˜))
1 − exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I˜))
+
√
µ2 + 2ρσ2
η+ + η− exp(−(η+ − η−)( I¯ − I˜))
η+ − η− exp(−(η+ − η−)( I¯ − I˜))
)
.
I need to show that√
µ2 + 2rσ2
1 + exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I˜))
1 − exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I˜))
+
√
µ2 + 2ρσ2
η+ + η− exp(−(η+ − η−)( I¯ − I˜))
η+ − η− exp(−(η+ − η−)( I¯ − I˜)) < 0.
Since the LHS is a strictly decreasing function in I˜. it is enough to show that√
µ2 + 2rσ2
1 + exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T ))
1 − exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T ))
+
√
µ2 + 2ρσ2
η+ + η− exp(−(η+ − η−)T )
η+ − η− exp(−(η+ − η−)T )
=
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
1 + exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T ))
1 − exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T )) + µ
< 0,
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where the last inequality holds since√
µ2 + 2rσ2 > µ and
1 + exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T ))
1 − exp((ν+ − ν−)(I0 − I + T )) < −1.
Since ∂U0(I)∂I
I=I0 = P′(I0)
(
κ
r − Bu(I0)
)
< 0 and U0(I) is a strict convex func-
tion for I ∈ [I∗∗, I¯−T ], if ∂U0(I)∂I I=I0 ≤ 0, there exists a unique I ∈ [I∗∗, I¯−T ]
maximizing the principal’s profit. Note that ∂U0(I)∂I
I=I0 ≤ 0 implies ∂U0(I)∂I < 0
for I ∈ ( I¯ −T , I0] by Lemma 7. Also, if ∂U0(I)∂I I=I0 > 0, there exists a unique
I ∈ ( I¯ − T , I0] maximizing the principal’s profit by Lemma 7.
B.1.7 Proof of Corollary 8
Denote the project level right after the final intermediate payment by It . Then, the
bonus payment Bu must be less than B∗u which is the optimal bonus payment with-
out any intermediate payment. (If not, the compensation scheme with intermedate
payments makes the principal worse off.) Recall that there is a I∗ ∈ (I, I¯) such that
∂W (I,B∗u ,A)
∂I
I=I∗ = φµ . Hence, ∂W (I,Bu ,A)∂I I=I∗ < φµ ,where A = {at = µ}0≤t<τ. Since
I∗ is reached with a positive probability, the compensation scheme with intermedi-
ate payments is not incentive-compatible.
B.1.8 Proof of Comparative Statics
Lemma 8 For given parameters, the optimal termination level I∗ is a strictly in-
creasing function in I0. That is,
∂I∗
∂I0
> 0.
Proof 12 Recall that
∂U0(I)
∂I
I=I∗ = P′(I∗)
(
κ
r
− Bu(I∗)
)
− P (I∗)B′u(I∗) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
∂I∗
∂I0
= −

 ∂2U0(I)∂I2
I=I∗


−1 [
∂P′(I∗)
∂I0
(
κ
r
− Bu(I∗)
)
− ∂P (I
∗)
∂I0
B′u(I∗)
]
> 0
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since
∂P (I∗)
∂I0
=
ν+ exp(ν−I∗ + ν+I0) − ν− exp(ν−I0 + ν+I∗)
exp(ν−I∗ + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I∗) > 0, and
∂P′(I∗)
∂I0
= −2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
exp
(
−2µ
σ2
I
)
ν− exp(ν−I0 + ν+ I¯) − ν+ exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I0)
(exp(ν−I∗ + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I∗))2
> 0.
Note that this implies that
∂Bu(I∗)
∂I0
< 0
since Bu(I) is a strictly decreasing function in I .
Lemma 9 For given parameters, the optimal termination time I∗ is a strictly in-
creasing function in φ. That is,
∂I∗
∂φ
> 0.
Proof 13 Again, by the implicit function theorem,
∂I∗
∂φ
=

 ∂2U0(I)∂I2
I=I∗


−1 [
P′(I∗) ∂Bu(I
∗)
∂φ
+ P (I∗) ∂B
′
u(I
∗)
∂φ
]
> 0
since
∂Bu(I∗)
∂φ
=
Bu(I∗)
φ
> 0
∂B′u(I∗)
∂φ
=
B′u(I∗)
φ
< 0.
Lemma 10 For given parameters, the principal’s discounted expected utility is a
strictly increasing function in I0. That is,
∂U0(I∗)
∂I0
> 0.
Proof 14 By the envelope theorem,
∂U0(I∗)
∂I0
=
∂P (I∗)
∂I0
(
κ
r
− Bu(I∗)
)
− P (I∗) ∂Bu(I
∗)
∂I0
> 0.
The inequality holds by Lemma 8.
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Lemma 11 Consider the case where I∗ = 1η+−η− log
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
+ I∗ < I¯ . Under this
circumstance, the agent’s discounted expected utility at time 0 is a strictly increas-
ing (decreasing) function in I0 if
∂I∗
∂I0
< (>)1.
On the other hand, if I∗ = I¯ , the agent’s discounted expected utility at time 0 is a
strictly increasing (decreasing) function in I0 if
∂I∗
∂I0
< (>)
(η−eη− I0+η+I∗ − η+eη− I∗+η+I0 )(η+eη− I∗+η+ I¯ − η−eη− I¯+η+I∗ )
(η+ − η−)(η−eη− ( I¯+I∗)+η+(I0+I∗) − η+eη− (I0+I∗)+η+( I¯+I∗)) ≤ 1.
Proof 15 Note that when I∗ = 1η+−η− log
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
+ I∗ < I¯ ,
Bu(I∗) = exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
φ
µ
.
Therefore, the agent’s discounted expected utility at time 0 is
W0(I0) =
exp(η−I∗ + η+I0) − exp(η−I0 + η+I∗)
η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗)
φ
µ
.
Differentiation this with respect to I0 yields
∂W0(I0)
∂I0
=
−η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+I0) + η− exp(η−I0 + η+I∗)
η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗)︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
<0
(
∂I∗
∂I0
− 1
)
φ
µ
.
Hence,
∂W0(I0)
∂I0
> (<) 0 if and only if
∂I∗
∂I0
< (>) 1.
When I∗ = I,
∂W0(I0)
∂I0
=
1
η+eη− I∗+η+ I¯ − η−eη− I¯+η+I∗
φ
µ
·

(η+ − η−)(η−eη− ( I¯+I∗)+η+(I0+I∗) − η+eη− (I0+I∗)+η+( I¯+I∗))
η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+ I¯) − η− exp(η− I¯ + η+I∗)
∂I∗
∂I0
+η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+I0) − η− exp(η−I0 + η+I∗)
]
.
Hence, ∂W0(I0)/∂I0 > 0 if the term in the square bracket is positive, and this holds
if the condition in Lemma holds. Also, the difference between the numerator and
denominator in the condition in Lemma is :
Numerator−Denominator =
(eη
− I∗+η+I0 − eη− I0+η+I∗ )eη− I∗+η+ I¯[(η−)2e−(η+−η− )( I¯−I∗) − (η+)2].
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Since I¯ − I∗ < 1η+−η− log
(
(η− )2
(η+)2
)
, the difference is greater than 0. Hence, the thresh-
old is less than 1. (Note that both numerator and denominator are negative.)
Lemma 12 For a given parameters, the principal’s discounted expected utility is a
strictly decreasing function in φ. That is,
∂U0(I∗)
∂φ
< 0.
Proof 16 By the envelope theorem,
∂U0(I∗)
∂φ
= −P (I∗) ∂Bu(I
∗)
∂φ
= −P (I∗) exp(η
−I + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I)
η+ exp(η−I + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I)
1
µ
< 0.
Lemma 13 The agent’s discounted expected utility at time 0 can be increasing or
decreasing in φ, depending on the parameter values.
Proof 17 Note that if φ = 0, the agent’s discounted expected utility is 0 since
Bu(I) = 0 regardless of the value of I . On the other hand, there is φ¯ such that
Bu(I0) > κr if φ ≥ φ¯ since Bu(I0) is a strictly increasing function in φ. Hence, the
agent’s discounted expected utility is 0 if φ ≥ φ¯. That is, the principal does not
hire the agent or sets I = I0. Combining this with the limited liability gives us the
desired result.
Lemma 14 The completion probability can be increasing or decreasing in φ, de-
pending on the parameter values.
Proof 18 Note that
∂P
∂I0
=
1
e−δI∗ − e−δ I¯

δe−δI0 + δe−δI∗ e−δ I¯ − e−δI0e−δI∗ − e−δ I¯ ∂I
∗
∂I0

 .
Therefore,
∂P
∂I0
≥ 0
if and only if
∂I∗
∂I0
≤ 1 − e
−δ( I¯−I∗)
1 − e−δ( I¯−I0) .
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Lemma 15 The completion probaility is a strictly decreasing function in φ. That
is,
∂P
∂φ
< 0.
Proof 19 This holds since ∂I
∗
∂φ > 0 and
∂P
∂φ
= δe−δI
∗ e−δ I¯ − e−δI0
[e−δI∗ − e−δ I¯]2
∂I∗
∂φ
< 0.
B.1.9 Proof of Proposition 21
Note that the principal’s problem is
max
( Î,I1,I2,C,B)
P (I0, Î, I1)
[
−C + P˜ ( Î, I¯, I2)
(
κ
r
− B
)]
subject to
∂PA(It , Î, I1)
∂It
(C + P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B) ≥
φ
µ
for It ∈ [I1, Î],
∂P˜A(It , I¯, I2)
∂It
B ≥ φ
µ
for It ∈ [I2, I¯], and
C ≥ 0,
where
P (I, Î, I1) =
exp(ν−I1 + ν
+I) − exp(ν−I + ν+I1)
exp(ν−I1 + ν+ Î) − exp(ν− Î + ν+I1)
,
P˜ (I, I¯, I2) =
exp(ν−I2 + ν
+I) − exp(ν−I + ν+I2)
exp(ν−I2 + ν+ I¯) − exp(ν− I¯ + ν+I2)
,
PA(I, Î, I1) =
exp(η−I1 + η
+I) − exp(η−I + η+I1)
exp(η−I1 + η+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
, and
P˜A(I, I¯, I2) =
exp(η−I2 + η
+I) − exp(η−I + η+I2)
exp(η−I2 + η+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
.
Claim 8
∂P˜A(It , I¯, I2)
∂It
B = φ
µ
for some It ∈ [I2, I¯], and
∂PA(It , Î, I1)
∂It
(C + P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B) =
φ
µ
for some It ∈ [I1, Î].
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Proof 20 First, suppose that both conditions do not bind. Then, the principal can
obtain a higher profit by reducing B since
∂P˜A(It , I¯, I2)
∂It
> 0 and
∂PA(It , Î, I1)
∂It
> 0.
Let’s assume that the first condition binds but the second does not. There are two
possibilities, C > 0 and C = 0. If C > 0, the principal increases his profit by
reducing C. On the other hand, if C = 0, lowering I1 by  > 0 yields a higher profit
to the principal since
∂P (I0, Î, I1)
∂I1
< 0 and
∂2P (It , I¯, I1)
∂It∂I1
> 0.
Therefore, the second condition must bind.
Suppose that the first condition does not bind but the second does. Then, choosing
B̂ = B − ∆, and Ĉ = C + P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)∆
does not affect the first constraint and still satisfies the second constraint, where
min
It∈[I2,I¯]
∂P˜A(It , I¯, I2)
∂It
B − φ
µ
≡ ∆ > 0.
This compensation scheme gives a higher profit to the principal since
−P (I0, Î, I1)P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)∆ + P (I0, Î, I1)P˜ ( Î, I¯, I2)∆
= P (I0, Î, I1)∆[P˜ ( Î, I¯, I2) − P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)]
is strictly greater than zero by Theorem 2.
This claim directly provides the following results.
Claim 9 For given ( Î, I1, I2), the optimal B is
B(I2) ≡
exp(η−I2 + η
+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
η+ exp(η−I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η−I∗∗ + η+I2)
φ
µ
,
where
I∗∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I2, I¯
]
,
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and the optimal C is
C( Î, I1, I2) ≡ max

φ
µ
exp(η− I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η− I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η− I∗ + η+I1)
− P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B(I2),0
 ,
where
I∗ = min
[
1
η+ − η− ln
(
(η−)2
(η+)2
)
+ I1, Î
]
.
Proof 21 Convexity of ∂P˜A (It ,I¯,I2)∂It and
∂PA (It ,̂I,I1)
∂It
implies that
B ≥ exp(η
−I2 + η
+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
η+ exp(η−I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η−I∗∗ + η+I2)
φ
µ
and
C ≥ φ
µ
exp(η−I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η−I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I1)
− P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B(I2).
Since C ≥ 0 and the principal’s profit is a strictly decreasing function in C and B,
the claim holds.
Claim 10 I2 is greater than I1.
Proof 22 Suppose not. That is, I1 > I2. This implies that C( Î, I1, I2) = 0 since
φ
µ
exp(η−I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η−I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I1)
< P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B(I2)
regardless of Î . Now, I show that the constraints can’t bind if I1 > I2. Without loss
of generality, assume that
B = exp(η
−I2 + η
+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
η+ exp(η−I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η−I∗∗ + η+I2)
φ
µ
.
Recall that the other constraint is
∂PA(It , Î, I1)
∂It
P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B ≥
φ
µ
for It ∈ [I1, Î].
This is equivalent to
η+ exp(η− I1 + η
+I∗) − η− exp(η− I∗ + η+I1)
η+ exp(η− I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η− I∗∗ + η+I2)
exp(η− I2 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I2)
exp(η− I1 + η+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
≥ 1.
This condition does not bind since the left hand side is a strictly increasing function
in I1 and equal to one if I1 = I = 2. Therefore, I1 ≤ I2.
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Claim 11 There is I∗ such that I1 ≥ I∗.
Proof 23 Since ∂B(I2)∂I2 < 0 and limI2→−∞ B(I2) = ∞, there is I
∗∗ such thatB(I∗∗) =
κ
r . Therefore, I2 ≥ I∗∗. For given I∗∗, there exist I∗ such that
φ
µ
exp(η−I∗ + η+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I∗)
η+ exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I∗) − P˜A( Î, I¯, I
∗∗)B(I∗∗) = κ
r
since
exp(η−I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η−I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I1)
is a strictly decreasing function in I1 and goes to infinity as I1 → −∞. Hence, if
I1 < I
∗, the principal never obtains a non-negative profit.
Therefore, the principal’s problem is
max
( Î,I1,I2,C,B)
P (I0, Î, I1)
[
−C( Î, I1, I2) + P˜ ( Î, I¯, I2)
(
κ
r
− B(I2)
)]
subject to C( Î, I1, I2) = max

φ
µ
exp(η−I1 + η
+ Î) − exp(η− Î + η+I1)
η+ exp(η−I1 + η+I∗) − η− exp(η−I∗ + η+I1)
−P˜A( Î, I¯, I2)B(I2),0
]
, and
B(I2) =
exp(η−I2 + η
+ I¯) − exp(η− I¯ + η+I2)
η+ exp(η−I2 + η+I∗∗) − η− exp(η−I∗∗ + η+I2)
φ
µ
.
The compactness of ( Î, I1, I2) ∈ ([I0, I¯], [I∗, I0], [I1, Î]) and the continuity of the ob-
jective function on the region guarantee the existence of a solution to the principal’s
problem.
B.2 Additional Mathematical Results
Theorem 1 1 Let X be a (µ,σ2) Brownian motion with initial condition x ∈ [b,B].
Let τ be the stopping time τ = min[τb, τB], and r > 0. If σ2 > 0, then
Ex[e−rτ |X (τ) = b]Px (X (τ) = b) = e
R1 xeR2B − eR2 xeR1B
eR1beR2B − eR2beR1B ,
Ex[e−rτ |X (τ) = B]Px (X (τ) = B) = e
R1beR2 x − eR2beR1 x
eR1beR2B − eR2beR1B ,
where
R1 =
−µ − √µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
and R2 =
−µ + √µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
.
1Proposition 5.3. in Stokey (2008)
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Theorem 2 Let X be a (µ,σ2) Brownian motion with initial condition x ∈ [b,B].
Let τ be the stopping time τ = min[τb, τB], and r > 0. If σ2 > 0, then
∂{Ex[e−rτ |X (τ) = B]Px (X (τ) = B)}
∂r
< 0.
Proof 24 First. notice that
∂R1
∂r
= − 1√
µ2 + 2rσ2
and
∂R2
∂r
=
1√
µ2 + 2rσ2
.
After some algebra, I can obtain
∂{Ex[e−rτ |X (τ) = B]Px (X (τ) = B)}
∂r
=
(
√
µ2 + 2rσ2)−1
[eR1b+R2B − eR1B+R2b]2 e
2R1b+R2(B+x) ·[
(1 − e−(R2−R2)(B+x−2b))(x − B) + (e−(R2−R1)(x−b) − e−(R2−R1)(B−b))(B + x − 2b)
]︸                                                                                                         ︷︷                                                                                                         ︸
≡ f (x)
.
Since e2R1b+R2(B+x) > 0, it is enough to show that f (x) < 0 for b < x < B. Notice
that f (B) = f (b) = 0. Now, I show that f (x) is a strictly convex function on
b < x < B. The second derivative of f (x) is
f ′′(x) = a2e−a(B+x−2b) (B − x) + a2e−a(x−b) (B + x − 2b) + 2a(e−a(B+x−2b)
− e−a(x−b)),
where a ≡ (R2 − R1) > 0. Since (B − b) > 0 and a > 0,
f ′′(x) = ae−a(x−b)[ae−a(B−b) (B − b) + 2e−a(B−b) − ae−a(B−b) (x − b)
+ a(B + x − 2b) − 2]
> ae−a(x−b)[2 − a(B − b) − ae−a(B−b) (x − b) + a(B + x − 2b) − 2]
= ae−a(x−b)a(x − b)(1 − e−a(B−b)) > 0.
Theorem 3 2 Let X be a (µ,σ2) Brownian motion with initial condition x ∈ [b,B],
and let τ be the stopping time τ = min[τb, τB]. If σ2 > 0, then
Px (X (τ) = b) =
e−δB − e−δx
e−δB − e−δb ,
Px (X (τ) = B) =
e−δx − e−δb
e−δB − e−δb , if µ , 0,
2Proposition 5.4. in Stokey (2008)
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where δ ≡ 2µ/σ2, and
Px (X (τ) = b) =
B − x
B − b ,
Px (X (τ) = B) =
x − b
B − b , if µ = 0.
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Derivation of the Simple Example
Consider a strategy profile (sˆ) of the following form:
• An agent with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursues the high-paying career.
• An agent with ability θ < θ̂ participates in the labor market of the low-paying
career paths.
If an agent with ability θ̂ pursues the high-paying career, then her expected utility
would be
E[u(·) |(si (θ̂) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] =
3∑
j=2
(
3
j
)
θ̂ j (1 − θ̂)3− ju(H4− j )
+
1∑
j=0
(
3
j
)
θ̂ j (1 − θ̂)3− ju(OH )
= −2θ̂3 + 6θ̂2.
If this agent pursues the low-paying career, her expected utility would be
E[u(·) |(si (θ̂) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))] = u(L1) = 3
since she is the best candidate in the labor market of the low-paying career paths if
she chooses to pursue the low-paying career. In order for θ̂ to be the equilibrium
cut-off, the two expected utilities must have the same value. Hence,
−2θ̂3 + 6θ̂2 = 3.
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Now, if an agent with ability θ ∈ [0,< θ̂) pursues the high-paying career, her
expected utility would be
E[u(·) |(si (θ) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i ))] =
3∑
j=2
(
3
j
)
(θ̂ − P (θ, θ̂)) j (1 − θ̂ + P (θ, θ̂))3− ju(H4− j )
+
3∑
j=2
(
3
j
)
(θ̂ − P (θ, θ̂)) j (1 − θ̂ + P (θ, θ̂))3− ju(OH )
= −2θ̂3 + 6θ̂2 + 6θ̂2P (θ, θ̂) − 6θ̂P (θ, θ̂)2 − 12θ̂P (θ, θ̂)
+ 6P (θ, θ̂)2 + 2P (θ, θ̂)3,
where P (θ, θ̂) = ∫ θ̂
θ
f (x)g(x)dx =
∫ θ̂
θ
g(x)dx. On the other hand, if this agent
decides to attend the other labor market, her expected utility would be
E[u(·) |(si (θ) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i ))] =
1∑
j=0
(
3
j
)
(θ̂ − θ − P (θ, θ̂)) j (1 − θ̂ + P (θ, θ̂) + θ)3− ju(L j+1)
+
1∑
j=0
(
3
j
)
(θ̂ − θ − P (θ, θ̂)) j (1 − θ̂ + P (θ, θ̂) + θ)3− ju(OL )
= 3 − 6θ̂ + 3θ̂2 − 6θ̂θ + 6θ + 3θ2 + 6P (θ, θ̂) − 6θ̂P (θ, θ̂)
+ 6θP (θ, θ̂) + 3P (θ, θ̂)2.
Equating these equations gives the equilibrium strategy.
C.2 Proofs
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 23
Consider a strategy profile (sˆ) of the following form:
• An agent with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursues the high-paying career.
• An agent with ability θ < θ̂ participates in the labor market of the low-paying
career paths.
I show that this strategy can not be an equilibrium. When agents follow this strategy,
the expected utility of an agent with ability θ̂ is
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ̂) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− ju(Hn− j )
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− ju(OH )
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if she pursues the high-paying career.
However, if she participates in the other labor market, her expected utility would be
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ̂) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))] = u(L1).
Therefore, the difference in the expected utility of an agent with ability θ̂ between
pursuing the high-paying career and the low-paying career is
D̂(θ̂) ≡ E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] − E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))]
when agents follow the pure strategy profile, sˆ, where I use the hat notation to
clarify that this difference depends on the strategy profile sˆ through θ̂.
Then, D̂(θ̂) = u(H1) − u(L1) > 0 when θ̂ = θ¯ and D̂(θ̂) = u(∅) − u(L1) < 0 if
θ̂ = θ. Now, I show that ∂D̂/∂θ̂ > 0 for θ̂ ∈ (θ, θ¯). This implies that there is a
unique θ̂ such that D̂(θ̂) = 0. Note that
∂D̂(θ̂)
∂θ̂
= f (θ̂)

I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂))I−2− ju(GI− j )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂))I−2− ju(OH )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
 .
First, notice that
lim
θ̂ ↓ θ
∂D̂(θ̂)
∂θ̂
= 0 and lim
θ̂ ↑θ¯
∂D̂(θ̂)
∂θ̂
= (n − 1) f (U)(u(H1) − u(H2)) > 0.
For θ̂ such that k−1I−1 < F (θ̂) ≤ kI−1 , k = 1,2, . . . , I − 2 and I−2I−1 < F (θ̂) < 1,
∂D̂(θ̂)
∂θ̂
= f (θ̂)

I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂)) I−2− ju(HI− j )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂)) I−2− ju(OH )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]

>
f (θ̂)
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))
u(H˜k )

I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂)) I−1− j [ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂)) I−1− j [ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]

=
f (θ̂)
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))
u(Hk )[(I − 1)F (θ̂) − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
= 0,
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where
u(H˜k ) =

u(Hk ) if k ≤ n
u(OH ) if k > n
.
Therefore, there is a unique θ < θ̂∗ < θ¯ such that D̂(θ̂∗) = 0. However, if agents
use this strategy, an agent with ability θ ∈ [θ, θ̂∗) has an incentive to deviate. In
particular, if she follows this strategy, her expected utility is strictly less than u(L1).
However, if she pursues the high-paying career instead, her expected utility would
be u(L1) since her expected utility when she pursue the high-paying career is ex-
actly the same as an agent with ability θ̂∗. Hence, there is no symmetric pure strat-
egy equilibrium in the form of sˆ. Also, for any other form of pure strategy, there is
no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium by the same logic.
C.2.2 Proof of Proposition 24
Consider a strategy profile (sˆ) of the following form:
• An agent with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursues the high-paying career with probability
one.
• An agent with ability θ < θ̂ pursue the high-paying career with probability
g(θ).
Also, recall that
P (a,b) ≡
(∫ b
a
f (θ)g(θ)dθ
)
, and Q(a,b) ≡
(∫ b
a
f (θ)(1 − g(θ))dθ
)
.
If an agent with ability θ̂ pursues the high-paying career, her expected utility would
be
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ̂) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(OH ).
Clearly, if she participates in the other labor market, her expected utility would be
u(L1).
143
Now, if an agent with ability θ ∈ [L, θ̂) pursues the high-paying career, her expected
utility is equal to
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))]
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(OH ).
However, if she decides to participate in the other labor market, her expected utility
would be
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))]
=
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(OL).
Recall that the function D(·) is
D(θ) = E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] − E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))].
Proof 25 (Proof of Claim 1) If θ̂ = θ, D(θ) = u(OH ) − u(L1) < 0. Hence, θ̂ > θ.
Proof 26 (Proof of Claim 2) For θ ≤ θ < θ̂, the difference between the two ac-
tions is
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(OH )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(OL).
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Consider the case where θ = θ. Then,
D(θ) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(OH )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(OL).
Note that D(θ) = u(OH ) − u(L1) < 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = 0, and D(θ) = u(H1) −
u(OL) > 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = 1. For 0 < Q(θ, θ̂) < 1, the differential of this difference
with respect to Q(θ, θ̂) is
∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ, θ̂)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(HI− j )[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(OH )[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)]
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(OL)[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)].
I define a pseudo-utility function U (·) by
U (Hi) =

u(HI−i) if I − n ≤ i ≤ I − 1
u(OH ) if 0 ≤ i < I − n,
and U (Li) =

u(OL) if m ≤ i ≤ I − 1
u(Li+1) if 0 ≤ i < m.
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Using this function, I can rewrite ∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ,̂θ) as
∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ, θ̂)
=
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))

I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jU (H j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− j
− (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U (H j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− j
−
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jU (L j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− j
+(I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U (L j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− j

>
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))
{
E[J]E[U (HJ )] − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (HJ )]
−E[J]E[U (LJ )] + (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (LJ )]
}
=
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))
{
(I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (HJ )] − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (HJ )]
−(I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (LJ )] + (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (LJ )]
}
= 0,
where
E[J] =
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jQ(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j
E[U (HJ )] =
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U (H j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j , and
E[U (LJ )] =
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U (L j )Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j .
The above inequality holds since the function U (H j ) is an increasing function in
j, U (L j ) is a decreasing function in j, and 0 < Q(θ, θ̂) < 1. This implies that
E[JU (HJ )] > E[J]E[U (HJ )] and E[JU (LJ )] < E[J]E[U (LJ )]
Therefore, there exists a unique value of Q(θ, θ̂) such that D(θ) = 0. I denote this
value by Q∗ ∈ (0,1).
Proof 27 (Proof of Claim 3) I have already shown that Q(θ, θ̂) has a unique value
Q∗ in equilibrium. Therefore, it suffices to show that there exists a unique θ̂ such
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that D(θ̂) = 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗. Note that
D(θ̂) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(OH ) − u(L1).
This difference has the value u(H1) − u(L1) > 0 when F (θ̂) = 1, and
D(θ̂) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗) j (1 − Q∗)I−1− ju(L j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗) j (1 − Q∗)I−1− ju(OL) − u(L1) < 0
when F (θ̂) = Q∗.1
The differential of this difference with respect to F (θ̂) is
∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j−1F (θ̂)I−2− ju(H j+1)[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ̂)) − j]
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j−1F (θ̂)I−2− ju(OH )[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ̂)) − j].
Using the pseudo-utility function I defined before, the above equation can be rewrit-
ten as
∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
=
1
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− jU (H j )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
>
1
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))
{
E[J]E[U (HJ )] − (I − 1)F (θ̂)E[U (HJ )]
}
=
1
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))
{
(I − 1)F (θ̂)E[U (HJ )] − (I − 1)F (θ̂)E[U (HJ )]
}
= 0.
Therefore, the differential of the difference is strictly greater than 0. Hence, there
exist a unique θ̂ and Q(θ, θ̂) such that D(θ̂) = 0 and D(θ) = 0. From now on, I
denote these unique θ̂, P (θ, θ̂), and Q(θ, θ̂) by θ̂∗, P (θ, θ̂∗), and Q(θ, θ̂∗) ≡ Q∗.
1Recall that Q∗ is the solution to the equation D(θ) = 0.
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Proof 28 (Proof of Claim 4) Consider an agent with ability θ ∈ (θ, θ̂∗). Recall
that
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j (F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j (F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(OH )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(OL).
Now, I show that there is a unique value of Q(θ, θ) such that D(θ) = 0. First, notice
that max{0,Q∗−F (θ̂)+F (θ)} ≤ Q(θ, θ) ≤ min{F (θ),Q∗} from P (θ, θ)+Q(θ, θ) =
F (θ) and Q(θ, θ) + Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗.
Consider the four possible boundaries. This shows that D(θ) has the value D(θ) >
0 whenQ(θ, θ) = max{0,Q∗−F (θ̂)+F (θ)} and D(θ) < 0 ifQ(θ, θ) = min{F (θ),Q∗}.
• Q(θ, θ) = 0: From D(θ) = 0,
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗) j (F (θ) + Q∗)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗) j (F (θ) + Q∗)I−1− ju(OH )
−
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − Q∗) j (Q∗)I−1− ju(H j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − Q∗) j (Q∗)I−1− ju(OH )
> 0.
The last inequality holds since u(H j+1) is a strictly decreasing function in j
and F (θ) > 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = Q∗ − F (θ̂) + F (θ):
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From D(θ̂) = 0,
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(OH )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ̂) − F (θ)) j (1 − F (θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ̂) − F (θ)) j (1 − F (θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(OL)
= u(L1) −
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ̂) − F (θ)) j (1 − F (θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ̂) − F (θ)) j (1 − F (θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(OL)
> 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = F (θ):
From D(θ) = 0,
D(θ) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗) j (1 − Q∗)I−1− ju(L j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗) j (1 − Q∗)I−1− ju(OL)
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − F (θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − F (θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + F (θ))I−1− ju(OL)
< 0.
The last inequality holds since u(H j+1) is a strictly decreasing function and
F (θ) > 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = Q∗:
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Then,
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ)) j F (θ)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ)) j F (θ)I−1− ju(OH ) − u(L1).
I have already shown that the differential of this equation is strictly greater
than zero in Claim 3. Since θ < θ̂, D(θ) < D(θ̂) = 0.
Remaining proof is to show that ∂D(θ)/∂Q(θ, θ) < 0. Define S(θ) := Q∗−Q(θ, θ).
Then, it suffices to prove ∂D(θ)/∂S(θ) > 0. The differential of the difference D(θ)
with respect to S(θ) is
∂D(θ)
∂S(θ)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) j−1(F (θ) + S(θ)) I−2− ju(H j+1)·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) − j]
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) j−1(F (θ) + S(θ)) I−2− ju(OH )·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) − j]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
S(θ) j−1(1 − S(θ)) I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)S(θ)]
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
S(θ) j−1(1 − S(θ)) I−2− ju(OL )[ j − (I − 1)S(θ)]
=
1
(F (θ) + S(θ))(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) ·
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + S(θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) I−1− jU (H j )·
[ j − (I − 1)(F (θ) + S(θ))]
− 1
S(θ)(1 − S(θ))
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
S(θ) j−1(1 − S(θ)) I−2− jU (L j )[ j − (I − 1)S(θ)]
>
1
(F (θ) + S(θ))(1 − F (θ) − S(θ)) ·
{E[J]E[U (HJ )] − (I − 1)(F (θ) + S(θ))E[U (HJ )]}
− 1
S(θ)(1 − S(θ)) {E[J]E[U (LJ )] − (I − 1)S(θ)E[U (LJ )]}
= 0.
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Hence, ∂D(θ)∂Q(θ,θ) < 0.
Therefore, by the Lebesgue Differentiation Theorem, the symmetric equilibrium
strategy g(θ) is unique among integrable functions.
C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 25
First, I derive g(θ). Recall that the equilibrium strategy g(θ) for θ ∈ [θ, θ̂) satisfies
0 =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j (F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j (F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(OH )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(OL).
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Differentiating this equation with respect to θ gives the following result:
0 = f (θ)g(θ)·
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j−1(F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(H j+1)·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) − j]
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j−1(F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(OH )·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) − j]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(L j+1)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
−
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(OL)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
}
+ f (θ)

m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(L j+1)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(OL)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
}
.
Aligning this equation gives
g(θ) = − 1
∂D(θ)
∂S(θ)

m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(L j+1)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ))I−2− ju(OL)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
}
.
From the proof of Claim 4, it can be easily shown that 0 < g(θ) < 1. Therefore,
g(θ) = − N (θ)M (θ) − N (θ) ,
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where
M (θ) ≡
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j−1(F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) I−2− ju(H j+1)·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) − j]
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) j−1(F (θ) + Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) I−2− ju(OH )·
[(I − 1)(1 − F (θ) − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) − j]
N (θ) ≡
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) I−2− ju(L j+1)·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))]
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ)) j−1(1 − Q∗ + Q(θ, θ)) I−2− ju(OL )·
[ j − (I − 1)(Q∗ − Q(θ, θ))].
Now, I prove the proposition. First, notice that g(θ) = 1 for θ ∈ [θ̂, θ¯] by Proposi-
tion 24. Therefore, it suffices to show that
lim
θ↑θ̂
g(θ) < 1.
Since
lim
θ↑θ̂
g(θ) = lim
θ↑θ̂
(
− N (θ)M (θ) − N (θ)
)
= − N (θ̂)
M (θ̂) − N (θ̂)
,
M (θ̂) − N (θ̂) > 0, and N (θ̂) < 0
, it is enough to show thatM (θ̂) > 0. Note thatM (θ̂) is the same as ∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
in Claim
3. Therefore,M (θ̂) > 0.
C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 26
Notice that D(θ) = 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗, and D(θ) = E[H ] − E[L] = 0 if
Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗ = mI . Hence, mI > (<) Q∗ if E[H ] > (<)E[L] since D(θ) is
an increasing function in Q(θ, θ̂). Moreover, the high-paying career path is more
(less) competitive than the low-paying career path if
I (1 − Q∗)
n
> (<)
IQ∗
m
.
This condition is equivalent to mI > (<) Q∗ when I = n + m.
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C.2.5 Proof of Proposition 27
Here, I only prove the case when I > n + m. The proof for the case when I = n + m
is similar to this proof. The proof for non-existence of symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium is similar to the proof of Proposition 23. Therefore, I skip the proof.
Again, consider a strategy profile (sˆ) of the following form:
• An agent with ability θ ≥ θ̂ pursues the high-paying career with probability
one.
• An agent with ability θ < θ̂ pursue the high-paying career with probability
g(θ).
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that u(OL) = u(∅) = 0 for brevity. Note
that if an agent with ability θ̂ pursues the high-paying career, her expected utility
would be :
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ̂) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i))] =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
n+m−1∑
j=n
n+m− j−1∑
i=0
(
I − 1
i, j, I − 1 − i − j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) jQ(θ, θ̂)iP (θ, θ̂)I−1−i− ju(Li+ j−n+1)
+
n+m−1∑
j=n
I−1− j∑
i=n+m− j
(
I − 1
i, j, I − 1 − i − j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) jQ(θ, θ̂)iP (θ, θ̂)I−1−i− ju(∅)
+
I−1∑
j=n+m
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(∅).
Clearly, if she participates in the other labor market, her expected utility would be
u(L1).
Now, if an agent with ability θ, L ≤ θ < θ̂, pursues the high-paying career, her
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expected utility has the following value:
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = H , sˆ−i (θ−i ))]
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
n+m−1∑
j=n
n+m− j−1∑
i=0
(
I − 1
i, j, I − 1 − i − j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) jQ(θ, θ̂)iP (θ, θ) I−1−i− j ·
u(Li+ j−n+1)
+
n+m−1∑
j=n
I−1− j∑
i=n+m− j
(
I − 1
i, j, I − 1 − i − j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) jQ(θ, θ̂)iP (θ, θ) I−1−i− ju(∅)
+
I−1∑
j=n+m
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂)) I−1− ju(∅).
However, if she decides to participate in the other labor market, her expected utility
would be
E[u(·) |(sˆi (θ) = L, sˆ−i (θ−i))]
=
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=m
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(∅).
Claim 12 The cut-off ability θ̂ is strictly greater than θ.
Proof 29 If θ̂ = θ, D(θ) = u(∅) − u(L1) < 0. Hence, θ̂ > θ.
Claim 13 There exists a unique value of Q(θ, θ̂) ∈ (0,1) such that D(θ) = 0.
Proof 30 For θ ∈ [θ, θ̂), the difference between two actions is
D(θ) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) j (F (θ) + Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
n+m−1∑
j=n
n+m− j−1∑
i=0
(
I − 1
i, j, I − 1 − i − j
)
(1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂)) jQ(θ, θ̂)iP (θ, θ)I−1−i− j ·
u(Li+ j−`+1)
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂) + P (θ, θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1).
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Consider the case when θ = θ. Then,
D(θ) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(Hn− j )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− ju(L j+1).
Note that D(θ) = −u(L1) < 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = 0 and D(θ) = u(H1) > 0 when
Q(θ, θ̂) = 1. Also, for Q(θ, θ̂) ∈ (0,1), the differential of this difference with respect
to Q(θ, θ̂) is
∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ, θ̂)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(HI− j )[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Q(θ, θ̂) j−1(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)].
Define a pseudo-utility function U (·) by
U (i) =

u(HI−i) if I − n ≤ i ≤ I
0 if m − 1 < i < I − n
−u(Li+1) if 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1.
Using this function, I can express ∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ,̂θ) as
∂D(θ)
∂Q(θ, θ̂)
=
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))

I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jU ( j)Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j
−(I − 1)
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U ( j)Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j

>
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))
{
E[J]E[U (J)] − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (J)]
}
=
1
Q(θ, θ̂)(1 − Q(θ, θ̂))
[
(I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (J)] − (I − 1)Q(θ, θ̂)E[U (J)]
]
= 0,
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where
E[J] =
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jQ(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j
E[U (J)] =
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
U ( j)Q(θ, θ̂) j (1 − Q(θ, θ̂))I−1− j .
The inequality holds since the function U ( j) is increasing function in j and 0 <
P (L, θ̂) < 1. This implies E[JU (J)] > E[J]E[U (J)].
Therefore, there exists a unique value of Q(θ, θ̂) ∈ (0,1) such that D(θ) = 0. From
now on, I denote this value by Q∗e .
Claim 14 There exist a unique θ̂ such that D(θ̂) = 0 and D(θ) = 0.
Proof 31 I have already shown that Q(θ, θ̂) has a unique value Q∗e . Therefore, it
suffices to show that there exists a unique θ̂ such that D(θ̂) = 0 when Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗e .
Note that
D(θ̂) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ̂) − Q∗e ) j (Q∗e )i (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− j−i ·
u(LI−n− j ) − u(L1),
where u(LI−n− j ) = 0 if I−n− j > m. This difference has the value u(H1)−u(L1) > 0
when F (θ̂) = 1, and
D(θ̂) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − Q∗e ) j (Q∗e )I−1− ju(H j+1) − u(L1)
=
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗e ) j (1 − Q∗e )I−1− ju(L j+1) − u(L1) < 0
when F (θ̂) = Q∗e .2
2Recall that Q∗e is the solution to the equation D(θ) = 0.
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The differential of this difference with respect to F (θ̂) is
∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂))I−2− ju(HI− j )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ̂) − Q∗e ) j−1(Q∗e )i (1 − F (θ̂))I−2− j−i ·
u(LI−n− j )[ j (1 − F (θ̂)) + ( j + i)(F (θ̂) − Q∗e ) − (I − 1)(F (θ̂) − Q∗e )].
Now, I show that ∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
> 0 for F (θ̂) ∈ (Q∗e ,1). The differentiation can be expressed
as
∂D(θ̂)
∂F (θ̂)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂))I−2− ju(HI− j )[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− j
(F (θ̂) − Q∗e )(1 − F (θ̂))
j∑
i=0
(
j
i
)  F (θ̂) − Q∗eF (θ̂)


i ( Q∗e
F (θ̂)
) j−i
·
u(LI−n−i, θ̂)[i(1 − F (θ̂)) + j (F (θ̂) − Q∗e ) − (I − 1)(F (θ̂) − Q∗e )]
>
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j−1(1 − F (θ̂))I−2− ju(HI− j , θ̂)[ j − (I − 1)F (θ̂)]
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− j
(F (θ̂) − Q∗e )(1 − F (θ̂))
{(1 − F (θ̂))E[A j]E[u(A j )]
+ j (F (θ̂) − Q∗e )E[u(A j )] − (I − 1)(F (θ̂) − Q∗e )E[u(A j )]}
=
1
F (θ̂)(1 − F (θ̂))

I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
jF (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− jUe( j)
−(I − 1)F (θ̂)
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− jUe( j, θ̂)

> 0,
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where
E[A j] =
(
j
i
)
j

 F (θ̂) − Q∗eF (θ̂)


i ( Q∗e
F (θ̂)
) j−i
,
E[u(A j )] =
(
j
i
)  F (θ̂) − Q∗eF (θ̂)


i ( Q∗e
F (θ̂)
) j−i
u(LI−n−i), and
Ue( j) =

u(HI− j , θ) if j ≥ I − n
E[u(A j )] otherwise
.
The last inequality holds since Ue( j) is a increasing function in j and 0 < F (θ̂) < 1.
Therefore, the differential of the difference is strictly greater than 0. Hence, there
exist a unique θ̂ and Q(θ, θ̂) such that D(θ̂) = 0 and D(θ) = 0.
Claim 15 For given θ̂ and Q(θ, θ̂), there is a unique Q(θ, θ) satisfying D(θ) = 0
for θ ∈ (θ, θ̂).
Proof 32 Consider an agents with ability θ ∈ (θ, θ̂∗). Recall that
D(θ) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Q∗e − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Q∗e + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ) − Q(θ, θ)) j (Q∗e )i ·
(1 − F (θ) − Q∗e + Q(θ, θ))I−1− j−iu(LI−n− j )
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗e − Q(θ, θ)) j (1 − Q∗e + Q(θ, θ))I−1− ju(L j+1).
Now, I show that there is a unique Q(θ, θ) such that D(θ) = 0. First, notice that
max{0,Q∗e−F (θ̂)+F (θ)} ≤ Q(θ, θ) ≤ min{F (θ),Q∗e } from P (θ, θ)+Q(θ, θ) = F (θ)
and Q(θ, θ) + Q(θ, θ̂) = Q∗e .
The difference D(θ) has a positive value when Q(θ, θ) = max{0,Q∗e −F (θ̂)+F (θ)},
and a negative value when Q(θ, θ) = min{F (θ),Q∗e }.
• Q(θ, θ) = 0: From D(θ) = 0,
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D(θ) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Q∗e ) j (1 − F (θ) − Q∗e )I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
F (θ) j (Q∗e )i ·
(1 − F (θ))I−1− j−iu(LI−n− j )
−
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗e ) j (1 − Q∗e )I−1− ju(HI− j )
> 0.
The inequality holds since the second summation is greater than 0 and the
first summation is strictly greater than the last summation because F (θ) > 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = Q∗e − F (θ̂) + F (θ): From D(θ̂) = 0,
D(θ) = u(L1) −
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ̂) − F (θ)) j (1 − F (θ̂) + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
> 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = F (θ): From D(θ) = 0,
D(θ) =
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗e ) j (1 − Q∗e )I−1− ju(L j+1)
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(Q∗e − F (θ)) j (1 − Q∗e + F (θ))I−1− ju(L j+1)
< 0.
The inequality holds since F (θ) > 0.
• Q(θ, θ) = Q∗e: From D(θ̂) = 0,
D(θ) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ) j (1 − F (θ))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ) − Q∗e ) j (Q∗e )i ·
(1 − F (θ))I−1− j−iu(LI−n− j ) − u(L1) < 0
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since F (θ) < F (θ̂).
Remaining proof is to show that ∂D(θ)/∂Q(θ, θ) < 0. Define Se(θ) := Q∗e−Q(θ, θ).
Then, it suffices to show that ∂D(θ)/∂Se(θ) > 0. The differentiation of the difference
D(θ) with respect to Se(θ) is
∂D(θ)
∂Se (θ)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Se (θ)) j−1(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−2− ju(HI− j )·
[ j − (I − 1)(F (θ) + Se (θ))]
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ)) j−1(Q∗e )i ·
(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−2− j−iu(L I−n− j )
[ j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) + ( j + i)(F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ)) − (I − 1)(F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ))]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Se (θ) j−1(1 − Se (θ)) I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Se (θ)]
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Se (θ)) j−1(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−2− ju(HI− j )·
[ j − (I − 1)(F (θ) + Se (θ))]
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Se (θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−1− j
(F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ))(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) ·
j∑
i=0
(
j
i
) (
F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ)
F (θ) + Se (θ)
) i ( Q∗e
F (θ) + Se (θ)
) j−i
u(L I−n−i )·
[i(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) + j (F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ)) − (I − 1)(F (θ) − Q∗e + Se (θ))]
−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Se (θ) j−1(1 − Se (θ)) I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Se (θ)]
>
1
(F (θ) + Se (θ))(1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) ·
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
j (F (θ) + Se (θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−1− jU˜e ( j)
− (I − 1)(F (θ) + Se (θ))
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Se (θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−1− jU˜e ( j)

−
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Se (θ) j−1(1 − Se (θ)) I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Se (θ)],
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where
U˜e( j) =

u(HI− j ) if j ≥ I − n
E[u(B j )] otherwise
with
E[u(B j )] =
j∑
i=0
(
j
i
) (
F (θ) − Q∗e + Se(θ)
F (θ) + Se(θ)
) i ( Q∗e
F (θ) + Se(θ)
) j−i
u(LI−n−i).
The summation
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
j (F (θ) + Se (θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−1− jU˜e ( j)
− (I − 1)(F (θ) + Se (θ))
I−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(F (θ) + Se (θ)) j (1 − F (θ) − Se (θ)) I−1− jU˜e ( j)

is strictly greater than zero since U˜e( j) is a increaing function in j and 0 < F (θ) +
Se(θ) < 1. Also, the summation
m−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
Se(θ) j−1(1 − Se(θ))I−2− ju(L j+1)[ j − (I − 1)Se(θ)]
is strictly less than zero since u(L j+1) is a strictly decreasing function in j and
0 < Se(θ) < 1.
Hence, ∂D(θ)∂Q(θ,θ) < 0.
Therefore, by the Lebesgue Differentiation Theorem, the symmetric equilibrium
strategy g(θ) is unique among integrable functions.
C.2.6 Proof of Proposition 28
Note that θ̂ satisfies :
D(θ̂) =
n−1∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(H j+1)
+
I−1∑
j=n
(
I − 1
j
)
(1 − F (θ̂)) j F (θ̂)I−1− ju(OH ) − u(L1) = 0,
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and θ̂e satisfies :
D(θ̂e) =
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
I−1−n− j∑
i=0
(
I − 1
j, i, I − 1 − j − i
)
(F (θ̂e) − Q∗e ) j (Q∗e )i (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− j−i ·
u(LI−n− j ) − u(L1)
=
I−1∑
j=I−n
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− ju(HI− j )
+
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂))I−1− j E[u(A j )] − u(L1) = 0.
Since
0 <
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− j E[u(A j )]
<
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− ju(Hn),
there exists a unique 0 < K < u(Hn) such that
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− j E[u(A j )]
=
I−1−n∑
j=0
(
I − 1
j
)
F (θ̂e) j (1 − F (θ̂e))I−1− jK .
Hence, if u(OH ) = K , D(θ̂) = D(θ̂e) = 0 with θ̂ = θ̂e. Moreover, if u(OH ) >
(<) K , D(θ̂) > (<) D(θ̂e) = 0 when θ̂ = θ̂e. Since D(θ̂) is a strictly increasing
function in θ̂, the equilibrium cut-off ability θ̂ < (>) θ̂e if u(OH ) > (<) K .
